

# The Fitna Awakens

*A study of two Palestinian newspapers' coverage of  
the intra-Palestinian power struggle in May and June  
2007*

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ARA 4590

Master Thesis in Arabic Language (60 credits)

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November 2010

## Abstract

During May and June 2007, the occupied Palestinian territories witnessed serious domestic fighting as a result of the power struggle between the two leading political parties, Fataḥ and Ḥamās. The fighting left hundreds of Palestinians dead and ultimately led to the split between a Fataḥ-controlled West Bank and a Ḥamās-controlled Gaza Strip that still remains at the time of writing.

This thesis examines how three significant events in this power struggle were represented in the news reports of two Palestinian newspaper with different political affiliations, namely the Fataḥ-affiliated *al-Ḥayāt al-jadīda* and the Ḥamās-affiliated *Filasṭīn*. Through combining social and textual analysis, based on the theoretical and methodological framework of critical discourse analysis, I examine how the apparently neutral news reports still carry ideological meaning. My findings show that different choices in linguistic expression such as transitivity and lexicon have a major impact on how the two newspapers represent different aspects of the events, and by referring to the wider political and sociocultural context surrounding the reports, I find that these representations clearly reflect each paper's respective political affiliations. As the interests of the respective political parties change according to developments in the political and social conditions, the choices in linguistic expression in the news reports also change, resulting in a move from a relatively conform representation in the coverage of the first of the events, to more diversified and conflict-orientated representations of the two later events.

## **Acknowledgements**

I would first and foremost like to thank my supervisor, Professor Gunvor Mejdell, for always being enthusiastic and supportive of the project, and for giving constructive and invaluable feedback throughout the work on this thesis.

Many thanks to family and friends for continued support throughout what sometimes must have seemed like ever-lasting studies. A special thanks also to my fellow students of Arabic and Middle Eastern studies for good company in the reading room and on travels across the Middle East during the last years.

Finally, my most profound thanks goes to Cecilie for her endless support, encouragement and patience.

## A note on transliteration and translation

Transliteration has been kept at a minimum in this thesis, and all examples taken from the newspaper texts which are used in the analysis are written in Arabic with the English translation in brackets beneath it. The aim of the English translations have been to retain as much of the effects of the linguistic choices of the original text as possible, and not necessarily to write idiomatically correct English.

All proper names that occur in the text are, however, fully transliterated (except names of authors and works used for reference), using the following system:

ء	’	د	d	ض	ḍ	ك	k
ب	b	ذ	dh	ط	ṭ	ل	l
ت	t	ر	r	ظ	ẓ	م	m
ث	th	ز	z	ع	‘	ن	n
ج	j	س	s	غ	gh	ه	h
ح	ḥ	ش	sh	ف	f	و	w
خ	kh	ص	ṣ	ق	q	ي	y

Short vowels: a, u, i

Long vowels: ā, ū, ī

Diphtongs: aw and ay

The definite article: al- (will not be assimilated)

Tā’ marbūṭa: -a (in plausal form) / -at (in iḍāfa)

Nisba-ending: -ī (masc) / -iyya (fem)

Hamza: will not be written word initially



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## Introduction

During the summer of 2007, the international media's attention was directed at the Palestinian territories once again. This time however, the reason was not the enduring Israeli-Palestinian conflict, but rather internal fighting between Palestinian factions. Ḥamās had won the elections for the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) the year before, but the ruling Fataḥ party lead by President Maḥmūd 'Abbās (Abū Māzen) was not willing to give up power without a struggle. Open fighting between members of the two factions occurred regularly throughout the Palestinian territories, and reached its peak in June 2007 when Ḥamās seized control of the headquarters of the Fataḥ-controlled security apparatus in the Gaza strip. Since then, the territories have been divided between the Fataḥ-controlled West Bank and the Ḥamās-controlled Gaza Strip. Attempts at unity talks have failed time and time again, and the power struggle between the two groups has continued with full effect. The two groups have not only fought in the streets of the Palestinian territories with weapons and violence, but also in the media. In April 2008, the *Al-Jazeera* TV channel dedicated one of their weekly programmes, *Listening Post*, to what they called the “equally fierce propaganda battle” taking place between Fataḥ and Ḥamās, in which they claimed that “a media war [...] is being conducted in the Palestinian territories and has had serious consequences with both groups attempting to use television programs and news bulletins to their political advantage”<sup>1</sup>. Almost a year earlier, international media had informed that what was described as the “first pro-Ḥamās Palestinian newspaper” had been launched in the Gaza Strip, bearing the name *Filasṭīn* (Palestine)<sup>2</sup>. According to the Reuters report on the event, the launch of this newspaper should be seen as a response by Ḥamās to the Fataḥ domination of Palestinian media.

When living for 18 months in the West Bank city of Hebron working for an international organisation, I had the chance to observe both how the power struggle between the two major Palestinian factions materialised itself on the streets, often including open fighting and violence, and how the media covered the events. My attention was drawn to how newspapers with different political affiliations often gave different representations of events related to the power struggle, and how these representations, while appearing to be neutral, seemingly served the purpose of legitimising the actions of one party in the conflict and at the same time delegitimise the actions of the other party.

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1 <http://english.aljazeera.net/programmes/listeningpost/2008/04/200861505544856326.html>, accessed 23.02.2009.

2 <http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/L03613675.htm>, accessed 25.02.2009

The aim of this thesis is therefore to show how different choices in linguistic expression made by the author(s) contribute to ideological meaning being expressed in such seemingly neutral newspaper reports. For this purpose, I have chosen to analyse and compare texts taken from the Fataḥ-affiliated *al-Ḥayāt al-jadīda* and the Ḥamās-affiliated *Filasṭīn*, covering three of the most significant events of intra-Palestinian fighting that took place in May and June 2007. The theoretical and methodological framework of my study will be discourse analysis, following especially the analytical framework developed under the umbrella of critical discourse analysis (CDA).

## 1. Background

The theoretical and methodological background of discourse analysis will be outlined in chapter 2, but I will already now establish that discourse analysis involves examining the sociocultural context of the discourse that is to be analysed. This includes the historical, political and economical conditions. In this chapter I will therefore firstly provide an outline of the historical background of Fataḥ and Ḥamās, in order to present the roots of their different ideologies and strategies, and the background for their different positions in the Palestinian nationalist cause. I will secondly give a short summary of the main events of the power struggle between the two groups following the Ḥamās victory in the 2006 elections, leading up to today's situation in the Palestinian territories. The last part of the chapter will focus on the Palestinian media situation, including a presentation of each of the two newspapers from which the texts used for analysis are taken from.

### 1.1 Fataḥ

The origins of what was to be known as *Ḥarakat al-Taḥrīr al-Waṭanī al-Filasṭīnī* (the Palestinian National Liberation Movement), Fataḥ, is to be found in the Palestinian student activist groups that emerged throughout the Arab world in the beginning of the 1950's. At that time, Arab nationalism and pan-Arabism were the dominant ideas in the region, with the goal of re-establishing Arab power and to get rid of the influence from the Western colonialist powers. Palestinian nationalism as a distinct movement did not exist, as the pre-1948 Palestinian nationalist leadership had been shattered during the war of 1947-49, and was dispersed. Most of the Palestinian refugees therefore turned to the pan-Arab movements and the Muslim Brotherhood to find support for their cause, the liberation of their homeland (Butenschøn, 2008:346). The concern of many of the younger activists, who were to become

the leaders of a new generation of Palestinian nationalist/resistance organisations, was that these movements regarded the liberation of Palestine as just a part of the higher goal of achieving Arab unity. This new generation of Palestinian nationalists insisted that the liberation of Palestine had to be the main priority, and that Arab unity then maybe could be achieved as a result of that at a later stage. “Palestine first” was their slogan, and they were ready to start an armed resistance against Israel without waiting for the Arab regimes, which under the lead of the Egyptian President Nāṣir did not wish to engage in a military battle with Israel without being certain of a successful result. In Cairo, Yāsir ‘Arafāt, leader of the Palestinian Students’ Union, and his fellow student, Ṣalāḥ Khalaf, were the main propagators of this “Palestine first” strategy, but the same ideas also won support among youth across the Palestinian Diaspora.

After the Suez-War of 1956, ‘Arafāt and Khalaf ended up in Kuwait where there was a huge Palestinian community, and where they came in contact with groups that shared their view on the Palestinian cause. It is in this environment that the creation of Fataḥ took place. It is not possible to point at a specific date or year when Fataḥ was officially founded since it took more the shape of a merging of different groups and individuals with a shared view and agenda. Khalaf, however, sets the founding date to be 10 October 1959, stating that this was the day when “a small group of us met in a discreet house in Kuwait to hammer out the organisational structures of Fateh [ sic]” (Cobban, 1984:23). Another of the founders, Khālīd al-Ḥassan, claims on his part that the final merging of individual groups into the Fataḥ organisation did not take place until 1962 with a conference held in Kuwait (ibid.:23-24). An important factor in the establishment of the Fataḥ organisation was the launch of a magazine called *Filasṭīnūnā* (Our Palestine) in 1959, which was published in Beirut under the leadership of Khalīl Wazīr (Abū Jihād). The magazine became an important tool in the process of spreading their ideas and gain support in the Palestinian refugee camps throughout the Arab world, showing already then the importance of the written media as a tool to carry ideological meaning. According to Cobban (ibid.:24), the Fataḥ organisation was established upon agreeing on five main principles that since have remained at the basis of the organisation:

1. The common goal of liberating Palestine
2. The need for armed struggle to obtain this goal
3. Reliance on Palestinian self-organisation
4. Co-operation with friendly Arab forces
5. Co-operation with friendly international forces

Interestingly, especially in relation to the ongoing struggle with Ḥamās, most of the early leadership of Fataḥ had connections to the Muslim Brotherhood, out of which its main

political rival would emerge several years later. According to Butenschön (2008:349), however, these leaders' attraction towards the Brotherhood was mainly due to the movement's opposition to the existing Arab regimes and its somewhat militant line against Israel rather than its religious significance. When Fataḥ was established, it was therefore along a secular line with the aim of gathering Palestinians across religious and political lines for the battle of liberating their homeland (ibid.). In 1967, the secular standing of the organisation was further underlined as the Central Committee changed the formulation of the final goal from “the liberation of Palestine”, to “the establishment of a secular, democratic state” in Palestine (Cobban, 1984:16). The name Fataḥ, which is the reversed acronym of Ḥarakat al-Tahrīr al-Waṭanī al-Filasṭīnī has somewhat religious affiliations. The natural acronym of the name would have been HATAF, but since this has the meaning “death” in Arabic, the founders probably found the reverse Fataḥ to be more appropriate. Fataḥ has the meaning “opening”, “conquest”, “triumph” or “victory” and appears several times in the Quran.

Fataḥ began their military campaign against Israel in January 1965 with an unsuccessful attack on water installations in the Galilee region through its first military wing named *al-‘Āṣifa* (the storm), and was soon to become the most powerful organisation within the Palestinian resistance movement. This was much due to the devastating defeat of the Arab armies in the Six-Day War of 1967, which left the Arab world in an ideological crisis. Fataḥ and Yāsir ‘Arafāt, who at that time had become the leading figure of the organisation, used the defeat to gather support among the broad line of Palestinians for its own agenda of guerrilla fighting against Israel. The 1967 War also paved the way for Fataḥ to gain control over the Palestinian Liberation Organisation, PLO, which had been established in May 1964. The establishment of the PLO was initiated at the first Arab League meeting in Cairo in January 1964 where 13 Arab state leaders were gathered and where “[t]he necessary practical decisions were taken... in the field of organising the Palestinian people and enabling them to play their role in the liberation of their country and their self-determination” (Cobban, 1984:29). The Palestinian representative to the meeting, Ahmad Shuqayrī, was given the task of organising the practical steps. In May the same year, 422 Palestinian representatives were gathered in Jerusalem where they established the PLO with the Palestinian National Council, PNC, as its highest organ, and with an Executive Committee that was to function like a cabinet between the sessions of the PNC. An army called the Palestinian Liberation Army, PLA, was also established, organised as divisions under the armed forces of each Arab state. ‘Arafāt and the Fataḥ leaders were sceptical to the establishment of PLO at first, and regarded it as an attempt by Egypt to control the Palestinian resistance. However, when the Arab states failed in their military campaign against Israel, they were ready to take over the control of the organisation together with a coalition of other groups that followed the same guerrilla line, such as the Popular Front for

the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) which had been established in 1967. In February 1969, Fataḥ took over the Executive Committee and Yāsir ‘Arafāt was elected Chairman. Fataḥ’s grip on the Palestinian nationalist movement was thus secured, and has continued until today. A point underlining this is that the current Palestinian President and Chairman of the PLO Maḥmūd ‘Abbās, also was among the founding fathers of Fataḥ in Kuwait in the late 1950’s.

Through continued guerrilla activities against Israel, Fataḥ grew increasingly strong and brought about a wave of Palestinian nationalist sentiment. Especially important in gaining popularity among the Palestinians was the battle of the Jordanian village of *Karāma* in March 1968. Fataḥ had established a command centre in the village and Israel launched an attack aimed at driving them out. Despite the enormous superiority of the Israelis concerning number of troops and equipment, the Fataḥ fighters were able to inflict relatively heavy losses on them with support from the Jordanian army, before in the end being forced out (ibid.:42). The symbolic effect of the fight put up by the Fataḥ fighters was tremendous as it showed to the disillusioned Arab world that armed resistance was possible, and consequently thousands of people applied to join Fataḥ, and money poured into the organisation (Yapp 1996:304). Even King Hussein himself declared after the battle “we shall all be *fedayeen* [sic]” (Cobban 1984:48). The increasing popularity of Fataḥ and its allied guerrilla groups became a threat to the Jordanian rulers, and despite Fataḥ’s core ideology stating non-intervention into other Arab states’ internal matters, they were in 1970 thrown into open confrontations with the Jordanian security forces (ibid.: 15). During what was to be known as ‘Black September’, King Hussein’s troops launched an offensive against the guerrilla groups and the Palestinian refugee camps, which in the end lead to Fataḥ and the other guerrilla groups pulling out of Jordan and re-establish themselves in Lebanon.

The Fataḥ leadership tried hard not to get involved in the civil war that broke out in Lebanon in 1975 in line with their core ideology of not involving themselves in the internal affairs of Arab states. Instead, they sought to focus on their guerrilla warfare against Israel, carried out from the southern parts of Lebanon, which in that period gained the name ‘Fataḥland’. In 1976, however, ‘Arafāt was not able to keep his Fataḥ fighters out of the fighting after the Lebanese Christian militias laid siege on two major Palestinian refugee camps in Beirut, and Fataḥ and the PLO was thrown into the war at full strength (Fisk 2001:79).

Strategically, Fataḥ had at this stage taken a new stand, which was to have a great impact on the future of the Palestinian nationalist cause. By embracing the idea of the creation of a Palestinian ‘mini-state’ in the West Bank and Gaza, they showed for the first time that they could be ready to pursue a peaceful settlement of the conflict. At the twelfth PNC meeting held in Cairo in the summer of 1974, the PLO agreed upon a ten-point programme, which

included a point stating that “[t]he PLO will struggle by every means, the foremost of which is armed struggle, to liberate Palestinian land and to establish the people’s national, independent and fighting sovereignty on every part of Palestinian land to be liberated” (Cobban 1984:62). Implicit in this point is the recognition of a possible two-state solution with a future Palestinian state alongside Israel on any land liberated, if only as a starting point from where to later seek liberation for the whole of Palestine. This new formulation was controversial and Fataḥ and the DFLP were the two main groups that pushed it through. Soon after, PFLP and three other groups pulled out of the PLO Executive Committee in protest and formed the ‘Rejection Front’. The articulation of this new goal helped ‘Arafāt and the PLO win recognition in diplomatic circles, both in the Arab world and internationally. At the Arab Summit in October the same year, the Arab states recognised PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, and in November, ‘Arafāt held his famous speech at the UN, and the PLO was granted observer status at the organisation. The first move had thus been made by Fataḥ and the PLO towards adapting a more diplomatic line, and moving in a direction away from its initial line of gaining results purely through guerilla warfare on Palestinian land itself. Other groups, like Ḥamās, were later to build much of their popularity on opposing this direction taken by Fataḥ. It was, however, still many years before the diplomatic line was to result in the setting up of a Palestinian national authority, as the diplomatic line in the following years was set back by several factors, among them the PLO’s refusal to accept the UN resolution 242 as the USA demanded, the Likud climbing to power in Israel and the Camp David agreement between Egypt and Israel in 1978.

Meanwhile in Lebanon, Fataḥ and other guerrilla groups were still caught up in fighting, and in 1982, Israel invaded the country in order to crush the Palestinian guerrillas. The invading army advanced all the way to Beirut where it enclosed the Western part of the city which was under Palestinian control. Following continued attacks on the city during the siege, the Palestinian leaders had no choice but to engage in negotiations about an evacuation of its troops, and on 21 August, the first PLO fighters were evacuated out of Beirut harbour (ibid.:124). Nine days later, Yāsir ‘Arafāt himself left, thus ending the official Fataḥ/PLO presence in Lebanon.

Following the retreat from Beirut, the PLO leadership resettled in Tunis. The withdrawal from Lebanon had left both the PLO and Fataḥ somewhat split after the failure to reach success both on the diplomatic and the military level, and with Syria lending support to factions that opposed ‘Arafāt and his leadership. ‘Arafāt, Fataḥ and the PLO had reached what Barry Rubin in his book *Revolution Until Victory?* (1994:65) calls the lowest point in their history. During the years following Lebanon, ‘Arafāt made an attempt at reopening the diplomatic way



through Jordan's King Hussein, but the attempts once again failed, and the Palestinian cause was partly left in the shadow of the Iran-Iraq war. This was to change dramatically with the start of the first Palestinian *intifāda* (uprising) which started in December 1987 inside the territories, and which again brought the Palestinian nationalist cause, 'Arafāt, Fataḥ and the PLO back to the centre stage of international politics. Being displaced in Tunis, far away from the Palestinian territories themselves, Fataḥ had seen the necessity of strengthening its institutional networks inside the West Bank and Gaza, which would come to lay the basis for their important role during the *intifāda* (Parsons 2005:35). Islamist groups, especially the Muslim Brotherhood, had already spent many years building up social institutions in the Palestinian territories, which gained them a lot of popular support. After having initially been surprised by the start of the uprising, the PLO leadership soon took control through the establishment of the Unified National Leadership of the Uprising (UNLU), which coordinated the actions of the leading nationalists factions within the PLO (ibid.:36). The split that had occurred after Lebanon was thus ended and 'Arafāt again emerged as the undisputed leader of the Palestinian nationalist cause.

The renewed strength of 'Arafāt and the Fataḥ/PLO leadership made it possible for them to reopen the diplomatic line towards the international community, especially after King Hussein in July 1988 renounced Jordan's claim for the West Bank, leading the way for the PLO to proclaim independence for the state of Palestine in November the same year, based on UN resolution 181 from 1947. Following pressure by the USA, 'Arafāt in December then finally uttered the words that could allow for direct talks between the American government and the PLO, accepting UN resolutions 242 and 338, recognising Israel's right to existence and renouncing terrorism (ibid.:40). The ideology of Fataḥ and the PLO had thus taken yet another major step away from its guerrilla history in the direction of moderation. At the same time as the *intifāda* provided 'Arafāt with support to seek this moderation, it also brought about a new expression of the Islamic sentiments that had been growing within the territories for many years already, in the establishment of Ḥamās (cf.1.2). In the beginning, Ḥamās did not compose any real political threat to Fataḥ and the PLO on a higher level, and they did not enter the UNLU. On the streets, however, Ḥamās soon gained a solid following and the relationship between 'Arafāt supporters and Ḥamās members became strained (Schanzer 2008:25). Interestingly, Schanzer describes how the first public struggle between the two parties in fact took the form of a propaganda struggle, with both groups spreading leaflets calling for support for their own cause.

The first direct talks between the PLO and the USA did not lead to any concrete results, and by 1990 they were abolished, with 'Arafāt and the rest of the PLO leadership still sitting in

Tunis. Once again a diplomatic initiative had failed, and when ‘Arafāt refused to condemn the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August 1990, the situation became even worse for the PLO. Parsons (2005:43) identifies three levels on which the PLO was severely hit by this decision. Firstly, it led to a severe loss of income for the organisation as taxes adding up to 8 billion dollar collected from the huge number of Palestinians residing in Kuwait, were lost. Secondly, most Arab states were alienated from the organisation, especially the oil-rich states like Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, and thirdly, it led to the organisation losing its credibility and goodwill among the western countries. At the same time, the Palestinians living inside the territories were facing harsher conditions as a result of Israel’s hard reactions to the intifāda, and demanded some results to come from their struggle. Ḥamās on their side gained huge support among the Palestinians for their line towards Israel (cf.1.2). Faced with this situation, ‘Arafāt and Fataḥ engaged in what was to be known as the Oslo channel, which eventually would lead to the signing by Israel and the PLO of the Declaration of Principles (DoP) in September 1993. With the DoP, ‘Arafāt and the PLO leadership were finally in a position to return to the territories, and to do so in the form of a government of an internationally recognised Palestinian entity, although an entity that only covered parts of the Gaza Strip and Jericho. Fataḥ had thus completed its transformation from a guerrilla organisation calling for the destruction of Israel and the establishment of an independent Palestinian state from the Jordan river to the Mediterranean, to the leaders of a government which mandate was built on diplomatic agreements with the former ‘enemy’. ‘Arafāt returned to Gaza on 1 July 1994 as President of the Palestinian National Authority (PA), but within the territories he faced a huge opposition against the agreement with Israel by groups that viewed it as a betrayal against the Palestinian people and its cause. Ḥamās was at the forefront of this opposition, and sought to undermine the authority of ‘Arafāt and the PA, mainly through a wave of attacks against Israel carried out by its military wing *Katā’ib al-Shahīd ‘Izz al-Dīn al-Qassām* (the al-Qassām Brigades). These attacks increased the support for Ḥamās among a large segment of the population, and thus put ‘Arafāt and the PA in a difficult situation. Israel and the USA demanded that it put an end to these attacks in order for the peace process to continue, while ‘Arafāt probably knew that a crack down on Ḥamās could make him unpopular among the population. It was also important to uphold the idea of national unity among the Palestinians as a basis for legitimacy for his rule. Leading up to the first formal elections for the PA in January 1996, Fataḥ and Ḥamās met in Cairo to discuss a settlement to the growing conflict, but it was, as should be the case several times in the years to come, unsuccessful (Schanzer 2008:44). As Ḥamās decided to boycott the 1996 elections in protest of the Oslo accords, Fataḥ's victory was not threatened, and their grip on the PA was even further consolidated. Ḥamās still continued their attacks in the years to come, with the PA subsequently arresting

hundreds of Ḥamās members in an attempt to quell the organisation (ibid.:68). National unity and the PA as a unifying national project was thus clearly not happening, and ‘Arafāt kept loosing popularity among the population to Ḥamās and other rejectionist groups. In addition, people inside Fataḥ started to demand reforms of the organisation, especially in the leadership, which mainly consisted of men from the ‘old guard’, i.e. the old leadership from the pre-PA period. In July 2000, the Oslo peace process came to an end with the failure of the so-called Camp David 2 talks between ‘Arafāt and then Israeli PM Ehud Barak. One reason for this was that ‘Arafāt, pressured from the difficult situation inside the territories and the growing support of Ḥamās, was not willing to give any more concessions. The failure of these talks once again increased ‘Arafāt’s popularity within the territories, and when the second intifāḍa broke out in September, the different Palestinian factions seemed more unified than ever with even Ḥamās for the first time officially participating in a meeting held by the PA (Tamimi 2007:199). This was not to last long, however, as ‘Arafāt soon again found himself under pressure from Israel and the USA to control the different Palestinian factions as the intifāḍa continued. His failure, or unwillingness, to do so, lead the Americans to demand that he delegated some of his power within the PA by creating the office of a Prime Minister in order for there being any chance of the peace process getting back on track. Maḥmūd ‘Abbās was appointed the first PM, but did not survive long in the position. The relationship between him and ‘Arafāt quickly soured over disputes of power, and by the population he was seen as being only a puppet controlled by Israel and the USA (ibid.:203-204). In the end, Fataḥ’s situation suffered tremendously from the second intifāḍa. Many of its leaders were killed or detained by the Israelis, some of the remaining leaders, including ‘Abbās, were seen as being more allies of Israel and the USA rather than loyal to the Palestinian cause. The infrastructure of the PA was in ruins and Israel had re-occupied the West Bank and Gaza, and in addition, the movement was hard hit by a culture of corruption. Together with the fact that its diplomatic line had not delivered peace and prosperity to the Palestinian people, these factors lead to a popularity crisis for the organisation that had been the undisputed leader of the Palestinian nationalist cause since the early 1960’s. This was the situation when ‘Arafāt passed away in November 2004 and ‘Abbās replaced him as Fataḥ’s leader. The elections for the Palestinian Legislative Council in January 2006 made apparent the failure of Fataḥ in accomplishing their goal of national unity, and that they had distanced themselves from the people they claimed to legitimately represent. At the same time it clearly showed the strength that Ḥamās had built up over 15 years.

## 1.2 Ḥamās

*Ḥarakat al-Muqāwama al-Islāmiyya* (The Islamic Resistance Movement), Ḥamās, emerged at the beginning of the first intifāḍa, with the first communiqué signed by the organisation being released on 14 December 1987 (Tamimi 2007:11). The acronym *ḥamās* has the meaning ‘zeal’ in Arabic. The background of the organisation that was to become the most serious contender to Fataḥ’s leading role in the Palestinian nationalist movement is to be found in the Islamist organisation of the Muslim Brotherhood. The leader of the Gaza branch of the Brotherhood, which was to develop into Ḥamās, was Aḥmad Yāsīn who since the 1960’s had built up the organisation there. Across the Arab world, the defeat of the Arab armies in the 1967 Arab-Israeli War left a huge segment of the population disillusioned, since they had seen the pan-Arabism of Nāṣir as the solution to its problems. When this failed, many turned to religion instead, and Islamist groupings experienced a surge in popularity. In the years following Israel’s occupation of the West Bank and Gaza, the Israeli authorities viewed the secular nationalism headed by Fataḥ as the main threat on the Palestinian side, and focused on the battle against it. Islamist groups such as the Brotherhood under Yāsīn’s leadership were at the same time given more or less free hands to go about with their activities. The Brotherhood had at that time developed the idea that *da‘wa* (preaching) should be their main concern instead of open military battle, as was the strategy of Fataḥ and the other secular resistance groups (ibid.:35). Due to the non-intervention policy of Israel towards the Brotherhood, Yāsīn was able to establish social institutions in Gaza which would provide the organisation with massive popular support. The first of these was called *al-Jama‘iyya al-islāmiyya* (the Islamic Society) which was established in 1967 and provided sports activities, recreational trips, scouting activities and public lectures for the youth (ibid.:36). In the early 1970’s, an even more comprehensive institution was established under the name *al-Mujam‘a al-islāmī* (the Islamic Centre), which also was responsible for establishing mosques, kindergartens, schools and clinics all over the Gaza Strip (ibid.). In 1978, the Islamic University was established in the Gaza Strip under the lead of the Brotherhood, which was to have a significant effect on the movement’s ability to spread its ideology. Through the different institutions it controlled, the Brotherhood was able to build up a network covering most areas of the society in the Gaza Strip, providing, as Beverly Milton-Edwards (2000:141) puts it: “something for everyone, from the cradle to the grave”.

As mentioned, the strategy of the Brotherhood in the 1970’s and the beginning of the 1980’s concerning Israel was that of non-confrontation. The leading thought, especially among the old guard, was that the society had to be based fully on Islam before one could stage a battle against the Zionists, and that the blame for the defeats of the Arab regimes was to be found in

the fact that these were secular regimes which had left their Islamic base (Tamimi 2007). The same argumentation was used for not joining the secular nationalist movement in their armed struggle. At the same time as Yāsīn built up his network inside the territories, the Islamic movement also became strong in the Palestinian student milieus in the Diaspora, such as in Kuwait, where Fataḥ had been formed some twenty years earlier. Among the leaders here was Khālīd Mish‘al, who today is regarded as the leader of Ḥamās. This younger generation of Islamists challenged the strategy of non-confrontation, as they sought to participate more directly in the nationalist cause on the ground, and launched the idea of establishing a *jihādī* project in Palestine (Rabbani 2008:67). In 1983, a conference was held in Jordan with delegates from the Palestinian Brotherhood both from inside the territories and exile to discuss the organisational matters concerning the launch of this project, and this conference is referred to by Mish‘al as laying “the foundation stone for the creation of Ḥamās” (Ibid.:68). Preparations for the start of an armed campaign got under way in Gaza, and in 1984 Aḥmad Yāsīn was arrested by the Israelis on suspicion of having been involved in buying weapons (Tamimi 2007:46). He was released a year later as part of a prisoner exchange deal, and continued the preparation for the launch of an armed struggle against Israel in the framework of the Palestinian Brotherhood. The call for actions to be taken came especially from the younger generation in the territories who had lived their whole life under occupation. Gilles Kepel (2003:152) points to the fact that half the population in the occupied Palestinian territories was under fifteen years, and over 70 percent was under the age of 30. Most of them were educated, many from the Islamic University and other Islamic institutes, but had little or no hope of finding work due to the economical situation and the occupation, and therefore had little to lose by engaging in a violent conflict. This group, the *shabāb* in Arabic, thus became the main movers in the intifāda when it broke out in December 1987.

Despite most observers regard Ḥamās as having being established at the outbreak of the intifāda, Mish‘al insists that Ḥamās in reality was formed in the years following the Jordan conference in 1983, and thus already existed as an organisation prior to the intifāda (Rabbani 2008:68). The organisation and network building that had been undertaken by the Palestinian Brotherhood in the territories and the Diaspora undoubtedly played a major role in helping Ḥamās take a leading role during the uprising and being able to challenge Fataḥ and the PLO and their UNLU.

The challenge from Ḥamās became even stronger when they entered the political arena by launching their charter on 18 August 1988, thereby presenting to the population a clear ideological and strategic alternative to the line of Fataḥ. The charter includes 36 articles and lays out the principles for how the organisation would fuse Palestinian nationalism and

Islamism. In Article one, it is declared that “[t]he Movement's programme is Islam. From it, it draws its ideas, ways of thinking and understanding of the universe, life and man” (Ḥamās covenant, 1988)<sup>3</sup>. Article Six goes on to proclaim that the movement “strives to raise the banner of Allah over every inch of Palestine”, thus making it clear that the aspiration is to establish a state built on Islamic principles. Concerning the fight for the liberation of Palestine, the charter states that *jihād* is an individual duty of every Muslim, and that it is “necessary to instill [sic] the spirit of Jihad [sic] in the heart of the nation so that they would confront the enemies and join the ranks of the fighters”. In its charter, Ḥamās also clarifies its view on the secular nationalist movements, and on the diplomatic line undertaken by ‘Arafāt and the PLO. Negotiations and peace talks are clearly dismissed in Article 13: “There is no solution for the Palestinian question except through Jihad [sic]. Initiatives, proposals and international conferences are all a waste of time and vain endeavours. The Palestinian people know better than to consent to having their future, rights and fate toyed with.” Although accepting that the PLO stems from the same people as themselves, Ḥamās takes a clear stand against the secular line of the organisation, stating: “Secularism completely contradicts religious ideology. Attitudes, conduct and decisions stem from ideologies. That is why, with all our appreciation for The Palestinian Liberation Organisation - and what it can develop into - and without belittling its role in the Arab-Israeli conflict, we are unable to exchange the present or future Islamic Palestine with the secular idea.”

One of the most controversial points of the charter is not found among the articles, but rather in the preamble, where it is referred to a statement by Hassan al-Bannā, the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood, saying: “Israel will exist and will continue to exist until Islam will obliterate it, just as it obliterated others before it”. To make Ḥamās refrain from this point, and accept the existence of the Israeli state has been one of the main demands from the international community towards the organisation in order to open a dialogue. In later years, there has been a tendency among Ḥamās leaders to not refer to the charter, but rather to mark some kind of distance to it. Tamimi (2007:149) cites for example Mis h‘al saying that the charter “should not be regarded as the fundamental ideological frame of reference from which the movement derives its position, or on the basis of which it justifies its actions”. Tamimi also claims that there has been an ongoing process within the Political Bureau of the organisation to rewrite the charter since 2003, but that the election victory in 2006 halted this process, as the leadership did not want it to look as if they had given in to external pressure of

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3 English translation from the Lillian Goldman Law Library, Yale Law School. URL: [http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th\\_century/Hamas.asp](http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/Hamas.asp), accessed 20.10.2009. All following citations from the covenant are from this site.

changing the charter (ibid.:150). Based on this, the charter still stands as the primary ideological document of Ḥamās.

With the launch of its charter, Ḥamās was able to present a clear alternative to the line of Fataḥ and soon gained support from those who were opposed to the diplomatic efforts undertaken by ‘Arafāt and the PLO. As Fataḥ moved further away from their guerrilla background, Ḥamās was in place to fill this role and gained popular support. At the same time, Israel felt increasingly threatened by the Islamist group, and launched a campaign against it towards the end of 1988. Mass arrests among the leadership were conducted, and in May 1989, Yāsīn was again detained. However, the arrests only lead to a further radicalisation of the movement as younger members who were generally more open for the use of violence emerged to fill the vacancies in the leadership. The hard line of Israel towards the movement also increased its legitimacy in the eyes of the population. In 1991, Ḥamās' military wing, the al-Qassām Brigades, was founded and soon launched a series of attacks on Israeli targets. The Brigades are named after the founder and leader of a resistance group from the uprising against the British and the Zionists in the 1930's, thus establishing a bond between Ḥamās and the historical resistance movement. The increase in violence lead to Israel deporting more than 400 hundred prominent Ḥamās members to Lebanon in December 1992 in an operation that was only to help Ḥamās gain international sympathy, and which ended in an UN resolution calling for the release of the prisoners (Kepel 2003:327). While Ḥamās increased its power based mainly on its clear line of confrontation, and opposition to all peace initiatives, Fataḥ and the PLO saw its own power diminish, and embarked on the Oslo process in an attempt to restore it. With the PA in place in Gaza following the signing of the Declaration of Principles, ‘Arafāt could start using his security apparatus to target the opposition, both based on his own wish to reduce the power of Ḥamās, and on pressure from Israel and the USA to control the different factions as a part of the peace agreement. The PA's attempted crack-down on Ḥamās suffered a severe blow, however, when Aḥmad Yāsīn was released from Israeli prison in 1997 following the infamous assassination attempt on Ḥamās' Political Bureau leader, Khālīd Mish‘al, by the Mossad. Back in Gaza, Yāsīn could again actively take the leadership of Ḥamās, and strengthen it further.

The tension between the PA and Ḥamās only increased in the years leading up to the second intifāda, with thousands of Ḥamās members being arrested and many being tortured (Tamimi 2007:195). The hard line adopted by ‘Arafāt at the Camp David meeting in July 2000 and the subsequent outbreak of the second intifāda, however, were to bring the two parties closer together, at least for a short period. As the violence increased, and the pressure on ‘Arafāt became stronger from the USA and Israel, it soon soured again with heavy clashes between

the two factions taking place in Gaza in December 2001. The retaliation attacks from Israel following the violence hit the infrastructure and the economy of the PA hard and helped undermine its power. ‘Arafāt himself was put under house arrest by the Israeli army, and these factors only boosted the effective power of Ḥamās. Schanzer (2008:77) notes that by 2003, Ḥamās had created a parallel government to the PA’s and controlled a parallel network of social services. The popularity of the movement was displayed when about 200,000 people turned to the streets of Gaza to follow the funeral of Yāsīn after he was assassinated on 22 March 2004 (ibid.:80). The assassination of the leader Yāsīn was followed by the assassinations of the two next persons to be named as leaders of the organisation, leading Ḥamās to decide not to name publicly their leader for the future, even though it is commonly acknowledged that Khālīd Mish‘al is the current leader. Although the assassinations led to some weakening of the leadership on short terms, the power of Ḥamās was not affected, and when the Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon evacuated all Israeli settlers and army personnel from the Gaza Strip in the fall of 2005, Ḥamās was ready to strengthen the grip they had built up there. For many Palestinians at that time, it was viewed as a victory for the line of confrontation lead by Ḥamās, in contrast to the moderate line of Fataḥ. This was the situation within the Palestinian territories when Ḥamās decided to change its political strategy and take part in the elections called for by ‘Arafāt’s successor, Maḥmūd ‘Abbās, to be held in January 2006.

### **1.3 The 2006 elections and escalation of the conflict**

The decision by Ḥamās to join the elections was made after a long discussion within the organisation, and Tamimi (2007:211) points to the main factors behind the decision as being the failure of the peace process that it opposed, the disappearance of ‘Arafāt from the political scene, the withdrawal of Israel from Gaza and, not least, the disillusionment of the population towards the PA. It was well known in the Palestinian society that corruption was a major problem within Fataḥ and the PLO, and Ḥamās made it one of their main points to put an end to this if they came to power, promising *change and reform*, which also was the name they gave their list for the elections. The election results on 26 January 2006 showed that Ḥamās had won a surprisingly huge victory, taking 74 of the 132 seats in the Palestinian Legislative Council, while Fataḥ only won 45. Attempts to form a national unity government lead by Ḥamās failed due to, amongst other things, the unwillingness of Fataḥ to join such a constellation, and thus Ḥamās formed its own government which took office on 29 March 2006. The organisation that had build much of its popularity on opposing the moderate line of Fataḥ, and the creation of the PA as a result of the Oslo process, was thus suddenly in charge.



It was clear, however, that Fataḥ was not ready to give up power, and ‘Abbās issued several Presidential decrees that transferred authority from the ministries to his own office on several areas, including the police force, the media and the control over border crossing points (ibid.:229). This meant that the government of Ḥamās did not have control over the police force, and chaos soon emerged on the streets of Gaza, as the Fataḥ-loyal police refused to follow orders from Ḥamās and stayed away from the streets. Ḥamās, in a response to this, put up its own security force, the Executive Force (القوة التنفيذية), under the Interior Ministry in April, and on 17 May, the world media reported that the police force loyal to President ‘Abbās were deployed onto the streets of Gaza in order to face this newly established Ḥamās force<sup>4</sup>. For the first time, two Palestinian forces were deployed on the streets to guard the political interests of one Palestinian party against another Palestinian party.

Heavy clashes between Fataḥ-loyal and Ḥamās-loyal forces took place throughout the summer and autumn of 2006, both on the West Bank and in the Gaza Strip. The attempts by Fataḥ to undermine the rule of the Ḥamās government were supported by the decision of several Western countries to boycott the government and put a blockade on all economical transfers to it, which made the living conditions very difficult. At the same time, money was given to President ‘Abbās for him to build up a new Presidential guard consisting of 10,000 troops (Tamimi 2007:229). As the tensions escalated between the two groups, several attempts were made to bring them together with the prospect of establishing the basis for a national unity government but all the initiatives failed until February 2007, when the Mecca agreement was signed after an initiative from the Saudi royal family. At that time the conflict had reached the stage of being on the brink of a full-scale civil war, with around 150 Palestinians being killed in factional fighting since October 2006 (Esposito 2007:148). The Mecca agreement laid the foundation for the establishment of a unity government which came about on 17 March, by putting stress on “banning the shedding of the Palestinian blood and to take all measures and arrangements to prevent the shedding of the Palestinian blood and to stress on the importance of national unity as basis for national steadfastness and confronting the occupation and to achieve the legitimate national goals of the Palestinian people and adopt the language of dialogue as the sole basis for solving the political disagreements on the Palestinian arena.”<sup>5</sup>

Despite the leaders of the two factions calling for national unity, dialogue and the end of intra-Palestinian fighting, tensions remained high. Clashes continued, escalating in mid-May with 47 Palestinians being killed and hundreds injured within the period of one week (Schanzer

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4 [http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle\\_east/4989226.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/4989226.stm), accessed 27.10.2009.

5 <http://www.fmep.org/analysis/analysis/the-mecca-agreement>, accessed 27.10.09

2008:105). The unity that was still being officially proclaimed by the leaders was clearly not seen in the streets, and on 7 June 2007, full-scale civil war broke out in Gaza, which resulted in Ḥamās taking over all security compounds and PA buildings within a week, and to President ‘Abbās dissolving the unity government on 14 June. Ḥamās did not accept the dissolution and the new emergency government put up by ‘Abbās led by the former Finance Minister Salām Fayyād, and less than three months after the establishment of a national unity government, the territories were thus divided into a Fataḥ-ruled West Bank and a Ḥamās-ruled Gaza Strip, after a civil war which left around 160 Palestinians dead and several hundreds wounded in the streets of Gaza (ibid.:108). These casualties came in addition to the 616 that had already been killed in internal Palestinian clashes since the January 2006 elections, according to Reuters on 6 June 2007<sup>6</sup>. Both parties were now seeking to secure control in their respective areas, and this was done partly by cracking down on members and supporters of the other party with arrests, beatings, abductions, etc. The media was also targeted, as both parties saw the importance of being presented as the legitimate rulers, and not as the ones responsible for the violence and suffering that took place (cf.1.4).

#### **1.4 The Palestinian media situation**

*Press and printing are free. Furthermore, freedom of opinion should be entitled to every Palestinian individual who attains the absolute right to express his opinion in a free manner either verbally, in writing, or drawing, as a different means of expression and information.*— Article 2, the 1995 Palestinian Press Law<sup>7</sup>.

The Palestinian Press Law was signed by Yāsir ‘Arafāt on 25 July 1995 and replaced the Israeli military regulations on the press, which had been in place in the territories since the War of 1967. The PA’s Ministry of Information was established already one year prior to this, before ‘Arafāt himself arrived in Gaza, showing the emphasis the newly established Palestinian National Authority put on organising the media and information sector in the territories (Jamal 2000:50). With the establishment of the PA following the Oslo accords, a new era started for the Palestinian media, but despite the positive tone of the article cited above, the conditions were not to improve significantly.

The first daily newspapers in Palestine emerged in 1929 under the British mandate following the riots that evolved during 1929. During the first years of the mandate period, the press in

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6 <http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3409548,00.html>, accessed 27.10.09

7 My translation of the Arabic version from the website of the Palestinian National Authority Ministry of Information, URL: <http://www.minfo.gov.ps/Docs/printing%20law.doc>, accessed 05.10.2009. All following citations from the Press Law are from this site.

Palestine enjoyed more freedom than the press in neighbouring countries, but in 1933 the British rulers issued a Publications Law which limited that freedom severely (Ayalon 1995). In 1945, they further restricted the freedom by introducing the Emergency Regulations, which established the censorship mechanism, and which Israel was to adopt after their occupation of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip in 1967 (Nossek & Rinnawi 2003). In the meantime, the two areas had been under the rule of Jordan and Egypt respectively with the media falling under their regulations. The first newspaper to be published after 1967, inside what was now the occupied Palestinian territories, was *al-Quds* (Jerusalem), which was a merger of two dailies that had been published in Jerusalem during the Jordanian rule, *al-Difāʿ* (the defence) and *al-Jihād* (Jamal 2000:46). *Al-Quds* was known to be a pro-Jordanian newspaper, but remained the only Palestinian daily to be published within the territories for four years, and is still today the largest Palestinian newspaper. Following the ‘Black September’ of 1970 and the evacuation to Lebanon, the Fatah leadership also turned their focus to the occupied territories and to mobilising the population there for the cause of the establishment of a Palestinian state some time in the future. They realised that the media could play an important role in this aspect, and in 1972 two new dailies were established by leading PLO figures in the territories as an attempt to reduce the influence of the pro-Jordanian *al-Quds* (ibid.). They were called *al-Fajr* (The Dawn) and *al-Shaʿb* (The People), and had a clear political aim of mobilising for the Palestinian cause fronted by Fatah and attacking the leading pro-Jordanian figures in the West Bank (ibid.). The Fatah leadership saw the media as an important tool in the struggle both against the occupation, and against the other Palestinian groups that might challenge their political position as leaders of the Palestinian national cause. The other Palestinian factions present in the territories also looked for opportunities to get their message out to a broader audience, and as a result a whole range of newspapers with different political affiliations emerged in the following years. Of these can be mentioned *al-Mithāq* (the Covenant) and *al-ʿAhd* (the Promise) supported by the PFLP, *al-Darb* (the Path) supported by the DFLP, and *Hudā al-Islām* (the Way of Islam) representing the Islamic movement (Nossek & Rinnawi 2003:188). In 1986, a daily called *al-Nahār* (the Day) was established, taking a pro-Jordanian line after the former pro-Jordanian *al-Quds* had now adopted a pro-PLO line instead (Jamal 2000:47).

The politicisation of the Palestinian newspapers was evident right from the start, with virtually no independent papers being established, something which of course has had a major impact on the journalistic traditions in the West Bank and Gaza. The strong affiliations with the various political factions restricted the journalists’ freedom in reporting and in addition, the Israeli censorship also represented a major impediment. In accordance with the Israeli military orders for the occupied territories, all newspapers had to pass through the military censor who

would then delete any material that could possibly harm Israeli interests. Newspapers were closed for periods of time and journalists and editors were arrested and deported if the Israeli authorities believed that they had failed to live up to their rules and regulations (Jamal 2000:47).

With the establishment of the PA, the formal Israeli censorship of the Palestinian press was removed and many hoped for better times for Palestinian journalism. However, the new leadership soon demonstrated that they intended to keep the media under tight control. The newly established Ministry of Information showed its strength already in July 1994 when it announced that the pro-Jordanian *al-Nahār* was not allowed into the areas controlled by the PA, which effectively led to the paper's fall (ibid.:48). The message was thus sent out to the other media institutions, and was understood to such an extent that the other surviving major daily at the time, *al-Quds*, did not even report on the closure of its rival (ibid.). The PA was well aware of the challenges it faced on the ground in the Palestinian territories concerning creating legitimacy for their authority and their agreement with the Israeli 'enemy', and sought from the start to make sure that the Palestinian media took part in this legitimating process. Two new newspapers were therefore established with close links to the PA, *al-Hayāt al-jadīda* (the New Day) led by former PLO ambassador to Moscow Nabīl 'Amru, and *al-Ayyām* (the Days) headed by Akram Haniyya, a close consultant to 'Arafāt and former editor of *al-Sha'b*. The former of the two is by many regarded as replacing the official PLO mouthpiece *Filasṭīn al-Thawra* (Palestine the Revolution) while the latter took the place of *al-Fajr* and *al-Sha'b*. According to Amal Jamal (2001:266), the names of these two dailies reflect "the passage from revolutionary and mobilising journalism towards new functions that fitted the stage of administrative centralisation, internal pacification and state-building". The PA leadership needed the press to help establish a consensus among the population for its national project, and thus needed to control it in more or less overt ways. One means of control was to patronise the press through offering financial support. The bad economical situation in the territories made it almost impossible for privately owned newspapers and magazines to survive without some kind of financial support, and the PA therefore subsidised the newspapers by for example paying for advertisements and subscriptions (Nossek & Rinnawi 2003:188).

The Press Law also offered ways for the PA to control the media despite the clear declaration on a free press as cited in the article above. In principle, the PA opened for everyone who wished to start a media outlet within the territories, even groups clearly in opposition to their policies. Parts of the law, however, are written in such an ambiguous way that they are open for interpretation, and can subsequently be used by the authorities to restrict this oppositional press. Article 8 of the law is one example of this, as it states that journalists are required to:

- (2) Perform the journalistic work in an objective, integrative and balanced manner.
- (3) Strive for accuracy, honesty and objectivity when commenting on news and events.
- (4) Avoid publishing anything that can cause violence, fanaticism and hatred, or give rise to racism and sectarianism.

By referring to arbitrary terms such as ‘honesty’, ‘objectivity’, ‘balanced manner’, etc., the PA has left it open for them to define the meaning of these terms at any given time, and thereby granted themselves the right to define ‘the truth’ (Jamal 2001:273). Journalists and editors who do not follow this official ‘truth’, will then face the risk of being punished as they have violated the law. In addition, Article 37 forbids publishing of any piece of writing that “do harm to the national unity or incite the perpetration of crimes or spread hatred, loathing, split and strife and sectarian agitation between members of the society”. The most obvious interpretation of this article is that any criticism of the PA and their state-building project would be viewed as an attack on the ‘national unity’, and thus as a violation of the law. Based on this law, the PA was able to confront the oppositional press if they crossed the line of what they regarded as tolerable critic against the authorities. The Palestinian Human Rights Monitoring Group (PHRMG) had in November 1999 recorded 50 violations against Palestinian journalists committed by Palestinian security forces since the establishment of the PA in 1994<sup>8</sup>. Publications affiliated with Ḥamās were especially targeted, such as the *al-Waṭan* (the Homeland) newspaper, established in April 1995. Before it was finally closed after just one year of existence, it had been closed several times for longer or shorter periods by the PA due to its content (Jamal 2000:52). After the closure of *al-Waṭan*, Ḥamās decided to publish a weekly in the name of the Islamic National Salvation Party called *al-Risāla* (the Message), which was established in January 1997 (ibid.). This publication, together with the weekly *al-Istiqlāl* (the Independence), published by the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, represented the main oppositional written media in Palestine during the first years of the PA.

As the popularity of Ḥamās grew in the territories, they were able to confront the monopoly that the PA was trying to build up. Leading up to the 2006 elections, Ḥamās showed how important it considered the media to be in influencing the population when it launched its own TV station called *Al-Aqṣā*. Following the elections, President ‘Abbās transferred the control of the media to his own office, but this did not prevent the launch of the first daily newspaper in the Gaza Strip on 3 May 2007, called *Filasṭīn* (Palestine). Although the editor in the first issue declared that the paper was to be a paper for all Palestinians, no matter what political affiliations, it was clear that it was closely linked to Ḥamās, which lead international news

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8 <http://www.phrmg.org/monitor1999/nov99-introduction.htm>, accessed 23.04.2009

agencies to state that it was the “first pro-Ḥamās Palestinian newspaper”<sup>9</sup>. The front page of the first issue supported this point by showing a big picture of the Ḥamās Prime Minister Haniyya accompanying an interview with him.

The split following the June 2007 fighting only made conditions worse for the Palestinian media, as both parties sought to control the media outlets. A result of this was that the West Bank government of Salām Fayyād banned the distribution in the West Bank of the two Gaza newspapers *al-Risāla* and *Filasṭīn* immediately after the Ḥamās takeover of the Gaza Strip on 14 June. Following the same line, Ḥamās banned the distribution in Gaza of the two West Bank papers *al-Ayyām* and *al-Ḥayāt al-jadīda* in July 2008, the latter still being banned at the time of writing. The Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ), stated in a report dated February 2008 that the “[...] split between the West Bank and Gaza had a ripple effect on the Palestinian media, with increasing factionalism within the media and the targeting of media seen as aligned with specific groups”<sup>10</sup>. Reporters Without Borders (RSF), supports this view in a report on their website, stating that “[s]ince June 2007, the media has been split in two between those close to the Palestinian Authority and those linked to Ḥamās – suffering the same threats and physical assaults on each side. Journalists with links to Ḥamās are summoned, questioned and arrested on the West Bank by the security forces of the Palestinian Authority, while pro-Fataḥ journalists are regularly threatened by Ḥamās police. The year 2008 saw an unprecedented upsurge in press freedom violations.”<sup>11</sup>

In the RSF Press Freedom Index of 2009 the Palestinian territories was rated as number 161 out of a total 175 countries<sup>12</sup>, showing the severe problems the Palestinian media faces on a daily basis. It is within this framework that the journalists and editors have to choose which discourse to follow when reporting on the events that take place in the streets of the Palestinian territories.

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9 <http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/L03613675.htm>, accessed 25.02.2009

10 <http://cpj.org/2008/02/attacks-on-the-press-2007-israel-and-the-occupied.php> , accessed 03.03.09

11 [http://www.rsfor.org/en-rapport147-Palestinian\\_territories.html](http://www.rsfor.org/en-rapport147-Palestinian_territories.html) , accessed 27.10.09

12 <http://www.rsfor.org/en-classement1003-2009.html> , accessed 27.10.09

## 1.5 Al-Ḥayāt al-Jadīda

*Al-Ḥayāt al-jadīda* was established in 1995 by Nabīl ‘Amru, a former PLO ambassador to Moscow who was closely linked with ‘Arafāt and the PA. The newspaper was therefore from the start regarded as an official mouthpiece for the Fataḥ-lead PA, supported by the fact that most of the paper’s journalists are paid directly by the PA<sup>13</sup>. According to a poll by the Jerusalem Media and Communication Centre from 1998, it was the third largest Palestinian paper, being read by 13,7 % of the population<sup>14</sup>. The paper has been banned from the Gaza Strip by the Ḥamās government there since the summer of 2008.

## 1.6 Filasṭīn

The daily newspaper *Filasṭīn*, ‘Palestine’, was launched on 3 May 2007 in the Gaza strip. Its editor in chief is the well-known Palestinian media personality Muṣṭafā al-Ṣawwāf. From the outset, it was clear that the paper was closely affiliated with Ḥamās, with the Ḥamās PM Ismā‘īl Haniyya holding a speech at the launching ceremony in Gaza. The editorial of the first issue clearly states that the paper shall be for all Palestinians, no matter what political affiliations, and that it is open for all different views to be expressed. The Reuters news agency, however, called it a *pro-Ḥamās newspaper* in their reports on the launch, and al-Ṣawwāf himself was reported as saying that the owners were close to Ḥamās<sup>15</sup>. Initially, the paper was published separately in the West Bank and Gaza, but since 14 June 2007, its distribution has been banned in the West Bank by the Fataḥ rule there.

## 2. Theory and Methodology

The theoretical and methodological framework of this thesis will be discourse analysis, and Norman Fairclough’s critical discourse analysis theory and method will be the basis for the analysis. In this chapter I will give an overview of the theoretical stand of discourse analysis and its link to power and media.

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13 <http://www.phrmg.org/monitor1999/nov99-written.htm> , accessed 23.04.09

14 Ibid.

15 <http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/L03613675.htm>, accessed 25.02.2009

## 2.1 Discourse and social constructionism

The field of discourse analysis covers a range of different approaches and the term *discourse* itself is used in various ways within these approaches. Several definitions have been offered for the term, but for the purpose of this thesis I will concentrate on the one that is proposed by Vivien Burr in her book *An Introduction to Social Constructionism* (1995:48), which states that a discourse “refers to a set of meanings, metaphors, representations, images, stories, statements and so on that in some way together produce a particular version of events. It refers to a particular picture that is painted of an event (or person or class of persons), a particular way of representing it or them in a certain light”. Language has a major role in creating this particular representation of the world, and even though discourse analytical approaches may vary a lot concerning methods of research and the goals for the research, they are based on the social constructionist way of looking upon language as not only reflecting reality to us neutrally, but as also being part of constructing that reality. This view is based on the idea that reality is only accessible to us through language, and that we, through language, create representations of reality (Jørgensen & Phillips 2002:8-9). Following this view, the physical world gains meaning for us and becomes available to us through our way of talking about and understanding it through language and thus, following the definition above, through discourse. Having gained meaning for us through discourse, we as human beings are able to act in accordance with the representation, and our actions will then vary according to through which discourse the meaning has been constructed, i.e. the discourse that was regarded as ‘common-sense’ or ‘truthful’ for us at that given time. Since our actions according to this view are based on the meaning given to us through discourse, discourse becomes a constructive part of the social world and thus, of reality. Implicit in the definition cited above is that a given discourse represents only *one* way of talking about and understanding the world, and that several different discourses will be available to represent an event in a another way. Burr (1995:48) outlines this: “[s]urrounding any one object, event, person etc., there may be a variety of different discourses, each with a different story to tell about the object in question, a different way of representing it to the world”. This means that there are at the same time several different ways of talking about the world. What we call knowledge about the world is always derived from looking at the world from a particular perspective, a perspective that serve some interests rather than others (Burr 2003:6). Such interests may include the political interests of different groups in a society, as will be the main focus of this thesis.



## 2.2 Language and power

If one accepts the social constructionist view that language does not only have the function of reflecting neutrally the world, but also of in fact creating and changing that world, the link between discourse and power becomes obvious. Being able to make one's own ideas and beliefs the basis for the way the world is represented and perceived through discourse in society, will lead to a strengthening of one's power in that society. This means that power struggles are also discursive struggles. Discourse functions ideologically by being the vehicle of what Norman Fairclough in his book *Language and Power* (2001:27) calls *ideological power*, which he defines as "the power to project one's practices as universal and 'common sense'". Ideology in this sense is to be seen as knowledge deployed in the service of power, used by relatively powerful groups in society to sustain their position (Burr 1995:82).

According to Fairclough (2001:28), there are two ways to exercise and sustain power in a society, through coercion or through consent. The two will in most cases be combined in one form or another, but it is mainly the aspect of power exercised through consent that is of interest to us here, being linked as it is to ideology and to discourses as bearers of ideological power. He also claims that in modern society, the exercise of power on the hands of one or another group is increasingly achieved through the ideological workings of language, and that language "has become perhaps the primary medium of social control and power" (ibid.:2). The study of language therefore needs to be a major part of social studies which seek to explore the relationships of power within a society. At the same time, the study of language cannot be separated from studies of the sociocultural context.

The French philosopher Michel Foucault has had a major influence on the field of discourse analysis and the perception of power as related to discourse. For him, to exercise power is to define the world or a person in a way that allows you to do the things you want, because through defining or representing something in a particular way, we produce a particular 'knowledge' (Burr 1995:64). Following this line, power is something productive that creates a type of knowledge, rather than a form of possession to be used for repressive means. Foucault claims that the use of repression, or "rule by coercion" in Fairclough's terms, is in fact evidence of lack of power, and will only be used when the limits of power have been reached (ibid.:65). As mentioned, Fairclough will claim that rulers in a society will also resort to the use of some kind of rule by coercion, but that rule by consent is the most effective and most used in a modern society. By establishing their ideas and beliefs as common-sensual and the 'truth', and thereby defining the world, power holders will legitimatise and sustain their rule.

Power then, becomes an effect of discourse, but discourses will also always be challenged by other discourses which again will serve other groups in the society.

Relating the notion of rule through coercion or consent to the Palestinian context, exercise of power through coercion is very much present, referring to the build up of a strong security and military apparatus by both Fatah and Hamās in order to guard the interests of its own organisation and undermine the influence of the other. At the same time, it is obvious that both factions also put a great deal of effort into the aspect of exercising and legitimising their power through consent, for example by building up and controlling media institutions which serve to convey their ideological stand.

### **2.3 Power and media**

Assuming that power in a society is closely linked to how the world is represented through language and discourse, the news media is undoubtedly one of the most influential channels when it comes to conveying certain representations of the world to a large number of people. People all over the world rely on newspapers and other media to give them a presentation of what happens in the world around them on an everyday basis, and news accounts for a significant part of peoples' daily involvement in discourse. Despite the fact that journalists and editors of newspapers tend to claim that they report on events in a neutral and objective manner, we find when comparing different newspapers, that there is a significant difference when it comes to how events are presented.

We have now assumed that language and discourse do not neutrally reflect the world, but rather contribute to the social construction of reality and to the establishment and sustaining of power relations. Since news are always carried through language, they are not a neutral reflection of the world, but contribute to the social construction of reality and affect the power relations in society. Roger Fowler gives the following definition of news in his book *Language in the News* (1991:4):

*News is a representation of the world in language; because language is a semiotic code, it imposes a structure of values, social and economic in origin, on whatever is represented; and so inevitably news, like every discourse, constructively patterns that of which it speaks. News is a representation in this sense of construction; it is not a value-free reflection of 'facts'.*

By giving a certain representation of events and persons in its articles, a newspaper has made a choice from several different possible ways of representing the same. Following the view on the ideological power of discourse that we discussed above, Fowler claims that the choices the

newspapers make concerning linguistic expressions when reporting are not random and accidental, but made for a reason, carrying ideological distinctions (ibid.). It might seem from this that the news media within the same context are likely to report on the same events, and that the difference between them are mainly to be found in the way these events are presented. This is, however, not the case, as different newspapers will also differ from one another with regard to which events are in fact reported on, based on political, social and economic factors and interests related to the respective papers (ibid.:11). Representation in the media then is a constructive practice, but Fowler insists that it is not for each and every journalist to freely choose the way in which he presents his story. Newspapers are socially, economically and politically situated, and this leads all news to be reported from some particular angle (ibid.:10). A thorough study of news discourse must therefore include an examination of the social, economical and political context in addition to detailed text analysis.

## **2.4 Consensus values**

Rule by consent involves that the power holders are able to create a consensual “we” feeling among the population. According to Fowler (ibid.:51), the media plays a major part in constructing this consensual feeling by citing so-called consensus values in their reports. These are values that intended readers will agree upon and view as positive and legitimate, and which will have their opposites in negative, illegitimate values that are linked to a certain “them” group. Such a “we” group typically refers to a national grouping, but it can also refer to groups in moral or social terms. In the latter sense, it refers to a group within a society that lives by and agrees upon one set of norms and is consequently challenged by a “them” group which is perceived as a threat (ibid.).

Fowler (ibid.:52) refers to a an extensive list of such positive, legitimate values and their negative opposites originally presented by Steve Chibnall (1977). In the present study relating to the Palestinian situation, I will draw the attention to some of the values included in this list, namely those which I expect to be referred to by the two newspapers of this study in their bid to help legitimise the rule of either Fataḥ or Ḥamās:

- Legality vs. illegality
- Order vs. chaos
- Peacefulness vs. violence
- Honesty vs. corruption
- Responsibility vs. irresponsibility

- Firmness vs. weakness

I expect that both parties will seek to create an impression that their rule will involve the positive legitimising values in the left column of the list, while the rule of the other party will be based on the opposite negative, delegitimising values in the right column of the list. My hypothesis is that references to these values will be found in the lexical choices of the newspapers in their reports on events related to the power struggle.

Ideological meaning is, however, not only embedded in the lexicon of news texts, but also in grammatical features. A linguistic method for uncovering such covert ideological elements of a text is therefore necessary, and this constitutes a major part of the methodological framework of Critical Discourse Analysis, which is outlined below.

## **2.5 Critical Discourse Analysis**

In the social constructionist view on discourse and language, it is assumed that language is a constructive part of social reality, and not merely a vehicle for a neutral and value-free reflection of a reality outside of language. Discourse and language carry with them ideological effects, which are clearly linked to the power relations in a society. This is a view that all approaches to discourse analysis share in their theoretical framework. These ideological effects will often be encoded in the language of, for example, newspaper articles through the choice of lexicon and syntax. Thorough linguistic analysis is therefore a tool to uncover these hidden ideological meanings of texts, but this is not sufficient for a complete discourse analysis. The social, economical and political context will also have a major effect on the discourses presented, and a theory and method that combines detailed text analysis with studies of the sociocultural context is therefore needed. This is what the approaches of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) seek to provide (Jørgensen & Phillips 2002:60). CDA emerged in the late 1980's and has since become one of the most influential branches within the broader field of discourse analysis (Blommaert & Bulcaen, 2000:447). Several different approaches have since then been developed under the umbrella of CDA that may vary significantly in their outlook, but according to Jørgensen & Phillips (2002:61) there are at least five common features that can be identified in all of them:

- They view discursive practices in everyday life as important forms of social practice which contribute to the constitution of the social world. Social and cultural reproduction takes partly place through discursive practices.
- Discourse is viewed as a social practice which not only constitutes the social world, but also is constituted by other social practices. It reflects social structures as well as contributes to shaping and reshaping them. The media discourse does for example

contribute to shaping forms of politics, but is at the same time influenced by societal forces, such as the political system, the economic system and the structure of the media institution.

- CDA engages in systematic, empirical studies of language use within its social context.
- Discourses are considered to have ideological effects. Discursive practices are closely linked to the power relations in society, and contribute to create and reproduce them.
- CDA is critical in the sense that it seeks to uncover the role of discursive practice concerning the creation and reproduction of the, often unequal, power relations in society.

Many regard Norman Fairclough as having developed the most comprehensive theory and method within CDA for the analysis of discourse as social practice (ibid.:64). Fairclough has his background in linguistics and detailed text analysis is the basis of his approach. His argument, however, is that text analysis is not sufficient, because, as we have seen, language and discourse is equally constituted by other social practices and contributes to shaping them. A combination of textual and social analysis is therefore required for discourse analysis, and in his approach he seeks to unite detailed textual analysis, macro-sociological analysis of social practice and micro-sociological interpretation in order to gain the full picture of the workings of discourse (ibid.:65). In order to achieve this, he has developed an analytical framework based on the idea that every instance of language use consists of three dimensions. It is at the same time a text, a discursive practice and a social practice (ibid.:68). All these three dimensions should be covered in a critical discourse analysis, focusing on (1) the linguistic features of the text, (2) processes related to the production and consumption of the text and (3) the wider social practice to which the communicative event belongs (ibid.).

In the present study, the three dimensions are covered in order to give a complete analysis. In 1.4, the general media situation in Palestine were presented, while each of the two papers history and position were outlined in 1.5 and 1.6. Combined, these cover the production process of the texts. In 1.1, 1.2 and 1.3, the history of Fatah and Hamās and the political situation in Palestine, including the history of the power struggle between the two groups, is outlined, covering the social practice part of the model. The main focus of the thesis will, however, be on the text analysis, which is at the core of Fairclough's model, covered in chapter 3.

The detailed textual analysis in CDA is based primarily on the tradition of critical linguistics, which was developed in the 1970's (O'Halloran 2003:14). According to one of the most influential developers of the approach, Roger Fowler (1991:67), critical linguistics "seeks, by studying the minute details of linguistic structure in the light of the social and historical situation of the text, to display to consciousness the patterns of belief and value which are

encoded in language”. Critical linguistics assume that certain areas of language are more implicated in coding such ideas and beliefs than others, and by identifying and analysing these, one will be able to ‘decode’ the text (ibid.). Analysis of both the syntax and the vocabulary are important to critical linguistics in order to uncover a text’s ideological perspective when reporting on events.

### 2.5.1 Transitivity and transformations

A key concept when it comes to displaying ideological meaning in text is transitivity. Transitivity in critical linguistics is concerned with how events are presented related to the type of process that has taken place, and to the role of the participants in the event concerning this process. Fowler (ibid.:71) defines it in this way: “[t]ransitivity is the foundation of representation: it is the way the clause is used to analyse events and situations as being of certain types”. The aspect of transitivity leaves many choices for the author of a text, and the choices made may have significant implications on the ideological meaning of the text.

There are three main elements in transitivity, namely *predicates*, *participants* and *circumstances*. In my analysis of transitivity in the newspaper texts, I will make use of the terminology used by Fowler (ibid.:73-76) for the various kinds of these three elements, and I will give a short introduction to these terms here.

*Predicates* is what designates the event or state of affairs described by the clause, and two different types of predicates are *actions* and *processes*. An action is a deliberate activity under the control of agent(s) while a process is an event or activity which is neither deliberate or controlled. Actions and processes can again be either material, mental or verbal according to the situation.

The *participants* are mainly divided into either *agents*, the doers of an action, and *affected participants*, the people and objects that have things done or happen to them. Affected participants are then divided into *objects*, where someone or something is affected in a material way by an action or process, and *patients*, who are human (or at least animate) and has something done to them. In addition, the term *force* is used to describe something inanimate which causes an effect on someone or something, but that due to not being something conscious cannot be termed agent. *Circumstances* are simply the description of the time and place of the event that has taken place.

Fowler (ibid.:77) uses the term *transformations* to refer to types of syntactic variations that will have a certain impact on the ideological meaning of a text. Two types of such

transformations are mentioned as the most significant in critical linguistics, namely *passivisation* and *nominalisation*. Passivisation of a sentence will basically mean that the focus is shifted from the agent to the affected by placing the affected in the syntactic subject position of the sentence. This move also opens for the agent to be completely omitted from the sentence, leaving the responsibility for the action(s) of the event unspecified and open for speculation. The role of the agent is thus blurred or mystified, while in an active sentence the agent is placed in the subject position and is clearly given the responsibility for the action(s). Nominalisation means that wider descriptions of events through the use of verbs and possible adjacent adjectives are substituted with a single noun. The effect of nominalisation will be, as with passivisation, that the agent(s) can be removed from the sentence. The action is made into a “thing”, something that happened without any clear responsibility on the hands of any agent. Readers will of course have an underlying knowledge which tells them that there has to be one or more agents responsible for what took place, but since this is blurred by passivisations and nominalisations, it will demand a lot more conscious thinking on behalf of the reader in order to put together the whole picture (Bergström & Bronéus 2005:285).

### **2.5.2 Lexicon**

The ideological perspective of a text is not only to be found in its syntactic structure, but also in the lexical structure, the vocabulary chosen for the representation. Different words may have different connotations and be associated with positive, negative or neutral values by readers. In 2.3 we introduced the concept of consensus values that are generally cited by the media in order to legitimate the rule of certain groups in a society. It is assumed that the choice of vocabulary will be closely linked to these values, as words which correspond with the positive legitimate values will be linked to the “we” group, while words that will give associations to the negative, illegitimate values will be linked to the “them” group.

In the following analysis, I will examine both the syntax and the vocabulary in the framework outlined here in order to uncover how the two newspapers carry ideological meaning in their news reports.

## **2.6 Data and analytical approach**

In my analysis, I have chosen to focus on three significant events in the internal strife between Fatah and Hamās from May and June 2007, and how the two newspapers report on these events respectively in their “hard news” coverage. The texts chosen will be the newspapers’

main stories on each of the events, taken from the front page. Both newspapers offer a complete archive of full-text pdf versions of each paper issued on their website, and I have downloaded the copies used for this thesis from these archives. I have chosen to look at news articles rather than for example editorials or comments, because news articles will most often be presented as being neutral, while editorials and comments are expected to carry the more subjective attitude of the newspaper or the writer. The particular events are chosen because they each represent dramatic changes in the political and social conditions, and I expect that these changes will be reflected in the linguistic choices of the two newspapers. The events I have chosen to look at are:

- The Outbreak of fighting in Gaza on 13 May 2007, with 5 persons killed, among them a prominent Al-Aqṣā Martyrs' Brigades leader and a journalist of *Filasṭīn*. This represented the first serious fighting between the two parties after the signing of the Mecca agreement and the establishment of a national unity government, taking place in a period when both parties officially focused on national unity.
- The fighting in Gaza on 11 June 2007, which clearly showed that the conflict had escalated into a full-scale civil war.
- The seizure of the security headquarters in the Gaza Strip by Ḥamās on 14 June 2007, and the subsequent decisions taken by President 'Abbās to dissolve the national unity government and declare a state of emergency in the Palestinian territories.

The linguistic features I will look at in the texts are:

- Transitivity: The choices made regarding the three elements of transitivity, including use of transformations, and the ideological effect this brings to the texts.
- Lexicon: How the lexical choices of the two papers carry ideological meaning and serve to link the two parties Fataḥ and Ḥamās to positive legitimising values or opposite negative, delegitimising values.

The texts are ordered chronologically according to the events on which they report, starting with the text from *al-Hayāt al-jadīda*. I begin each paragraph with a short introduction to the background of the event. Since the topic of this thesis is how different presentations of events can serve different interests, I find it necessary to point out that the introduction to each event is my own narrative based on my background knowledge obtained from several sources. I go on to analyse the texts related to each event. After giving a content summary of the text, I examine the analytical points outlined above and provide examples from the text. The findings linked to each event are then compared and discussed.



### 3. Analysis

#### 3.1 Mid- May 2007 fighting

On 13 May 2007, the most serious fighting between Fataḥ and Ḥamās supporters since the signing of the Mecca agreement on 8 February 2007 and the subsequent establishment of the national unity government, took place in the Gaza Strip. There had been incidents of violence in the days prior to this, but the newspapers had not reported much on it. The events of this day, however, left several people dead and injured, and they were covered in the main story of both the newspapers the following day. Among those killed was a leader of the Al-Aqṣā Martyrs' Brigades, Bahā' Abū Jarād, and a journalist from the *Filasṭīn* newspaper.

*Al-Ḥayāt al-jadīda* covered the the events in one extensive article on its front page (Text A), while *Filasṭīn* covered them in four shorter articles. For analytical purposes, I will treat the four texts as one, but for references, I have numbered them B-1, B-2, B-3 and B-4 to match the numbering in the appendix. Two main themes are covered in these texts: the fighting which lead to the killing of five people and injuries to several more, and the efforts made by the Fataḥ and Ḥamās leadership to resolve the situation and uphold their obligations towards the Mecca agreement.

##### 3.1.1 Text A – Al-Ḥayāt al-Jadīda 14 May 2007

Text A was the main story on the front page of al-Ḥayāt al-jadīda on 14 May 2007, and has the following headline:

الفتنة تصحو: هقتلى وعشرات الجرحى والمختطفين في غزة

The civil strife awakens: 5 killed and tens injured and kidnapped in Gaza

It has two sub-headlines:

حماس وفتح تتفقان بواسطة مصرية على انتهاء الاقتتال وسحب المسلحين والافراج عن المحتجزين

Ḥamās and Fataḥ agree, with Egyptian mediation, to stop the fighting and withdraw the gunmen and free the detainees

and

قائد من "شهداء الأقصى" ومرافقه وصحفي من جريدة فلسطين بين ضحايا الأحداث المؤسفة

Leader of “the Al-Aqṣā Martyrs” and his companion, and a journalist from the newspaper *Filasṭīn* among the victims of the regrettable events

Three themes are covered in Text A:

1) The renewal of the fighting in the Gaza Strip and its tragic result. Eyewitnesses describe heavy shooting between members of Fataḥ and Ḥamās (line 32-38) and medical sources confirm (line 1-18) that five people were killed and more than 20 were injured in what is called *the regrettable internal fighting* (الاشتباكات الداخلية المؤسفة).

2) That the two parties Fataḥ and Ḥamās had reached an agreement, through Egyptian mediation, to immediately end the fighting, withdraw the gunmen and free the detainees. Much focus is in these parts of the text on the two parties' efforts to resolve the situation and to uphold the obligations of the Mecca agreement. A *joint office* (المكتب المشترك) have been activated in order to supervise and follow up the agreement on the ground, and President ‘Abbās and Prime Minister Haniyya conducted a telephone call during which they discussed the situation (line 26-30).

3) The killing of the Al-Aqṣā Martyrs’ Brigades leader Abū Jarād and mutual accusations from Fataḥ and Ḥamās. The Fataḥ spokesman ‘Abd al-Ḥakīm ‘Awḍ gives Ḥamās the full responsibility for the murder, describing it as an attack on the national unity and the Mecca agreement, and calling it *a severe violation of the agreement* (تجاوزا خطيرا لاتفاق مكة) (line 43-48). Ḥamās spokesmen on their side express their deep concern and surprise over the rapid manner of the events which led to Abū Jarād’s death, and kidnappings, shooting and targeting of Ḥamās- members’ houses undertaken by Fataḥ members. Ḥamās further confirms its obligation towards the signed agreements with Fataḥ, calling upon the interior minister to investigate the events, assuring that the movement had no connection to the killing (line 49-54). Two other Palestinian factions, Islamic Jihad and the Sāmī al-Ghūl Brigades, are also given space to express their reaction to the renewed fighting (line 132-145) with the former calling on Fataḥ and Ḥamās to show self-control, in order for the enemies of Palestine people to not get possibilities from the fighting. The latter, which is affiliated with Fataḥ, on their part condemn the criminal act of the murder of Abū Jarād and his companion, stating that the executors of this crime are *scum* (حثة) who work together with the occupation, striving for internal fighting and battle.

### 3.1.1.1 Transitivity and transformations

Regarding transitivity in Text A, there is a clear difference between the parts of the text which deal with the negative and violent aspects of the incidents, such as the killings, injuries and kidnappings, and the parts which deal with the more positive aspects of how the two sides Fataḥ and Ḥamās apparently worked to resolve the situation and end the fighting.

(1) الفتنة تصحو: هقتلى وعشرات الجرحى المختطفين في غزة  
(headline)

The civil strife awakens: 5 killed and tens injured and kidnapped in Gaza

أكدت مصادر الطبية الليلة الماضية ارتفاع حصيلة ضحايا الاشتباكات الداخلية المؤسفة في قطاع غزة إلى (2)  
خمسة قتلى وأكثر من عشرين جريحا في حوادث إطلاق نار  
(line 1-6)

Medical sources confirmed last night the increase of amount of victims of the regrettable domestic clashes in the Gaza Strip, to five killed and more than twenty injured in incidents of shooting

وادت اجواء التوتر هذه الى عمليات خطف متبادلة بين حركتي فتح وحماس شملت عشرات الاشخاص. (3)  
(line 12-15)

This atmosphere of tension lead to mutual actions of kidnappings between the two movements Fatah and Hamās which included tens of people.

Examples (1), (2) and (3) are all related to the negative aspects of the incidents, and show similarity in the choices made regarding transitivity. The most striking feature is how the predicates are presented as being *processes* and not *actions*, meaning that they are seemingly not under the control of any specific agent(s). In (1), *the civil strife awakens* (الفتنة تصحو) is presented as the process that leads to the result of killed and kidnapped, and thus has the role of force in the sentence. The responsibility for what took place remains unspecified, made possible by the use of nominalisation, *five killed and tens injured and kidnapped* (هقتلى وعشرات الجرحى والمختطفين), to describe the result.

Similar nominalisations are also used in (2) with the result that the responsible agents are omitted from the sentence. The only verb left in the sentence is *confirmed* (أكدت) which describes the verbal action undertaken by the medical sources, and which is not linked to any violent actions.

In (3), Fatah and Hamās are mentioned in connection to the kidnappings, but still not as the responsible agents with *this tense atmosphere* (اجواء التوتر هذه) instead filling the role as the force which created this result.

حماس وفتح تتفقان بواسطة مصرية على انتهاء الاقتتال وسحب المسلحين والافراج عن المحتجزين (4)  
(sub-headline 1)

Hamās and Fatah agree, by Egyptian mediation, to stop the fighting and withdraw the gunmen and free the detainees

وكان جرى اتصال هاتفي مساء امس بين الرئيس محمود عباس ورئيس الوزراء اسماعيل هنية بحثا خلاله (5)  
الأحداث المؤسفة وشددوا على وجوب احتوائها والحفاظ على اتفاق مكة.  
(line 29-30)

A telephone call took place between President Maḥmūd ‘Abbās and Prime Minister Ismā‘īl Haniyya, during which they discussed the regrettable events and emphasised the necessity of containing them and upholding the Mecca agreement.

واعلن امس ان هنية اتفق مع وزير الداخلية هاني القواسمي، الذي علق استقالته من منصبه، على البدء (6) في "الخطوات الاجرائية" لتطبيق الخطة الامنية، في نزاع فتيل التوتر على ما يبدو.  
(line 35-37)

It was announced yesterday that Haniyya had agreed with Interior Minister Hānī al-Qawāsmī, who suspended his resignation from office, to start "the operational steps" in the application of the security plan, apparently defusing the tension.

In contrast to the manner in which the violent aspects are reported, (4), (5) and (6) show how the text presents predicates related to the efforts by the leadership of Fataḥ and Ḥamās to resolve the conflict mainly as actions, meaning that there is an active and responsible agent behind what took place. Fataḥ and Ḥamās are the agents in (4) who actively *agree* (تتفقان) to stop the fighting, withdraw the gunmen and release the detainees. In (5), the President and the Prime Minister fill the same role, as they during the telephone call *discussed* (بحثا) the events and *emphasised* (شددوا) the need to contain them and of upholding the Mecca agreement. In these two examples, both parties are equally portrayed as showing responsibility, while in (6), it is Prime Minister Haniyya who is the agent behind the positive action of agreeing to start *the operational steps* (الخطوات الاجرائية) to implement the security plan.

We see here a tendency that *al-Ḥayāt al-jadīda* in its reports on the events is careful not to directly blame any party or group for what took place, and rather focuses on the positive efforts undertaken by the authorities. The readers will of course have a knowledge that Fataḥ and Ḥamās were involved in the fighting, but instead of pointing to their direct involvement in violent actions in its own reports, the paper refers to statements made by the two parties and groups affiliated to them, in which they accuse each other for being involved in such actions. In this way, the text presents them as being agents behind different verbal actions aimed at hurting the other side, but not as directly responsible for material actions, which would have been more dramatic. Below are two examples of such statements, in which the most direct accusations come from Fataḥ-affiliated groups aimed at Ḥamās:

وحملت حركة فتح على لسان ناطقها عبد الحكيم عوض حركة حماس المسؤولية الكاملة عن عملية الاغتيال التي (7) وصفتها بانها تستهدف الوحدة الوطنية واتفاق مكة.  
(line 43-45)

And the Fataḥ movement, through its spokesman 'Abd al-Ḥakīm 'Iwāḍ, gave the Ḥamās movement the full responsibility for the murder, which it described as targeting the national unity and the Mecca agreement.

كما حملت كتائب شهداء الاقصى قي بيان "المسؤولية الكاملة لما يسمى بالقسام و(القوة) التنفيذية مسؤولية (8) اغتيال الاخ القائد بهاء ابو جراد واحد مرافقه"  
(line 69-70)

Likewise did the al-Aqṣā Martyrs' Brigades in statement give "the full responsibility for the murder of the brother, the leader Bah ā' Abū Jarād and one of his companions"

The action undertaken by the Fataḥ movement and the al-Aqṣā Martyrs' Brigades here is to verbally *give* Ḥamās the full responsibility (حملت [...] المسؤولية الكاملة الاغتيال) for the killing of Abū Jarād in (8). In addition, the Fataḥ spokesperson in (7) also *described* (وصفتها) it as targeting the national unity and the Mecca agreement.

### 3.1.1.2 Lexicon

The lexicon used by *al-Ḥayāt al-jadīda* in the coverage of the events reflects the newspaper's apparent interest in presenting the violence in a neutral manner and not to blame specific groups, while at the same time focusing on the national unity and agreement. The vocabulary used to denote the violent aspects is therefore one that gives the reader the impression that what took place is negative, but that no deliberate violations are committed by specific agents. If anything, a mutual responsibility is indicated:

- (9) الفتنة (headline) 'the civil strife'
- (10) الأحداث المؤسفة (headline, line 27 and 30) 'the regrettable events'
- (11) الاشتباكات الداخلية المؤسفة (line 3) 'the regrettable domestic clashes'
- (12) الاشتباكات/اشتباكات (line 7, 32, 38, 58 and 59) 'the clashes/clashes'
- (13) عمليات خطف متبادلة (line 13) 'mutual acts of kidnapping'
- (14) الحادث الأول من نوعه (line 34) 'the first incident of its kind'

The few times agents are mentioned in connection with violent actions, the wordings chosen do not place the responsibility with a certain group or party:

- (15) الملثمين (line 31) 'the masked'
- (16) عناصر محسوبة على حركة فتح وعناصر أخرى محسوبة على حركة حماس (line 33) 'elements accountable to the Fataḥ movement and other elements accountable to the Ḥamās movement'

In the parts of the text that are concerned with the efforts to resolve the conflict, a vocabulary which focuses on joint efforts and agreement creates an impression of strong national unity and a functioning and responsible government:

- (17) المكتب المشترك (line 26) 'the joint office'
- (18) تنفيذ الاتفاق (line 26) 'implementation of the agreement'
- (19) اتخاذ الاجراءات القانونية (line 27-28) 'take legal steps'
- (20) الحفاظ على اتفاق مكة (line 30) 'protecting the Mecca agreement'
- (21) وأكدت حماس التزامها بالاتفاق الموقع (line 52) 'Ḥamās stressed its obligation to the signed agreement'
- (22) العمليات المشتركة (line 104) 'the joint efforts'

The tendency to use a vocabulary which presents the violence in a neutral way regarding responsibility and rather focus on positive efforts is contrasted by the parts of the text which contain statements by the different groups, and which include mutual accusations. The majority of the accusations are in Text A from the Fataḥ-affiliated al-Aqṣā Brigades and the Sāmī al-Ghūl Brigades directed at Ḥamās, concerning the killing of the al-Aqṣā leader Abū Jarād, and the lexicon used to denote the incident presents it as a deliberate illegal action:

- (23) اغتيال (line 43, 60 and 70) 'murder'
- (24) عملية الاغتيال (line 44 and 46) 'the act of murder'
- (25) الجريمة (line 74) 'the crime'
- (26) الجريمة الاغتيال (line 142) 'the crime of murder'
- (27) العملية الإجرامية (line 143) 'the criminal act'

The responsible for these actions are also denoted by a vocabulary with strong negative connotations:

- (28) المجرمين (line 73) 'the criminals'
- (29) حشالة من المتواطئين مع الاحتلال (line 144) 'scum among those who collaborate with the occupation'
- (30) العملاء (line 147) 'the agents'

### 3.1.2 Text B – Filasṭīn 14 May 2007

*Filasṭīn* covered the events of the previous day in four articles on its front page on 14 May 2007. It should be noted that the paper on this day had added a front page dedicated to the deceased journalist of the newspaper in addition to the regular front page, which appeared on page three.

**Text B-1** has the headline:

مقتل خمسة مواطنين وإصابة 15 آخرين برصاص عناصر مسلحة

Five civilians killed and 15 others injured by the bullets of armed elements

The text is divided into three main parts. The first part (line 1-37) gives an account of the fighting that took place. The paper states that the al-Aqṣā Martyrs Brigades leader Abū Jarād was killed by splinters from a rocket propelled grenade fired by *unknown gunmen*

(مسلحون مجهولون), but adds that Fataḥ accused the Ḥamās movement for the killing. In a statement, Fataḥ gives Ḥamās the full responsibility for the killing, while the ‘Izz al-Dīn al-Qassām Brigades on their part deny any connection to the incident and blame Fataḥ for trying to cause a flare-up in tensions and demolish the air of calm and agreement in order to realise a foreign agenda.

The second part (line 37-76) is devoted to statements from Ḥamās, most of which are taken from an interview with the movement's representative to the Joint Office (المكتب المشترك), Ayman Ṭaha. The main message in these statements is that Ḥamās had no connection to the killing of Abū Jarād, and that there are groups which work to put fire to the situation again and to return to the previous fighting in order to implement a certain agenda. No specific groups are mentioned in this regard, but Fataḥ is accused of randomly throwing accusations and of wanting to convey the message that it does not want any collaboration in the implementation of the new security plan. Ḥamās further confirms its obligation towards the signed agreement with Fataḥ, assuring that it will not be driven into suspicious attempts aimed at setting ablaze the interior Palestinian scene and poisoning the atmosphere of agreement, the national unity and the national Palestinian peace.

The final part of the text (line 77-115) elaborates on the events that took place the previous day, including the spread of gunmen across the Gaza Strip, setting up of checkpoints and kidnappings. Most of this part appears to be the newspaper's own reports, but a statement from Ḥamās is also referred to in which Fataḥ is accused of kidnapping the dean of the Islamic University in Gaza.

**Text B-2** has the headline:

عباس وهنية يبحثان تطويق الأحداث المؤسفة بغزة

‘Abbās and Haniyya discuss the confinement of the regrettable events in Gaza

It deals mainly with two events:

1) The telephone call between President ‘Abbās and Prime Minister Haniyya. The text states (line 1-7) that a call took place between the President and the Prime Minister and that the two during it discussed the regrettable events and the work to confine them as soon as possible, stressing the need for self-control.

Two more phone calls are also said to have taken place (line 10-16), one with the Saudi foreign minister and one with the leader of the Egyptian security delegation in Gaza, in which all affirmed the necessity of stopping the bloodshed and to proceed to the language of dialogue and to put the Palestinian national interest first.

2) The appeal from the legislative council to stop the fighting. The last part of the text (line 17-31) deals with an appeal from the *Legislative Council* (المجلس التشريعي) to all the Palestinian factions and forces, and especially Fataḥ and Ḥamās, to urgently stop the violence and destruction that take place in the Gaza Strip, and condemn the killings. The Council also calls

on the Palestinian media to work with a *national spirit* (بروح وطنية) and to pursue accuracy when publishing information and news.

**Text B-3** has the headline:

فتح وحماس تتفقان على وقف إطلاق النار وسحب المسلحين من الشوارع  
Fataḥ and Ḥamās agree to end the shooting and withdraw the gunmen from the streets

The text reports on the agreement that was reached between Fataḥ and Ḥamās in order to resolve the situation and is very similar in its content to the parts of Text A which dealt with the same topic (cf. 3.1.1). It is stated that the agreement on a cease fire and withdrawal of the gunmen was reached during a meeting the night before (line 1-5), while the last part (line 6-20) refers to a statement published by the two movements in which more details on what was agreed are given.

**Text B-4** has the headline:

عناصر أمنية تعذب بدم بارد المحرر بصحيفة فلسطين سليمان العشي  
Elements of the security executes the editor of the Filasṭīn newspaper in cold blood

The text is entirely focused on the incident in which the journalist Sulaymān al-‘Ashī was killed and his colleague Muḥammad ‘Abdū was injured.

The newspaper in this text goes far in accusing groups affiliated with Fataḥ for what happened by stating that elements of the security apparatus committed the crime of executing al-‘Ashī, claiming that he was targeted after he and his colleague were kidnapped on the morning of the previous day by members of the Presidential Guard, when they were in a taxi close to the house of President ‘Abbās (line 1-12).

The last part of the text reports that eyewitnesses added that members of the security apparatus seized the two men and a third person, and fired shots at them, leading to serious injuries before leaving them, bleeding (line 41-45).

### 3.1.2.1 Transitivity and transformations

The choices regarding transitivity in *Filasṭīn*'s reports are mainly similar to those of *al-Ḥayāt al-jadīda* in Text A, with the same division between the parts dealing with the violence and the parts dealing with the efforts to resolve the conflict:



قتل أمس، خمسة مواطنين من بينهم الصحفي في صحيفة "فلسطين" اليومية سليمان العشي "23 عامن" (31) وأصيب خمسة عشرة آخرون بجراح مختلفة في مناطق متفرقة من قطاع غزة، إثر تجدد الاشتباكات المسلحة وعمليات الخطف المتبادل بين حركتي "فتح" و"حماس"

(B-1, line 1-5)

Five civilians, among them the journalist from the daily newspaper "Filastīn" Sulaymān al-Ashī, 23 years old, were killed yesterday, and 15 others suffered different injuries in various areas of the Gaza Strip, after the renewal of the armed clashes and mutual kidnappings between the two movements Fataḥ and Ḥamās

وقال وزير الإعلام د. مصطفى البرغوثي، في تصريح له: "إن حصيلة الاشتباكات بين حركتي فتح وحماس في (32) غزة أمس بلغت خمسة قتلى و ١٤ جريحاً".

(B-1, line 8-11)

The information minister dr. Muṣṭafā al-Barghūthī said in a statement: "that the result of the clashes between the two movements Fataḥ and Ḥamās yesterday reached five killed and 14 injured.

In (31), the focus is on the affected participants of the fighting, the killed and injured, rather than on the agents responsible for it. The use of passives *were killed* (قُتِلَ) and *suffered injuries* (أُصِيبَ [...]) allows for the agent to be omitted from the sentence, and together with the use of the nominalisation *renewal of the the armed clashes and mutual kidnappings* (تجدد الاشتباكات المسلحة وعمليات الخطف المتبادل), the events are presented as processes which are not controlled by any specific agent. The mentioning towards the end that the events took place between Fataḥ and Ḥamās has more the function of circumstances in the sentence and does not place agency directly with either of them. The two movements are also mentioned in (32), but again they are not given agency for the killed and injured, which is presented as a process.

ووقعت الاشتباكات بعد ساعات من مقتل بهاء أبو جراد (٢٣ عاماً) أحد كوادر كتائب شهداء الأقصى شمال (33) قطاع غزة إثر إصابته بشظايا قذيفة صاروخية أطلقها مسلحون مجهولون على السيارة التي كان يستقلها

(B-1, line 12-16)

The clashes took place hours after the killing of Bahā' Abū Jarād (23 years old), one of the leaders of the Al-Aqsā Martyrs' Brigades in Northern Gaza, after he was hit by splinters from a rocket-propelled grenade fired by unknown gunmen at the car which he was riding

وشهد قطاع غزة انتشاراً مكثفاً للمسلحين، وإقامة عشرات الحواجز وإغلاق الطرق الرئيسية للمدينة، حيث (34) اختطف المسلحون على تلك الحواجز ما يزيد على (٧٠) مواطناً، غالبيتهم من طلبة الجامعات والمواطنين.

(B-1, line 78-82)

The Gaza Strip witnessed a dense spreading of gunmen and the setting up of tens of checkpoints and the closure of the main roads of the city, whereas the gunmen at those checkpoints kidnapped more than 70 citizens, most of whom were students of the universities and civilians.

The event which led to the killing of Abū Jarād is in (33) presented as an action, but we still find that the newspaper does not blame any specific group by referring to the agents behind this action as *unknown gunmen* (مسلحون مجهولون). Similarly, the anonymous *the gunmen* (المسلحون) fill the role as agents of the action *kidnapped* (اختطف) in the last part of (34). The first

part of (34), however, follows the line of presenting the events as processes by using the nominalisations *a dense spreading of gunmen* (انتشارا مكثفا للمسلحي) and *setting up of tens of checkpoints* (إقامة عشرات الحواجز), instead of using active clauses like *gunmen spread* (انتشر مسلحون) or *gunmen set up* (أقام مسلحون).

*Filasṭīn's* coverage also contains several references to statements in which the two parties verbally accuse each other of being responsible for negative actions. However, in contrast to Text A, the majority of these accusations are directed at Fataḥ by Ḥamās or Ḥamās-affiliated groups, the only exception being (35):

وحملت حركة "فتح" حركة "حماس" في بيان لها "كامل المسؤولية عن مقتل أبو جراد"، وقالت: "نمنح الجميع (35) مدة ٤٨ ساعة لاتخاذ الإجراءات المناسبة لملاحقة المجرمين والذين ارتكبوا هذه الجريمة".  
(B-1, line 22-26)

The Fataḥ movement gave in a statement the Ḥamās movement "the full responsibility for the killing of Abū Jarād", and said: "we grant the public 48 hours to take the suitable steps in order to prosecute the criminals who committed this crime".

بدورها أصدرت كتائب عز الدين القسام، التابعة لحركة "حماس" بيانا نفت فيه علاقتها بعملية الاغتيال، (36) واعتبرت اتهامات فتح محاولة "لإذكاء التوتر وتقويض أجواء الهدوء والاتفاق لتحقيق مآرب شخصية وأجندة خارجية".  
(B-1, line 27-31)

On their part, the 'Izz al-Dīn al-Qassām Brigades, which belongs to Ḥamās, issued a statement in which it denied its connection to the murder, and considered the accusations of Fataḥ to be an attempt "to cause a flare-up in the tension and to demolish the air of calm and agreement in order to realise special goals and a foreign agenda.

ومن أبرز المختطفين الذين تم الإفراج عنهم د.علي الشريف، المحاضر بالجامعة الإسلامية بغزة الذي تعرض (37) منزله لاعتداء، وتم خطفه وإهانته من عناصر تابعة لحركة فتح حسب ما ذكرت "حماس" في بيان لها.  
(B-1, line 83-87)

Among the most prominent kidnapped who was released was dr. 'Alī al-Sharīf, the dean of the Islamic university in Gaza, whose house was attacked, and who was kidnapped and insulted by members belonging to the Fataḥ movement, according to what Ḥamās said in a statement.

The Fataḥ movement in (35) verbally *gave* (حملت) the Ḥamās movement the responsibility for the killing, while the 'Izz al-Dīn al-Qassām Brigades *considered* (اعتبرت) the accusations to be an attempt at causing a flare-up in (36). The two parties are thus presented as being responsible for verbal actions aimed at hurting the other party, but not of actual material actions. The same kind of modification is found also in (37) in which the last part, *according to what Ḥamās said in a statement* (في بيان لها), shows that this is not the newspaper's own report, and as such it cannot confirm that the action actually took place.

One part of *Filasṭīn's* report breaks with the above pattern, however, namely the report on the killing of the journalist al-ʿAshī. Here the Fataḥ-affiliated security apparatus is openly blamed for the killing without any modifications:

أقدمت عناصر أمنية على ارتكاب جريمة إعدام المحرر بصحيفة فلسطين سليمان عبد الرحيم العشي، بدم بارد (38) وإطلاق النار باتجاه الموظف الإداري، محمد عبود، ما أدى إلى إصابته بجروح خطيرة.

(B-4, line 1-6)

Elements of the security undertook the perpetration of the crime of execution of the editor of the Filasṭīn newspaper, Sulaymān ‘Abd al-Raḥīm al-‘Ashī, in cold blood and of firing shots at the administrative employee, Muḥammad ‘Abdū, which led to him being seriously injured.

وقد استشهد الزميل العشي، بعد أن قامت عناصر أمنية تابعة لحرس الرئاسة باختطافه وزميله عبود، صباح (39) أمس حينما كانا مستقلين لسيارة أجرة، قرب منزل الرئيس محمود عباس.

(B-4, line 7-12)

The colleague al-‘Ashī was martyred after elements of the security belonging to the Presidential Guard kidnapped him and his colleague ‘Abdū yesterday morning, when they were boarding a taxi close to the house of President Maḥmūd ‘Abbās.

The killing of al-‘Ashī is in (38) and (39) presented as an action with a clear agent. In (38) this agent is *elements of the security* (عناصر أمنية), while in (39) it is further specified as *elements of the security belonging to the Presidential Guard* (عناصر أمنية تابعة لحرس الرئاسة), both of which refer to the Fataḥ-controlled security apparatus. The newspaper does not make any efforts to conceal the responsibility, and it is interesting to note that these two examples are not taken from parts of the text which refers to statements from one of the two parties or neutral witnesses, but is presented as the newspaper's own report on the incident.

The positive efforts that took place to resolve the conflict are also in *Filasṭīn* presented mainly as actions with both parties being given the role as active agents:

عباس وهنية يبحثان تطويق الأحداث المؤسفة بغزة (40)

(B-2, headline)

‘Abbās and Haniyya discuss the confinement of the regrettable events in Gaza

وأكدت الطرفان على وجوب ضبط النفس وتطويق الأحداث المؤسفة (41)

(B-2, line 6-7)

The two parties emphasised the obligation of self-control and enclosing of the regrettable events

فتح وحماس تتفقان على وقف إطلاق النار وسحب المسلحين من الشوارع (42)

(B-3, headline)

Fataḥ and Ḥamās agree to end the shooting and withdraw the gunmen from the streets

واتفق الوفدان أيضا على الإفراج الفوري عن كافة المختطفين من الطرفين وكل ما تم احتجازه من ملكيات عامة (43) وخاصة (أسلحة وعتاد).

(B-3, line 18-20)

The two delegations also agreed to the immediate release of all the kidnapped of the two parties, and of all belongings that has been confiscated, personal and public (weapons and ammunition).

No transformations are used in these examples to conceal responsibility as the two parties and their respective leaders are presented as being the agents responsible for the actions *discuss* (يبحثان) in (40), *emphasised* (أكدت) in (41) and *agree* (تتفقان)/*agreed* (اتفق) in (42) and (43).

### 3.1.2.2 Lexicon

The lexicon of *Filasṭīn* in its coverage of the events does not differ much from that of *al-Hayāt al-jadīda* in Text A. In its reports on the violence, a vocabulary which neutralises the responsibility is used, both when denoting the events:

- (44) الاشتباكات المسلحة (B-1: line 4) 'the armed clashes'
- (45) عمليات الخطف المتبادل (B-1: line 4) 'mutual actions of kidnapping'
- (46) الأحداث المؤسفة (B-1: line 6, B-2: headline, line 3-4 and 7) 'the regrettable events'
- (47) الاشتباكات (B-1: line 9, 12 and 20) 'the clashes'
- (48) أعمال العنف والتخريب (B-2: line 21-22) 'acts of violence and destruction'
- (49) الأحداث الخطيرة (B-3: line 6) 'the serious events'

and the agents:

- (50) مسلحون مجهولون (B-1: line 15) 'unknown gunmen'
- (51) المسلحين/ المساحون (B-1: line 18, 55, 80, 103 and 115) 'the gunmen'
- (52) مجهولين (B-1: line 96) 'unknown'

When referring to the positive efforts undertaken by the two parties and the government in relation to the events, also *Filasṭīn* uses a lexicon that refer to national unity and agreement:

- (53) وأكدت حماس على التزامها بالاتفاق الموقع (B-1: line 62) 'Ḥamās confirmed its obligation to the signed agreement'
- (54) لغة الحوار (B-2: line 15) 'language of dialogue'
- (55) مصلحة الوطنية (B-2: line 15-16) 'national interest'
- (56) بروح وطنية (B-2: line 30) 'with national spirit'
- (57) حرصا على المصلحة الوطنية (B-3: line 10) 'protecting the national interest'
- (58) المكتب المشترك (B-3: line 22) 'joint office'

Like in Text A, the image of unity and agreement is modified by a more negatively loaded vocabulary found in the statements by the different parties. In *Filasṭīn*, however, the majority of the statements are from Ḥamās and the al-Qassām Brigades in which they deny the accusations from Fataḥ concerning the killing of Abū Jarād, and at the same time accuse Fataḥ of actions which disrupt the unity and agreement:

- (59) تقويض أجواء الهدوء والاتفاق (B1: line 30) 'demolition of the atmosphere of peace and agreement'

- (60) لتحقيق مآرب شخصية وأجندة خارجية (B1: line 30-31) 'to realise special goals and a foreign agenda'
- (61) إلقاء التهم جزافاً (B1: line 44) 'randomly throwing charges'
- (62) تفجير الساحة الفلسطينية الداخلية (B1: line 65) 'blasting the Palestinian domestic field'
- (63) تسميم أجواء الوفاق والوحدة الوطنية والسلام الأهلي الفلسطينية (B1: line 66-67) 'poisoning the atmosphere of national unity and national Palestinian peace'

As already mentioned, *Filasṭīn*'s report on the killing of the journalist al-‘Ashī is distinctively different from the rest of the coverage. The lexicon in this part, which appears to be the newspaper's own report, portrays the incident as a serious violation:

- (64) تعمد بدم بارد (B-4: headline) 'execute in cold blood'
- (65) جريمة إعدام [...] بدم بارد (B-4: line 2-4) 'crime of execution [...] in cold blood'
- (66) استشهد (B-4: line 7) 'was martyred'

The responsibility for the killing is put on the Fataḥ-controlled security apparatus:

- (67) عناصر أمنية (B-4: headline, line 1 and 41) 'elements of the security'
- (68) عناصر أمنية تابعة لحرس الرئاسة (B-4: line 8-9) 'elements of the security belonging to the Presidential Guards'

### 3.1.3 Summary of the coverage of the mid-May 2007 fighting

The fighting in the Gaza Strip on 13 May 2007 took place only some three months after the signing of the Mecca agreement which called for national unity and the language of dialogue, and the subsequent establishment of the unity government. The renewal of the fighting threatened to demolish the basis for this unity project which the two parties entered into after being subjected to heavy internal and external pressure, and the coverage of the fighting in both *al-Ḥayāt al-Jadīda* and *Filasṭīn* appears to be aimed at conveying the message that the unity is still strong and that the unity government will survive and continue to work for the interests of the Palestinian people.

Based on this, the two newspapers' representations of the events are to a large extent conform, and follow what can be called a *national unity discourse*. In the texts, efforts are apparently made to not blame any specific group or party for the violence that took place, but rather focus on the active role played by the government and the leaders of Fataḥ and Ḥamās in order to resolve the conflict. This is illustrated by the difference in choices made regarding transitivity in the parts of the texts which cover the violence and the parts that cover the more positive aspects, such as the calls that took place between ‘Abbās and Haniyya and the agreement that was reached between Fataḥ and Ḥamās through Egyptian mediation. In the former we find an extensive use of transformations such as passives and nominalisations which moves the focus

from the agent(s) responsible for what took place, to the affected participants and the result. The negative sides of the events are thus mainly presented as processes which are neither deliberate nor controlled. In the latter, however, the opposite is the case. In these parts, the leaders and the unity government are more often presented as agents who are both active and responsible, and no efforts are made to blur the agency. This representation is dominant in both papers and helps create the impression that a strong national unity still exists in the Palestinian territories and that the legitimacy of the unity government and the Mecca agreement are not affected by the renewed fighting.

The lexical choices in the texts largely support the impression of a national unity discourse. The negative aspects of violence are described through the use of a vocabulary which does not put the blame on any specific agent but rather points to a mutual responsibility. By modifying the two parties' direct involvement in the violence, their legitimacy and the legitimacy of the unity government is upheld.

In the reports on the efforts undertaken by the two parties and the government to resolve the conflict, however, a vocabulary with positive connotations is used by both newspapers. Referring to Chibnall's list of consensus values (cf. 2.4), this vocabulary corresponds with several of the positive legitimising values (the number in brackets refers to the example in which the lexicon occurs):

Lexicon	Values
المكتب المشترك 'the joint office' (17), (58)	Peacefulness, responsibility
تنفيذ الاتفاق 'implementation of the agreement' (18)	Responsibility, order
اتخاذ الاجراءات القانونية 'take legal steps' (19)	Legality, responsibility, firmness
الحفاظ على اتفاق مكة 'protection of the Mecca agreement' (20)	Responsibility, order
العمليات المشتركة 'the joint efforts' (22)	Peacefulness, responsibility
لغة الحوار 'language of dialogue' (54)	Peacefulness
مصلحة الوطنية 'national interest' (55)	Responsibility
بروح وطنية 'with national spirit' (56)	Honesty, responsibility
حرصا على المصلحة الوطنية 'protecting the national interest' (57)	Responsibility, firmness

Through linking both parties equally to a vocabulary which correspond with positive legitimising values, the newspapers contribute to building consensus for unity and agreement, and not for one specific side of the conflict.

Despite the main impression from the reports on the fighting being that the newspapers try to follow the line of what I have called a national unity discourse, the underlying conflict between Fataḥ and Ḥamās appears in parts of the text, particularly in the statements made by the two movements and affiliated groups. While being careful not to directly blame any specific group for violence in their own accounts of what took place, both papers allow the parties to accuse each other of being responsible for violence, including killings and kidnappings.

The lexicon used in these statements is also significantly different from that used in the newspapers' own reports. The violence is described by a vocabulary with strong negative connotations, presenting it mainly as deliberate violations committed by responsible agents. In *al-Ḥayāt al-jadīda*, the accusations are mainly concerned with the killing of one of the leaders of the al-Aqṣā Martyrs Brigade, Abū Jarād, and in most of these, Ḥamās or its affiliated groups are mentioned explicitly as the agent, while in others it is implicit from the context that they are the ones who are blamed. When analysing the negatively loaded vocabulary in these accusations, we find that they correspond with several of the negative, delegitimising values of Chibnall's list:

Lexicon	Values
اغتيال/عملية اغتيال/الجريمة الاغتيال 'murder'/'the act of murder'/'the crime of murder' (23), (24), (26)	Illegality, violence
الجريمة/العملية الإجرامية 'the crime'/'the criminal act' (25), (27)	Illegality

*Filastīn* on its part has only one reference to the accusations from Fataḥ in its report, and focuses instead on statements from Ḥamās in which the movement distances itself from any involvement in the killing and accuse Fataḥ of trying to destroy the unity and agreement. The lexicon in these accusations also correspond with negative, delegitimising values on Chibnall's list:

Lexicon	Values
تفويض أجواء الهدوء والاتفاق 'demolition of the atmosphere of peace and agreement' (59)	Irresponsibility, chaos

لتحقيق مآرب شخصية وأجندة خارجية 'to realise special goals and a foreign agenda' (60)	Corruption
إلقاء التهم جزافاً 'randomly throwing charges' (61)	Corruption, irresponsibility
تفجير الساحة الفلسطينية الداخلية 'blasting the Palestinian domestic field' (62)	Chaos, violence
تسميم أجواء الوفاق والوحدة الوطنية والسلام الأهلي الفلسطينية 'poisoning the atmosphere of national unity and national Palestinian peace' (63)	Corruption, chaos

The fact that it is clearly stated that these are statements presented by the two parties, and not the newspapers' own accounts of the events, however, helps modify the effect of these accusations, but by comparing which statements that are included in the respective newspapers and the content of the accusations in these statements, we do not only get an indication of the two papers political affiliations, but also of some of the core elements of the conflict. Ḥamās is mainly linked to the negative, illegitimate values *illegality* and *violence* in the accusations from Fataḥ, while Fataḥ on their part is mainly linked to *corruption* and *irresponsibility* in the accusations from Ḥamās. Looking at the historical and political context, this is not surprising as Ḥamās has traditionally been regarded as having taken over the role of leading the armed resistance against Israel from Fataḥ, and as such been deemed an illegal terrorist organisation by many countries. At the same time, Fataḥ has been criticised by Ḥamās for being corrupt and for letting the down the Palestinian cause through its focus on diplomatic solutions. By including these statements, *al-Hayāt al-jadīda* and *Filasṭīn* contribute, although in an indirect manner, to each party's attempts at delegitimising the other party, showing that the national unity discourse which prevail in other parts of the coverage is fragile.

A further indication of the underlying conflict is the report on the killing of the journalist al-ʿAshī in *Filasṭīn*, in which the Fataḥ-controlled security apparatus is openly blamed for his death in the newspaper's own reports. This part breaks with the style of the rest of the coverage, and a possible explanation for this is the direct involvement of the newspaper in the incident as it was one of their own journalists who was killed, and that the report therefore is coloured by the emotions of the author(s) at the time of writing.

### 3.2 The 11 June 2007 fighting in Gaza

On 11 June 2007 the heaviest fighting since the January 2006 elections broke out in the Gaza Strip between troops loyal to Ḥamās and Fataḥ. It seemed clear that the unity government was



not going to last, and that a full-scale civil war was in the making. International media reported that “fighting has taken on a new intensity and brutality in recent days”<sup>16</sup>, and the Egyptian mediator in Gaza was quoted, saying about the two rival parties that “[...] they have killed all hope. They have killed the future.”<sup>17</sup> Both *al-Ḥayāt al-jadīda* and *Filasṭīn* had the fighting as the main story on the front page the following day.

### 3.2.1 Text C – *Al-Ḥayāt al-jadīda* 12 June 2007

Text C is taken from the front page of *al-Ḥayāt al-jadīda* on 12 June 2007 and has the headline:

١٩ قتيلا بينهم قائد فتحاوي وشقيقه وأب ونجله وعشرات الجرحى في غزة

19 killed, among them a Fataḥ leader and his brother and a father and his two sons, and tens injured in Gaza

It also has two sub-headlines:

الاشتباكات تفضّ جلسة الحكومة وتمتد إلى داخل المستشفيات و"الصحة" ونقابة الأطباء  
تناشدان لإخراج المرافق الصحية من دائرة الاقتتال

The clashes break up cabinet session and spread to inside the hospitals and the “health”, and the Medical Association plead for the health installations to be kept out of the sphere of fighting

and:

فتح تقترح وقفا فوريا لإطلاق النار وحماس تدرس العرض وحماد يدعو الحركتين للاجتماع  
اليوم ويهدد بالجوء للشارع

Fataḥ proposes an immediate ceasefire and Ḥamās considers the proposal, and Ḥamād calls the two movements to a meeting today and warns against resorting to the street

The main part of the text reports on the heavy fighting that took place in different areas of the Gaza Strip the previous day, and the result of this fighting, including 19 people being killed and tens injured. The fighting is reported to have spread to inside the hospitals in Gaza and to the surroundings of the cabinet headquarters, leading to the break up of an official governmental meeting. Several medical sources are quoted in the text giving details on the victims' names and injuries (line 42-54).

The Fataḥ spokesperson Tawfīq Abū Khūṣa is quoted from a press conference in which he presented a proposal saying that Fataḥ is ready to bear the responsibility and have the courage

16 [http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle\\_east/6744713.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/6744713.stm) , accessed 13.11.09

17 *ibid.*

to initiate a unilateral cease fire. He further underlined his movement's obligation to the Mecca agreement, which stipulates the end of armed display. In response to this, a Ḥamās spokesperson says that his movement is studying the proposal and that Ḥamās is working to end the tension (line 18-35).

In the last part of the text (line 86-110), the government's view on the situation is expressed, especially regarding the shooting towards the building where the cabinet was conducting its weekly meeting. The government assures in a statement that it will prosecute the responsible for what it calls *serious violations* (مخالفات خطيرة), without naming any specific groups. An unnamed source at the Prime Minister's office says that the Prime Minister is following the events in order to return the situation back to normal. The deputy Prime Minister, al-Aḥmad, on his part accuses unnamed elements for not wanting an end to the fighting and for wishing to create conditions suitable to direct a decisive blow towards the agreements contained in the Mecca agreement.

### 3.2.1.1 Transitivity and transformations

The choices made regarding transitivity in Text C follow mainly the line of the texts discussed in 3.1 covering the mid-May 2007 fighting, with a widespread use of transformations in the reports on the violence, which contribute to concealing the responsibility:

قتل ١٩ مواطنا وأصيب العشرات بجروح امس في حلقة دموية من مسلسل الانتال الدائر في قطاع غزة بين (69)  
حركتي فتح وحماس.  
(line 1-5)

19 citizens were killed and tens were injured yesterday in a new bloody sequence of the revolving series of fighting in the Gaza Strip between the two movements Fataḥ and Ḥamās.

وكانت اشتباكات عنيفة اندلعت امس بين انصار فتح وحماس في محيط ودخل المستشفيات في قطاع غزة (70)  
(line 57-59)

And violent clashes broke out yesterday between followers of Fataḥ and Ḥamās around and inside the hospitals in the Gaza Strip

Fataḥ and Ḥamās are mentioned as being involved in the incidents in both (69) and (70), but by using transformations, the newspaper is able to move the focus away from them as agents. In (69) the use of passives *killed* (قُتل) and *injured* (أُصيب) instead makes the patients *19 citizens* (١٩ مواطن) in the beginning of the sentence the focal point, while the passive *broke out* (اندلعت) is used in (70) with the result that the events are presented as processes rather than actions.

In Text A we saw how *al-Ḥayāt al-Jadīda* presented predicates related to the efforts taken to resolve the conflict as actions, with the leaders of both Fataḥ and Ḥamās as active agents. In

Text C such efforts are still presented as actions, but with the significant difference that this time Fataḥ is given agency alone:

فتح تقترح وقفاً فورياً لاطلاق النار وحماس تدرس العرض (71)  
(sub-headline 2)

Fataḥ proposes immediate ceasefire and Ḥamās studies the proposal

بدورها اقترحت حركة فتح وقفاً فورياً لاطلاق النار في حين قالت حماس انها تدرس مدى جدية هذا العرض. (72)  
(line 15-18)

On their part did the Fataḥ movement propose an immediate ceasefire, while Ḥamās said that they were investigating the seriousness of that proposal.

In both (71) and (72), Fataḥ is presented as the agent responsible for the verbal action *proposes immediate ceasefire* (تقترح وقفاً فورياً) and *did propose an immediate ceasefire* (اقترحت [...] وقفاً فورياً), while Ḥamās is given a more passive role.

While the reports on the mid-May fighting in both papers referred to several statements in which the two parties accused each other of being responsible for violent actions, Text C only contains one similar reference. Interestingly this refers to the Ḥamās-affiliated al-Qassām Brigades accusing members of Fataḥ, saying that they *executed* (اعدمت) one of its field commanders:

وقالت كتائب القسام في بيان لها ان عناصر من حركة فتح اعدمت احد قادتها الميدانيين (73)  
(line 70-71)

The al-Qassām Brigades said in a statement that members of Fataḥ executed one of their field commanders

### 3.2.1.2 Lexicon

The lexical choices in the parts of Text C that cover the violent aspects of the events are not significantly different from those found in *al-Ḥayāt al-jadīda*'s coverage of the mid-May fighting. A vocabulary which presents the violence as negative, but not as deliberate violations is still predominant, with the main difference being that in this text, more qualifying adjectives with negative connotations are added, indicating that the fighting had intensified:

(74) الاشتباكات (headline and line 61) 'the clashes'

(75) حلقة دموية جديدة من مسلسل الاقتتال الدائر (line 3-4) 'new bloody sequence of the revolving fighting'

(76) اشتباكات عنيفة (line 49, 58 and 68) 'violent clashes'

(77) الاشتباكات المسلحة (line 53) 'the armed clashes'

(78) عمليات اختطاف متبادلة (line 56) 'mutual acts of kidnapping'

(79) الاقتتال العنيف (line 63-64) 'the violent fighting'

The agents involved in the violence are presented by a neutral vocabulary which indicates mutual responsibility and which do not blame any specific group:

- (80) عناصر من حماس وفتح (line 53-54) 'elements from Ḥamās and Fataḥ'
- (81) انصار فتح وحماس (line 58) 'adherents of Fataḥ and Ḥamās'
- (82) مقاتلين من فتح وحماس (line 65) 'fighters from Fataḥ and Ḥamās'
- (83) المسلحين (line 75) 'the gunmen'

The only reference in the text to an accusation from one of the parties which contains a vocabulary indicating that the other party committed violations, is the accusation by the al-Qassām Brigades blaming Fataḥ:

- (84) عناصر من حركة فتح اعدمت (line 70) 'elements from Fataḥ executed'

In contrast to the report on the violence, we find differences regarding the lexical choices in the parts of the report concerned with the efforts to resolve the conflict. The vocabulary that linked both parties and the government to unity and agreement in the coverage of the mid-May fighting is no longer present in this text, and instead Fataḥ alone is linked to a lexicon referring to peace and agreement:

- (85) وقفا فوريا لاطلاق النار (headline, line 16 and 21-22) 'immediate ceasefire'
- (86) الجرأة للمبادرة بوقف اطلاق النار (line 23-24) 'the courage to initiate a ceasefire'
- (87) التزام [...] باتفاق مكة المكرمة (line 29-30) 'obligation [...] to the Mecca agreement'

### 3.2.2 Text D – Filasṭīn 12 June 2007

Text D is taken from the front page of *Filasṭīn* on 12 June 2007 and has the headline:

عشرة قتلى وعشرين جريحا حصيلة الاثنين الدامي في غزة

Ten killed and 20 injured as a result of the bloody Monday in Gaza

The first part of the text (line 1-48) focuses on the clashes that took place in the Gaza Strip the previous day and its results, stating that nine people were killed and more than 20 injured. Both medical sources and eyewitnesses are referred to in this part, and they state that it was gunmen affiliated with the Fataḥ movement that targeted many of the victims.

A large part of the text (line 50-95) is dedicated to statements made by the Ḥamās-affiliated *Executive Force* (القوة التنفيذية) in which it announced that it called up all its members in order to work for the protection of the citizens and that they shall defend the Palestinian people with full strength. They also stress that the Executive Force is a part of the security establishment, working in accordance with the laws and regulations. The statements contain some serious

accusations towards Fataḥ, saying that Fataḥ are coup makers and usurpers who implement the plans of the *Zionist enemy* (العدو الصهيوني) against the Palestinian people, and that have exercised a propaganda campaign against the Executive Force from the beginning, which also included direct attacks.

Following the strong attacks from the Executive Force against Fataḥ, a part of the text (line 97-110) is dedicated to the announcement from the Fataḥ movement regarding its readiness to declare a unilateral cease fire in order to end the internal fighting. Ḥamās on their part obligate themselves to retaliate the killing of the Ḥamās-affiliated imam Muḥammad Rafātī, (who was killed on 10 June 2007<sup>18</sup>), while at the same time declaring in a statement that they are not in a struggle with the Fataḥ movement for the power (line 111-125).

### 3.2.2.1 Transitivity and transformations

The choices made regarding transitivity in Text D break with the line of using transformations to blur responsibility in reports on violence, which has been prevailing in the previous texts we have discussed from both *Filasṭīn* and *al-Ḥayāt al-jadīda*. In this text, the violence is instead mainly presented as actions, with the Fataḥ movement and groups affiliated with it as agents.

وقالت المصادر الطبية في مستشفى بيت حانون ان المواطن باسل الكفارنة ٢٥ عامن وهو أحد أفراد القوة (88) التنفيذية التابعة لوزارة الداخلية، قتل بعد أن استهدفته مجموعة مسلحة تتبع حركة فتح شمال قطاع غزة.  
(line 11-16)

The medical sources at the Beit Ḥanūn hospital said that the citizen Bāsal al-Kafārnah, 25 years old and one of the members of the Executive Force which belongs to the Interior Ministry, was killed after an armed group belonging to the Fataḥ movement targeted him north in the Gaza Strip.

وأفاد شهود عيان أن مسلحين يتبعون لحركة فتح قاموا بإطلاق النار على منزل أحد قادة القسام (89)  
(line 22-24)

And eyewitnesses added that gunmen belonging to the Fataḥ movement fired shots at the house of one of the leaders of al-Qassām

وقال شهود عيان في مخيم الشاطئ: “أن عدداً من مسلحي عائلة بكر المحسويين على حركة فتح قاموا بإطلاق (90) النار على منزل عائلة عجور في المخيم، مما أدى إلى استشهاد المواطن مازن عجور أحد قادة القوة التنفيذية، وقاموا بإشعال النار في منجرة لهم”.  
(line 35-40)

Eyewitnesses in the al-Shāṭi' refugee camp said: “that a number of gunmen from the Bakr family, affiliated with the Fataḥ movement, fired shots at the house of the ‘Ajūr family in

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18 [http://www.pchrgaza.org/portal/en/index.php?option=com\\_content&view=article&id=4165:bloody-fighting-in-gaza-on-the-first-day-of-the-general-certificate-of-education-exams&catid=72:press-releases-security-chaos-&Itemid=213](http://www.pchrgaza.org/portal/en/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=4165:bloody-fighting-in-gaza-on-the-first-day-of-the-general-certificate-of-education-exams&catid=72:press-releases-security-chaos-&Itemid=213), accessed 29.07.10

the camp, which led to the martyrdom/loss of life of the citizen Māzin ‘Ajūr, one of the leaders of the Executive Force, and put fire to a carpentry belonging to them”

In (88) focus is on the affected participant as a consequence of the use of the passive *was killed* (قُتِلَ), but through the inclusion of the circumstances *after an armed group belonging to the Fatah movement targeted him* (بعد أن استهدفته مجموعة مسلحة تتبع حركة فتح), Fatah is still presented as the responsible agent. In (89) and (90) agency is even more clearly expressed as *gunmen belonging to the Fatah movement* (مسلحين يتبعون لحركة فتح) and *gunmen from the Bakr family, affiliated with the Fatah movement* (مسلحي عائلة بكر المحسويين على حركة فتح) respectively, are presented as active agents who *fired shots* (قاموا بإطلاق النار) and *put fire to a carpentry* (قاموا بإشعال النار في منجرة). This representation of agency is similar to what we found in the mutual accusations referred to in Text A and Text B, however, with the significant difference that here *the medical sources* (المصادر الطبية) and *eyewitnesses* (شهود عيان), which are supposedly neutral, are behind the statements. In this way the newspaper gives the readers the impression that this is an unbiased and correct account of what took place.

The only place where *Filasṭīn* uses transformations to blur responsibility is in the opening lines, as shown in (91), in which passives *killed* (قُتِلَ) and *injured* (إصابة) makes it possible for the author to omit the agent(s):

قتل تسعة مواطنين وإصابة أكثر من عشرين آخرين أمس في الاشتباكات الدموية المؤسفة التي شهدت تصعيدا (91)  
خطيرا بعد ظهر أمس في مناطق متفرقة من قطاع غزة  
(line 1-4)

Nine citizens were killed and more than 20 others were injured yesterday in the regrettable bloody clashes which witnessed a serious intensification yesterday afternoon in different areas of the Gaza Strip

There are no references to violent actions undertaken by Ḥamās or its affiliated groups in the text. The Ḥamās-controlled Executive Force is rather presented as being responsible for positive actions as a response to the violence of the Fatah-affiliated groups:

إلى ذلك، أعلنت القوة التنفيذية التابعة لوزارة الداخلية، حالة الاستنفار العام في صفوفها، واستدعاء جميع (92)  
عناصرها للعمل من أجل حماية المواطنين، مؤكدة أنها "لن تقف مكتوفة الأيدي وستدافع بكل قوة عن أبناء شعبنا  
وستلاحق كل من يعتدي أو يحرّض على القوة التنفيذية مهما كلف ذلك، ولن تسكت بعد الآن".  
(line 50-57)

Thereby, the Executive Force, belonging to the Interior Ministry, declared a state of general alert within its ranks and called up all of its members for duty in order to protect the citizens, stressing that they “will not stand idly by and shall protect our people with full force and prosecute all those who attack or provoke the Executive Force, whatever the cost, and they shall not be silent from now on”.

The Ḥamās-controlled Executive Force in (92) declare that they *shall protect* (ستدافع) the people and *prosecute* (ستلاحق) those who attack them. Focus is thus no longer on joint efforts

to resolve the conflict, which was portrayed in the texts covering the mid-May fighting, but rather on this group as taking responsibility on its own.

Despite the focus on Fataḥ as the active part in the violence, the statement in which the organisation announces its preparedness to enter an agreement in order to end the fighting is also referred to by *Filasṭīn*:

وفي وقت متأخر من مساء أمس، أعلنت حركة "فتح" استعدادها لاتفاق جاد وملزم وحقيقي لوقف الاقتتال الداخلي في قطاع غزة  
(line 97-99)

Fataḥ announced late last night its preparedness to enter a sincere, binding and genuine agreement to stop the internal fighting in the Gaza Strip

### 3.2.2.2 Lexicon

In the parts of Text D which appear to be *Filasṭīn*'s own report, i.e. where no other source is mentioned, the lexicon used to denote the violent aspects of the events are similar to that used in the coverage of the mid-May fighting, meaning that it is presented as negative but with no specific group being blamed:

- (94) الاشتباكات الدموية المؤسفة (line 2) 'the regrettable bloody clashes'
- (95) الاشتباكات (line 27) 'the clashes'
- (96) اشتباكات مسلحة (line 34) 'armed clashes'
- (97) عناصر من الأجهزة الأمنية الموالية لحركة فتح ومسلحين من حركة المقاومة الإسلامية "حماس" (line 5-7) 'elements from the security apparatus adherent to the Fataḥ movement, and gunmen from the Islamic Resistance Movement "Ḥamās"'
- (98) المسلحون (line 41) 'the gunmen'
- (99) بعض المسلحين الملتئمين المدججين (line 47) 'some of the masked and heavily armed gunmen'

Large parts of the text are, however, based on statements from different sources, and in these parts we find a vocabulary which presents the violence mainly as violations committed by Fataḥ or Fataḥ-affiliated groups. It is significant that this is the case not only in statements from Ḥamās-affiliated persons, but also from persons that appear to be neutral, including medical sources and eyewitnesses:

- (100) استهدفه (line 14) 'targeted him'
- (101) قاموا بإطلاق النار [...] مما أدى إلى استشهاد المواطن مازن عجزور (line 38) 'fired shots [...] which led to the martyrdom/loss of life of the citizen Māzin 'Ajūr'
- (102) استهداف أبناء القوة التنفيذية (line 90) 'targeting of members of the Executive Force'
- (103) جريمة إطلاق النار (line 91) 'crime of shooting'
- (104) إعدامهم بدم بارد (line 95) 'their execution in cold blood'

In these statements, Fataḥ is openly blamed for being responsible for these negative actions:

- (105) مجموعة مسلحة تتبع حركة فتح (line 15) 'group of gunmen belonging to the Fatah movement'
- (106) مسلحين يتبعون لحركة فتح (line 22-23) 'gunmen belonging to the Fatah movement'
- (107) انقلابي حركة فتح الذين ينفذون مخططات العدو الصهيوني (line 67) 'coup-makers from the Fatah movement who implement the plans of the Zionist enemy'
- (108) الخونة والانقلابيين المحسوبين على حركة فتح (line 89) 'the traitors and the coup-makers adherent to the Fatah movement'

Statements by the Ḥamās-controlled Executive Force is also given considerable space in the text, containing a vocabulary which presents its actions in a positive manner, as opposed to those of Fatah:

- (109) ستدافع/سندافع (line 54 and 70) 'shall protect'
- (110) ستلاحق (line 55) 'shall prosecute'
- (111) تعمل وفق القانون (line 59) 'working according to the law'
- (112) تضبطها لوائح المؤسسة الأمنية (line 60) 'regulated by the standing rules of the security establishment'
- (113) أعلى درجات الانضباط والمسؤولية (line 85-86) 'highest level of discipline and responsibility'

Fatah on its part is only referred to by a positive vocabulary regarding its willingness to enter an agreement and to declare ceasefire:

- (114) استعدادها لاتفاق جاد ومُلزم (line 98) 'its readiness to enter a sincere and binding agreement'
- (115) استعداد لإعلان اتفاق وقف إطلاق النار من جانب واحد (line 104-105) 'readiness to declare a unilateral ceasefire'

### 3.2.3 Summary of the coverage of the 11 June 2007 fighting

The fighting on 11 June 2007 was the most serious of its kind in the Gaza Strip since the elections in January 2006, and the representation of the events in both *al-Ḥayāt al-jadīda* and *Filasṭīn* reflect the increased tension. In their coverage of the mid-May fighting discussed in 3.1, the two newspapers both followed what I called a national unity discourse which apparently focused on creating the impression that unity and agreement was still valid regardless of the renewed clashes. Despite this discourse being prevailing, however, there were also indications of the papers' respective political affiliations, displayed mainly in the references to statements made by the two parties. These affiliations are more directly displayed in their coverage of the 11 June 2007 fighting, and the conformity in the two newspapers' representation is no longer present. Of the two, *al-Ḥayāt al-jadīda* is the one which remains closest to a national unity discourse, while *Filasṭīn* on its part clearly moves in the direction of a more conflict-orientated discourse.

Different choices regarding transitivity, both in reports on the violent aspects of the conflict, and in reports on the efforts to resolve it, contribute to the diversified representation.



Concerning the former, *al-Hayāt al-jadīda* in its reports continue to make use of transformations such as passives in order to present the events as processes which are not under the control of specific agents. *Filasṭīn* on its part, mainly presents the violence as deliberate actions undertaken by Fataḥ-affiliated persons and directed against members of the Ḥamās-controlled Executive force and the al-Qassām Brigades. This representation of the violence is similar to what we found in the parts referring to statements made by the two parties in Text A and Text B concerning the mid-May fighting. A significant difference, however, is that in Text D we find this representation in statements made by eyewitnesses and medical sources who are supposedly neutral parts in the conflict, giving the reader the impression that this is an accurate account of what took place. The presentation in *Filasṭīn* of Fataḥ as the aggressive part not only serves to place this organisation in a bad light, but also to create a sense of consensus for the actions undertaken by the Ḥamās-controlled Executive Force, which are presented as being a necessary response to the violent actions of Fataḥ.

While *Filasṭīn* apparently aims at building consensus for Ḥamās and the Executive Force by focusing on Fataḥ as being responsible for violence, *Al-Hayāt al-jadīda* on its part focuses on Fataḥ's role in the efforts undertaken to resolve the conflict. In its coverage of the mid-May fighting, such efforts were presented as a joint venture involving both parties and the government. This time, however, Ḥamās is not given an active role in this positive aspect of the conflict as Fataḥ is presented as the sole agent behind actions aimed at ending the fighting. These efforts by Fataḥ are also mentioned in *Filasṭīn* (cf. example (93)), but the main focus in this paper is rather on the Executive Force's reaction to the Fataḥ aggression which include promises to protect the Palestinian people whatever the cost (cf. example (92)).

The different choices in transitivity in the two newspapers' coverage contribute to two contradicting pictures being painted of the events and of each of the parties role in what took place. It is clear that building consensus for the national unity government and to express support for the Mecca agreement is no longer the main focus, and this impression is further strengthened when we look at the lexical choices in the reports, and how these link the two parties to either legitimising or delegitimising values.

In its reports on the violence, the lexical choices of *al-Hayāt al-jadīda* are mainly similar to those of its coverage of the mid-May fighting, meaning that it is presented as negative, but not as direct violations committed by specific agents. There are equally no statements included in the coverage in which any group is accused of committing violations, and based on this the vocabulary used does not link either of the two parties to negative, delegitimising values.

In *Filasṭīn*'s reports, however, we find statements which include a vocabulary that clearly links Fataḥ to such values:

Lexicon	Values
قاموا بإطلاق النار [...] مما أدى إلى استشهاد المواطن 'fired shots [...] which led to the martyrdom/loss of life of the citizen Māzin 'Ajūr' (101)	Violence, illegality
'targeting members of the Executive Force' (102) استهداف أعضاء القوة التنفيذية	Violence, illegality
'the crime of shooting' (103) جريمة إطلاق النار	Illegality, violence
'their execution in cold blood' (104) إعدامهم بدم بارد	Illegality, violence
انقلابي حركة فتح الذين ينفذون مخططات العدو 'the coup makers of the Fataḥ movement who implement the plans of the Zionist enemy' (107) الصهيوني	Corruption, illegality, chaos
'the traitors and coup makers adherent to the Fataḥ movement' (108) الخونة والانقلابيين المحسوبين على حركة فتح	Corruption, illegality, chaos

The linking of Fataḥ to corruption through accusing it of advocating foreign interests was present also in the coverage of the mid-May fighting. The allegations take a more serious form in this text, however, as members of the movement are directly accused of collaborating with what is named *the Zionist enemy*, and of being traitors. In addition, there is also a stronger focus on linking Fataḥ to the negative, delegitimising values of *violence* and *illegality* through presenting it as the aggressive part in the conflict. In contrast to this representation of Fataḥ, *Filasṭīn* also includes in its report statements by the Ḥamās-controlled Executive Force in which a vocabulary which mainly links it to positive legitimising values is used:

Lexicon	Values
'shall protect' (109) ستدافع	Responsibility, order
'shall prosecute' (110) ستلاحق	Responsibility, legality, firmness
'working according to the law' (111) تعمل وفق القانون	Legality, honesty, order

regulated by the standing rules of the security establishment' (112)	Legality, honesty, order
'highest levels of discipline and responsibility' (113)	Responsibility, honesty, order

The aim of these statements is apparently to at one hand delegitimise Fataḥ, and on the other hand build consensus for Ḥamās in general and for the Executive Force in particular. The increased focus on the Executive Force can be explained by the intensification of the conflict which took place since the mid-May fighting. This Force was established in April 2006 by the Ḥamās-led Interior Ministry as a response to President 'Abbās' decision to transfer the control with the regular police force to the President's office (cf. 1.3). As the conflict intensified and a break-up of the unity government and the Mecca agreement seemed likely, the Ḥamās leadership probably realised the need of creating an impression of this force as a responsible and legitimate police force under the control of the Interior Ministry, and not as yet another armed group loosely connected to one of the sides in the conflict. This is done by opposing it to the violence and illegality of Fataḥ and its security forces, and by emphasising honesty, responsibility and legality as core principles of the force. As an armed force, the Executive Force can be used as a tool for Ḥamās to establish a rule by coercion (cf. 2.2), but the focus on linking it to consensus values show that it is important for the movement to establish a rule based on consent.

While *Filasṭīn*'s reports contain statements which link Fataḥ to negative, delegitimising values and which focus on the positive aspects of the Executive Force, *al-Ḥayāt al-jadīda* on its part focuses on Fataḥ's will and efforts to end the fighting, by referring to statements by the movement with a vocabulary that links the movement to positive legitimising values:

Lexicon	Values
'immediate ceasefire' (85) وقف فوراً لاطلاق النار	Responsibility, peacefulness
'the courage to initiate a ceasefire' (86) الجرأة للمبادرة بوقف إطلاق النار	Responsibility, peacefulness
'obligation ... to the Mecca agreement' (87) التزام ... باتفاق مكة المكرمة	Responsibility, honesty

In these statements we find that Fataḥ is linked to the values *responsibility*, *peacefulness* and *honesty*. Focus is thus on presenting the movement as the responsible and strong part which can secure peace for the Palestinian people, in line with its historical background as the

advocate for a diplomatic approach. At the same time the impression of Fataḥ as the aggressive part that was given in the statements, is contradicted. In the coverage of the mid-May fighting, positive efforts to end the conflict were in *al-Ḥayāt al-jadīda* linked equally to both parties and the government. The fact that it is only Fataḥ that is presented as being involved in such efforts this time shows that the newspaper has taken a significant step away from the national unity discourse, although to a less extent than *Filasṭīn*.

### **3.3 The Ḥamās seizure of the security headquarters in Gaza and the dissolving of the unity government on 14 June 2007**

After several of days of intense fighting between groups affiliated with Fataḥ and Ḥamās respectively in the Gaza Strip, Ḥamās and groups loyal to it seized control of the headquarters of the different Fataḥ-controlled security forces in the Gaza Strip on 14 June 2007. This led to President ‘Abbās dissolving the unity government and declaring a state of emergency in the Palestinian territories. An emergency government was put up by the President, headed by the former Finance Minister Salām Fayād, while Ḥamās on their side announced that they would not accept this new government and continue to rule on their own. The dramatic developments dominated the front page of both the newspapers on 15 June 2007. *Al-Ḥayāt al-jadīda* covered both the Ḥamās takeover of the security headquarters and the response from President ‘Abbās in one article (Text E), while *Filasṭīn* had the same themes covered in three shorter separate articles. As in 3.1, I will treat these texts as one for analytical purposes, numbering them F-1, F-2 and F-3 for reference.

#### **3.3.1 Text E – Al-Ḥayāt al-jadīda 15 June 2007**

Text E was the top story of the front page of *al-Ḥayāt al-jadīda* on 15 June 2007 and has the headlines:

الرئيس يقيل الحكومة ويعلن فرض حالة الطوارئ في الضفة وغزة

The President dismisses the government and declares the imposing of state of emergency in the West Bank and Gaza

and:

حماس تسيطر على المقار الأمنية بما فيها منتدى الرئاسة ومقتل ٢٧ مواطنا بالقطاع

Ḥamās takes control of the headquarters of the security including the Presidential assembly room and 27 citizens killed in the Gaza Strip

The first part of the text (line 1-22) focuses on the decisions made by President ‘Abbās to dismiss the current government, impose a state of emergency and form an emergency government after the latest security developments in Gaza. It is referred to statements from the Presidential General Secretary al-Ṭayyib ‘Abd al-Raḥīm, who describes the developments that took place in Gaza as an attempt at a military coup against the Palestinian legislation and a violation of the basic law.

In response to the decisions taken by the President, Ḥamās, through its spokesperson Sāmī Abū Zahrī, says that the decisions made by the President to dismiss the government and to declare a state of emergency are unacceptable and do not have any practical value, claiming that according to the law, the current government should be transformed into a care taking government (line 23-29).

The last part of the text (line 30-48) is concerned with the events that took place the previous day. The newspaper states that at least 107 people have been killed during the last week's fighting, and that the spokesperson of the al-Qassām Brigades announced that the group the night before took control over all the security headquarters of the Palestinian National Authority in the Gaza Strip, including the presidential assembly room. It is further reported that fighters from Ḥamās seized the office of the security forces and that the Ḥamās leaders announced the “liberation” of the Gaza Strip. Medical sources say that at least 24 people were killed, among them 18 from Fataḥ who were found in the headquarters of the Preventive Security. According to witnesses, masked gunmen from Ḥamās evicted tens of Fataḥ fighters from the building, some of whom were undressed. The text ends with a reference to a statement from Abū Zahrī in which he says that what takes place in Gaza is a second liberation of the Strip from the *herds of agents* (قطعان العملاء) after the liberation from the *herds of settlers* (قطعان المستوطنين).

### 3.3.1.1 Transitivity and transformations

The main focus of *al-Ḥayāt al-jadīda*'s coverage of the 14 June events is on the decisions taken by the President in response to the Ḥamās offensive. The choices made regarding transitivity in this part of the text help create an impression of the President as a strong leader by making him the active agent:

الرئيس يقيل الحكومة ويعلن فرض حالة الطوارئ في الضفة وغزة (116)  
(headline)

The President dismisses the government and declares the imposing of state of emergency in the West Bank and Gaza

اعلن الطيب عبد الرحيم الامين العام للرئاسة مساء امس ان الرئيس محمود عباس قرر اقالة الحكومة الحالية (117) برئاسة اسماعيل هنية وفرض حالة الطوارئ اثر التطورات الامنية الاخيرة في قطاع غزة.

(line 1-3)

The Presidential General Secretary, al-Tayyib ‘Abd al-Raḥīm, declared yesterday evening that President Maḥmūd ‘Abbās decided to dismiss the the current government headed by Ismā‘īl Haniyya and to impose state of emergency after the latest security developments in the Gaza Strip.

وقال عبد الرحيم ان الرئيس عباس اصدر مرسوما "باقالة رئيس الوزراء [...]" (118)

(line 8)

‘Abd al-Raḥīm said that the President issued a decree “dismissing the prime minister [...]"

واضاف ان الرئيس اصدر مرسوما ثالثا يقضي بتشكيل "حكومة انفاذ حالة الطوارئ" (119)

(line 14-15)

And he added that the President issued a third decree calling for the formation of “a government for implementation of the state of emergency”

The decisions made by ‘Abbās are in these examples presented as actions under the control of him as the sole agent. He is the one who actively *dismisses* (يقيل) and *declares* (يعلن) in (116), *decided* (قرر) in (117) and *issued* (اصدر) in (118) and (119). No transformations are used to modify or conceal the responsibility.

The other aspect of the events, namely the takeover of the security headquarters, are also presented as actions in the text. This time, however, it is Ḥamās and groups affiliated to it which are given agency:

حماس تسيطر على المقار الأمنية بما فيها منتدى الرئاسة ومقتل ٢٧ مواطنا بالقطاع (120)

(sub-headline)

Ḥamās takes control of the headquarters of the security including the Presidential assembly room and 27 citizens killed in the Gaza Strip

جاء ذلك بعد تدهور الأوضاع في قطاع غزة واستيلاء مقاتلي حركة حماس على جميع المقار الأمنية بما فيها (121) مقر الرئاسة.

(line 4-5)

That came after the deterioration of the conditions in the Gaza Strip and the seizure by fighters from the Ḥamās movement of all the security headquarters, including the Presidential headquarters.

وكان استولى مقاتلو حماس امس على مجمع القوى الأمنية وأعلن مسؤولوهم "تحرير" قطاع غزة. (122)

(line 35-36)

Gunmen from Ḥamās took over the building of the security forces and its responsible declared “liberation” of the Gaza Strip.

وقام مسلحون مقنعون من حماس باخراج عشرات من مقاتلي فتح، جرد بعضهم من ملابسه، من المبنى (123) وقد رفعوا ايديهم في الهواء، حسب الشهود.

(line 45-46)

Masked gunmen from Ḥamās evicted tens of Fataḥ fighters, some of them undressed, from the building and they raised their hands in the air, according to witnesses.

In the first part of (120), Ḥamās is the agent which actively *takes control over the headquarters* (تسيطر على المقار). In the same sentence, the use of the passive *27 citizens killed* (مقتل ٢٧ مواطنا) contributes to concealing the direct responsibility for these deaths, but since Ḥamās is mentioned as the agent in the first part, the impression is that it is responsible also for the killings. Nominalisation is used in (121) with *seizure* (استيلاء), but here the agent *fighters from the Ḥamās movement* (مقاتلي حركة حماس) is included, making it clear who is responsible. In (122) and (123), there are no elements that modify the responsibility for the actions, as *gunmen from Ḥamās* (مقاتلو حماس) and *masked gunmen from Ḥamās* (مسلحون مقنعون من حماس) respectively functioning as agents. The mentioning of the patients *tens of Fataḥ fighters* (عشرات من مقاتلي فتح) in (123) strengthens the impression that Fataḥ is the victim in the events, while Ḥamās is the aggressive agent.

### 3.3.1.2 Lexicon

Most of Text E is based on statements from persons affiliated with either Fataḥ or Ḥamās, and the lexical choices vary according to whose statements are referred to. The statements by the Presidential General Secretary ‘Abd al-Raḥīm, representing Fataḥ, are given most space in the text, and the vocabulary used in these parts presents the actions undertaken by Ḥamās as deliberate illegal actions:

- (124) الحرب الاجرامية (line 11) 'the criminal war'
- (125) الانقلاب العسكري (line 12) 'the military coup'
- (126) العصيان المسلح (line 12) 'the armed revolt'
- (127) محاولة انقلابية عسكرية ضد الشرعية الفلسطينية (line 20) 'attempted military coup against the Palestinian legislation'
- (128) انتهاك واضح للقانون الاساسي (line 20) 'clear violation against the Basic Law'

Statements from Ḥamās and the al-Qassām Brigades are not given the similar amount of space in the text, but the lexicon used in these statements presents the same actions in a different manner, as something positive:

- (129) تحرير (line 36) 'liberation'
- (130) "تحرير ثانٍ للقطاع من" قطاعان العملاء" (line 47) 'second liberation of the (Gaza) Strip from herds of agents'

The decisions by the President are in these statements, however, denoted by a vocabulary with clear negative connotations:

- (131) مرفوض (line 25 and 26) 'unacceptable'
- (132) ليس له ادنى قيمة عملية (line 25 and 28) 'it has not the least practical value'

### 3.3.2 Text F – Filasṭīn 15 June 2007

**Text F-1** was the main story on the front page of *Filasṭīn* 15 June 2007, and has the headline:

القصاص يحكم قبضته على قطاع غزة

Al-Qassām strengthens its grip on the Gaza Strip

The first paragraph (line 1-9) of this short text states that fighters from Ḥamās took control of most of the security headquarters in Gaza the day before, after the *surrender and flight* (استسلام وهروب) of the members and commanders of the *Palestinian security apparatus* (الأجهزة الأمنية الفلسطينية). The Ḥamās spokesperson Abū Zahrī is quoted saying that Ḥamās was forced to this step after negotiations failed to stop what he calls *the crimes of this group* (جرائم من هذه الفئة), without specifying which group he points to.

The second paragraph (line 10-14) is concerned with the international reactions to the events, with the UN General Secretary calling for talks regarding the deployment of an international force to the Gaza Strip, something which Ḥamās is reported to reject.

**Text F-2** is also from the front page of *Filasṭīn* on 15 June 2007, next to Text H, and has the headline:

الرئيس عباس يقرر حل الحكومة وإعلان حالة الطوارئ

President ‘Abbās decides on dissolution of the government and declaration of state of emergency

The text deals solely with the three decrees issued by President ‘Abbās in response to the developments the day before. Except from line 15-16, the entire text consists of statements made by the Presidential General Secretary al-Ṭayyib ‘Abd al-Raḥīm regarding these decrees. The statements referred to are almost identical with the statements referred to in line 1-22 of Text H (cf. 3.3.1). The text does not refer to any statements from other organisations or persons.

**Text F-3** was placed below the two previous texts on the front page of *Filasṭīn* on 15 June 2007 and has the headline:

حماس تعتبر ان قرارات عباس "مرفوضة ولا قيمة عملية له"

Ḥamās considers ‘Abbās' decisions to be unacceptable and without any practical value

The text is based on statements from three different persons who are all affiliated with Ḥamās regarding the decisions made by the President.

In the first part (line 1-33) the spokesperson Sāmī Abū Zahrī says that he considers the decisions taken by President ‘Abbās to dismiss the government, declare a state of emergency



and form transition government to be unacceptable and without any practical value. He states further that, according to the law, the current government transforms into a care-taking government and that there is no such thing in the law called state of emergency. He also discloses that contacts took place during the last two days between the Ḥamās movement and President ‘Abbās, under Saudi supervision, but that Ḥamās was still surprised by the latest decisions. This, he claims, indicate that the President responded to foreign pressure.

The Minister of Local Government, Muḥammad al-Barghūthī (Ḥamās), in the second part of the text (line 34-41) says that he was surprised by the President's decrees and that they will complicate the issue of reaching an agreement and have a negative effect.

The last part of the text (line 42-97) is devoted to statements from the spokesperson of the *Change and Reform block* (كتلة التغيير والإصلاح), which represents Ḥamās in the Legislative Council, Ṣalāḥ al-Bardawīl. He describes the decrees as being *erratic* (متخبطة), *contradicting* (متناقضة) and *emotional* (انفعالية), and stresses that these decrees do not have any connection to the constitution or the public good. In the end he says that it is necessary for the real leaders of the Fataḥ and Ḥamās movements to meet and reshape the security apparatus to give it a national shaping, and to put the the interests of the Palestinian people over the the interests of the factional groups. He also expresses his support to the unity government, the interior ministry and the joint forces.

### 3.3.2.1 Transitivity and transformations

Like in *al-Ḥayāt al-jadīda*, the different aspects of the conflict are in *Filasṭīn* presented as actions which are under the control of specific agents. A major difference, however, is that in *Filasṭīn* it is the Ḥamās takeover which is given precedence in the coverage and not the decisions taken by the President:

القسام يحكم قبضته على قطاع غزة (133)  
(F-1, headline)

Al-Qassām strengthens its grip on the Gaza Strip

سيطر مقاتلو حركة المقاومة الإسلامية (حماس) أمس على أبرز المقرات الأمنية في غزة، باسطين سيطرتهم (134) على كافة القطاع، بعد استسلام وهروب أفراد وقادة الأجهزة الأمنية الفلسطيني. وأصبحت مقرات الأمن الوقائي الفلسطيني والمخابرات وأمن الرئاسة والأمن الوطني، في محافظات قطاع غزة بأيدي مقاتلي حماس.  
(F-1, line 1-5)

Fighters from the Islamic Residence Movement (Ḥamās) yesterday took control over most of the security headquarters in Gaza, extending its control to the entire Strip, after the surrender and flight of the members and leaders of the Palestinian security apparatus. And the headquarters of the Palestinian Preventive Security, the Intelligence, the Presidential

Guards and the National Security in the governorates of the Gaza Strip came under the control of Ḥamās fighters.

وقد بسطت حماس الخميس سيطرتها على قطاع غزة بعد ان استولت على المقار الامنية التابعة لفتح في (135) القطاع.

(F-2, line 15-16)

Ḥamās extended its control in the Gaza Strip on Thursday after it seized the headquarters of the security belonging to Fataḥ in the (Gaza) Strip.

The al-Qassām Brigades are presented as the agent that *strengthens its grip* (يحكم قبضته) in (133). By choosing to use this specific verb, the newspaper indicates that the al-Qassām Brigades had already been in control over the Gaza Strip for some time, and that the latest development does not represent a dramatic change. The same is the case in (135) in which Ḥamās is the agent that *extended its control* (بسطت [...] سيطرتها). In (134), *fighters from the Islamic Resistance Movement* (مقاتلو حركة المقاومة الإسلامية) are the agents who actively *took control* (على [...] سيطر), but also in this example is it indicated that this was more an expansion of its power by the inclusion of the nominalisation *extending their control* (بأسطين سيطرتهم). As a further modifying aspect is the circumstances *after the surrender and flight of the members and leaders of the Palestinian security apparatus* (بعد استسلام وهروب أفراد وقادة الأجهزة الأمنية الفلسطيني) also included, giving the impression that the Ḥamās fighters moved in to fill a gap left by the Fataḥ-controlled security apparatus.

*Filasṭīn* also refers to the decisions made by the President in its coverage on the front page, citing mainly the same statements that *al-Hayāt al-jadīda* did in its coverage:

أعلن الطيب عبد الرحيم الامين العام للرئاسة الفلسطينية مساء امس ان الرئيس محمود عباس قرر إقالة (136) الحكومة الحالية برئاسة اسماعيل هنية وفرض حالة الطوارئ اثر التطورات الامنية الاخيرة في قطاع غزة.

(F-2, line 1-3)

The Palestinian Presidential General Secretary, al-Ṭayyib ‘Abd al-Raḥīm, declared yesterday evening that President Maḥmūd ‘Abbās decided to dismiss the the current government headed by Ismā‘īl Haniyya and imposed state of emergency after the latest security developments in the Gaza Strip.

واضاف عبد الرحيم ان عباس اصدر مرسوما ثانيا اعلن فيه "حالة الطوارئ في جميع اراضي السلطة (137) الوطنية الفلسطينية

(F-2, line 6-7)

And ‘Abd al-Raḥīm added that ‘Abbās issued a second decree in which he announced “a state of emergency in all the territories of the Palestinian National Authority

In both (136) and (137), the President is presented as the responsible agent who *decided to dismiss* (قرر إقالة), *imposed* (فرض), *issued* (اصدر) and *announced* (اعلن). These choices in transitivity can serve to give an impression of the President as a responsible and powerful leader as it did in *al-Hayāt al-jadīda*, but *Filasṭīn* modifies this impression by including

statements from Ḥamās in which he is accused of not making these decisions on his own, and that they were taken due to external pressure:

[...] الرئيس استجاب لضغوط خارجية. (138)  
(F-3, line 21-22)

[...] the President responded to external pressure.

[...] الرئيس خضع لضغوط خارجية". (139)  
(F-3, line 33)

"[...] the President succumbed to external pressure".

In the same statements, Ḥamās is on its part presented as being active in the work to reach a peaceful solution to the conflict:

"أول أمس قدمت الحركة مبادرة [...]" (140)  
(F-3, line 23-24)

"The movement presented an initiative the day before yesterday [...]"

نحن مع تدعيم حكومة الوحدة الوطنية ومع تدعيم وزارة الداخلية ومع تدعيم القوة المشتركة (141)  
(F-3, line 94-96)

We are for strengthening the national unity government, the interior ministry and the joint force

The Ḥamās movement is in these examples the active agent which *presented* (قدمت) an initiative in (140) and which declare its apparent support for the institutions contained in the Mecca agreement in (141).

### 3.3.2.2 Lexicon

As mentioned, the main focus of *Filastīn*'s coverage is on the Ḥamās takeover of the security headquarters. The lexical choices in the newspaper's own reports covering this aspect affirm the impression created by the choices in transitivity, namely that this took form more of a consolidation of Ḥamās' existing power than of a dramatic change:

- (142) يحكم قبضته (F-1, headline) 'strengthens its grip'
- (143) باسطين سيطرتهم (F-1, line 2) 'extending their control'
- (144) بسطت حماس الخميس سيطرتها (F-2, line 15) 'Ḥamās on Thursday extended its control'
- (145) بعد استسلام وهروب (F1, line 2-3) 'after the surrender and flight'

*Filastīn* in its coverage also includes the statements made by the Presidential General Secretary ‘Abd al-Raḥīm concerning the decisions taken by the President. Since these statements are the same which were referred to in *al-Ḥayāt al-jadīda*, the same vocabulary denoting Ḥamās' actions as violations is present:

الحرب الاجرامية (F-2: line 7) 'the criminal war' (146)

- (147) الانقلاب العسكري (F-2: line 8) 'the military coup'  
 (148) العصيان المسلح (F-2: line 8) 'the armed revolt'  
 (149) محاولة انقلابية عسكرية ضد الشرعية الفلسطينية (F-2: line 17-18) 'attempted military coup against the Palestinian legislation'  
 (150) انتهاك واضح للقانون الاساسي (F-2: line 18) 'clear violation against the Basic Law'

The Ḥamās spokesperson Abū Zahrī on his part has a different approach in his statement, which is identical to example (130) from Text E:

- (151) "تحرير ثانٍ للقطاع من قطعان العملاء" (F-1: line 6-7) 'second liberation of the (Gaza) Strip from herds of agents'

This is the only example in *Filasṭīn*'s report in which Ḥamās uses a vocabulary seemingly aimed at justifying its own actions. Instead, considerable space is given to statements which focus on the President's decisions, and which contains a lexicon that presents them as being far from legitimate:

- (152) مرفوض/مرفوضة (F-3: headline, line 5 and 9) 'unacceptable'  
 (153) لا قيمة عملية لها (F-3: headline) 'they have no practical value'  
 (154) ليس له ادنى قيمة عملية (F-3: line 6) 'it has not the least practical value'  
 (155) متخيلة (F-3: line 42, 47 and 83) 'erratic'  
 (156) متناقضة (F-3: line 48) 'contradicting'  
 (157) انفعالية (F-3: line 48 and 82) 'emotional'  
 (158) لا علاقة لها بالدستور (F-3: line 49 and 83) 'they have no connection to the constitution'

Despite the latest development and the apparent unavoidable break between the two parties, Ḥamās is, in statements made by its parliamentary group, also linked to a vocabulary which focuses on unity and collaboration:

- (159) صياغة وطنية (F-3: line 91) 'national shape'  
 (160) المصلحة العليا للشعب الفلسطيني (F-3: line 92-93) 'the best interest of the Palestinian people'  
 (161) تدعيم حكومة الوحدة الوطنية (F-3: line 94) 'support the national unity government'  
 (162) تدعيم القوة المشتركة (F-3: line 95-96) 'support the joint force'

### **3.3.3 Summary of the coverage of the seizure of the security headquarters in Gaza and the dissolving of the unity government on 14 June 2007**

Following the intensification of the conflict between Fataḥ and Ḥamās on 11 June 2007, we witnessed a change in the coverage of the two newspapers from a relatively conform representation situated within what I chose to call a national unity discourse, to a diversified representation in which their respective political affiliations were displayed more clearly than in the coverage of the mid-May fighting. While *Filasṭīn* entered into a more conflict-oriented

discourse, *al-Ḥayāt al-jadīda* remained cautious in its reports on the violence not to blame specific groups, and as such stayed closer to the national unity discourse. After the events of 14 June 2007, however, which led to Ḥamās taking over the security headquarters in Gaza and President ‘Abbās dissolving the government and declaring a state of emergency, it is apparent that the national unity discourse has been abandoned by both papers. Despite covering the same events in their reports, we find clear differences in the respective representations of these events, which are seemingly aimed at legitimising the actions of one or the other party in the conflict in line with each paper's political affiliations.

The diversification in representation is not only displayed in different choices in transitivity and lexicon, but also in which aspects of the events that are focused upon in the two papers. *Al-Ḥayāt al-jadīda*'s main focus is on the decisions taken by the President as a reaction to the Ḥamās takeover. These decisions are in the text presented as actions which are undertaken by President ‘Abbās as the sole agent, creating an impression of a strong leader who has the power and will to act when needed. Since he was appointed Prime Minister for the first time in 2000, ‘Abbās has been accused by different elements in the Palestinian society of being a weak leader and of being a puppet of Israel and the West (cf. 1.1). Faced with the challenge from Ḥamās and Prime Minister Haniyya, it is therefore seemingly important for Fataḥ to negate this image and to build consensus for him as a legitimate leader of the Palestinian people, and *al-Ḥayāt al-jadīda* contributes to this by making his decisions the main focus of its coverage.

The focus on the President's reaction to the latest developments also moves the attention to a certain extent away from the seizure of the security headquarters in the Gaza Strip by Ḥamās and its affiliated groups, which represented a devastating blow to Fataḥ's authority in the area. This aspect could not be ignored in the report, however, and while *al-Ḥayāt al-jadīda* previously has used transformations to conceal responsibility for violent aspects of the conflict, it here presents these events as actions under the control of Ḥamās. Fataḥ fighters on their part are at the same time mentioned as only being affected participants in this part of the report, with some indications that Ḥamās fighters committed violations against them (cf. (123)). This representation contributes to creating an impression of Ḥamās as the aggressive part responsible for the dramatic situation that has occurred, and at the same time it legitimises the decisions taken by President ‘Abbās by portraying them as a necessary reaction to this aggression.

*Filasṭīn* on its part chooses to put main focus on the seizure of the security headquarters in its coverage. In contrast to the representation in *al-Ḥayāt al-jadīda*, however, it presents this aspect of the events not as a dramatic change in the situation which might have negative

consequences, but rather as a natural consolidation of Ḥamās' power in the Gaza Strip. The active role of the movement is also toned down as *Filasṭīn*, instead of including statements from witnesses saying that Ḥamās fighters evicted members of the security apparatus, states that the latter voluntarily surrendered and fled (cf. (134)), leaving it open for Ḥamās to move in and take control. Fataḥ is thereby given its share of responsibility for the developments. As a consequence of this, the decisions taken by President ‘Abbās are in *Filasṭīn* not presented as a strong and necessary reaction to actions undertaken by Ḥamās. Instead, statements from Ḥamās in which is claimed that these decisions came as a consequence of external pressure are included, something which challenges not only their validity, but also the legitimacy of the President.

The lexical choices in the texts also support the impression that the two newspapers contribute to building consensus in line with their political affiliations, and interestingly this is mainly done by including a vocabulary that links the opposite part to negative, delegitimising values. In its coverage of the 11 June 2007 fighting, *al-Ḥayāt al-jadīda* did not include any statements with a vocabulary that linked any specific groups to negative, delegitimising values. This time, however, the statements by the Presidential General Secretary ‘Abd al-Raḥīm, which are given considerable space in its report, denotes the actions undertaken by Ḥamās by using a lexicon which links the movement to such values:

Lexicon	Values
الحرب الاجرامية 'the criminal war' (124)	Illegality, violence
الانقلاب العسكري 'the military coup' (125)	Illegality, chaos
العصيان المسلح 'the armed revolt' (126)	Violence, chaos, illegality
انتهاك واضح للقانون الاساسي 'clear violation of the Basic Law' (128)	Illegality

The aim of ‘Abd al-Raḥīm is here apparently to undermine the authority of Ḥamās by linking it to *illegality*, *chaos* and *violence*. By indicating that the movement took control of the Gaza Strip through an illegal and violent military coup he not only delegitimises the rule of Prime Minister Haniyya, but also gives legitimacy to President ‘Abbās and his decision to dissolve the current government and form a new government under Fataḥ leadership. The statements by the Presidential General Secretary are also included in *Filasṭīn*'s report, and the linkage of Ḥamās to negative, delegitimising values are thus present also in this newspaper. The impression of Ḥamās' actions as illegal and violent are, however, modified by the lexicon used

in *Filasṭīn*'s own report on the events which describes it as an undramatic consolidation of power (cf. examples (143)-(145)).

In addition, *Filasṭīn*'s report also includes several statements by Ḥamās and its affiliated groups concerning the decisions made by the President, in which these decisions are depicted by a lexicon that presents them as illegitimate and that links the President to negative, delegitimising values:

Lexicon	Values
متخبطة 'erratic' (155)	Weakness, chaos
متناقضة 'contradicting' (156)	Chaos, weakness
انفعالية 'emotional' (157)	Weakness, irresponsibility
لا علاقة لها بال دستور 'they have no connection to the constitution' (158)	Illegality, corruption

The representation of President ‘Abbās as a strong leader is here challenged by Ḥamās as he is linked to *weakness*, *chaos* and *irresponsibility*. As already mentioned, it has been common for his opponents to portray him as weak and as being under the control of foreign powers. The statements by Ḥamās support this image, which clearly undermines his authority and subsequently the authority of Fataḥ and the new government. At the same time, the actions undertaken by Ḥamās in the Gaza Strip can be seen as a necessary response to the weakness and irresponsibility of the President, and this representation therefore also indirectly gives legitimacy to the authority of Ḥamās and Prime Minister Haniyya.

Interestingly, *Filasṭīn* in its report also includes statements by the parliamentary group of Ḥamās, the Change and Reform Block, which includes a vocabulary that refers to national unity and joint efforts, linking the movement to positive, legitimising values:

Lexicon	Values
المصلحة العليا للشعب الفلسطيني 'the best interest of the Palestinian people' (160)	Responsibility, honesty
تدعيم حكومة الوحدة الوطنية 'support the national unity government' (161)	Responsibility, peacefulness, order
تدعيم القوة المشتركة 'support the joint force' (162)	Responsibility, peacefulness, order

Through these statements, Ḥamās apparently aims at contradicting the impression that it is responsible for the crisis in the national unity project by insisting that it stills support the national unity government and the joint force, and that it represents *responsibility*, *peacefulness* and *order*. The inclusion of these statements, however, does not change the impression that the most important aspect in the two papers' representations is to build consensus for the respective parties according to their political affiliations.

## 4. Conclusion

The aim of this thesis has been to show how ideological meaning is expressed in seemingly neutral newspaper reports on three significant events in the intra-Palestinian power struggle between Fataḥ and Ḥamās in May and June 2007. Based on the theoretical and methodological framework of discourse analysis, following especially the analytical framework developed by Norman Fairclough under the umbrella of critical discourse analysis, I have analysed and compared the main stories from the Fataḥ-affiliated newspaper *al-Ḥayāt al-jadīda* and the Ḥamās-affiliated newspaper *Filasṭīn* covering these three events. According to Fairclough (cf. 2.5), a combination of textual and social analysis is necessary in order to get the full picture of communicative events such as newspaper reports, and in the first part of the thesis I therefore give an overview of the historical and sociocultural context in which the two newspapers operate, before moving on to the textual analysis which make up the main part of the thesis.

In the analysis, I have chosen to examine especially the choices of the two newspapers concerning the linguistic features of transitivity and lexicon, which according to Roger Fowler (cf. 2.5) are particularly inclined to carry ideological meaning in a text. My findings support this view. Different choices regarding transitivity have a major impact on how the two papers represent different aspects of the events, and by referring to the wider political and sociocultural context surrounding the reports, I found that these representations clearly reflect the political affiliations of the two newspapers. The interests of the respective parties are conveyed in the way in which the two papers present certain aspects of the events as processes which are neither deliberate nor controlled, and other aspects as actions which are under the control of specified agents. As these interests change according to developments in the political and social conditions, the choices concerning transitivity in the reports also change, resulting in a move from a relatively conform representation in the coverage of the mid-May fighting to more diversified and conflict-orientated representations of the two other events. The reports of the mid-May fighting are situated within what I have called a national unity



discourse. Both papers use transformations such as passives and nominalisations in order to conceal responsibility for violence in their reports on these events, while positive efforts to resolve the conflict are presented as actions under the control of both parties and the government. In this way, the representations are in line with the interests of both Fataḥ and Ḥamās to communicate the message that the unity government and the Mecca agreement were still strong.

As the conflict intensifies on the ground, however, the choices in transitivity change and lead to more conflict-oriented representations which are seemingly aimed at building consensus for one or the other party, in accordance with the respective political affiliations of the two newspapers. The papers build consensus for “their” party both by presenting it as the sole agent behind positive efforts to resolve the conflict, and by presenting violent aspects of the conflict as actions under the control of the other party. In the reports on the fighting on 11 June, *al-Ḥayāt al-jadīda* follows mainly the former strategy by focusing on Fataḥ's active role in the efforts undertaken to end the conflict, while *Filasṭīn* on its part focuses on Fataḥ as the agents responsible for violence. I claim that the strategy of *Filasṭīn* here is more conflict-orientated than that of *al-Ḥayāt al-jadīda*, which apparently aims at staying more in line with the national unity discourse, reflecting the fact that Fataḥ at this point had a stronger interest in upholding the impression that the unity project was still valid. In its report on the events of 14 June 2007, which showed that the Mecca agreement would not survive and that a split was unavoidable, *al-Ḥayāt al-jadīda*, however, takes a further step away from the national unity discourse and also gives a more conflict-orientated representation clearly aimed at building consensus for Fataḥ.

In addition to choices regarding transitivity, the analysis shows that lexical choices also play an important role in conveying ideological meaning in the newspaper reports. In chapter 2.4, I listed a set of so-called consensus values which I expected that the lexical choices of the two newspapers would refer to in order to help build consensus for the respective parties in the conflict. The findings confirm this hypothesis as both papers use vocabulary in their reports that on one hand links the party affiliated to the respective party to positive delegitimising values, and on the other hand links the other party to negative, delegitimising values.

The events of 14 June 2007 led to a split in the Palestinian territories that has remained in place until today. The findings of this study show that the two newspapers reflect the increased conflict-level that took place in May and June 2007 by engaging in a gradually more conflict-orientated discourse in their representations, clearly displayed in the choices made regarding transitivity and lexicon.

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## **B. Internet sources**

Newspaper archives:

***Filasṭīn:***

URL: <http://www.felesteen.ps/>

***Al-Ḥayāt al-jadīda:***

URL: <http://www.alhayat-j.com/newsite/index.php>

References to other internet sites are given in footnotes throughout the text.

## **Appendix**

### **Texts A-F**



# الفتنة تصحو : ٥ قتلى وعشرات الجرحى والمختطفين في غزة

حماس وفتح تتفان بواسطة مصرية على انهاء الاقتتال وسحب المسلحين والافراج عن المحتجزين

قائد من شهداء الأقصى ومرافقه وصحفي من جريدة فلسطين بين ضحايا الأحداث المؤسفة



«ا.ف.ب»

صورة للرئيس الراحل عرفات تظهر عبر نافذة سيارة ابو جراد التي اخترقها الرصاص ما أدى الى وفاته.

١ غزة - الحياة الجديدة - وكالات - أكدت مصادر الطبية الليلة الماضية ارتفاع حصيلة ضحايا الاشتباكات الداخلية المؤسفة في قطاع غزة إلى خمسة قتلى وأكثر من عشرين جريحا في حوادث إطلاق نار في مناطق متفرقة من قطاع غزة، ومن بين ضحايا الاشتباكات بهاء ابو جراد (٣٢ عاما) احد قادة كتائب شهداء الأقصى ومرافقه توفيق البودي (٢٧ عاما) والزميل الصحفي سليمان العشي (٢٥ عاما) وهو يعمل في صحيفة «فلسطين». وادت اجواء التوتر هذه الى عمليات خطف متبادلة بين حركتي فتح وحماس شملت عشرات الاشخاص. وقالت حماس ان «سبعين شخصا» من انصارها تعرضوا للخطف في حين اعلنت فتح ان «العشرات» من انصارها تعرضوا للخطف ايضا. واتفقت فتح وحماس في وقت متأخر من الليلة الماضية بعد اجتماع ضم أعضاء من الحركتين برعاية الوفد الأمني المصري في مقر اقامته بغزة، على الوقف الفوري للاقتتال وسحب مظاهر التسليح والافراج عن المختطفين ابتداء من فجر اليوم. التتمة ص ١٥

كما تم الاتفاق على تفعيل المكتب المشترك وقيامه بمراقبة ومتابعة تنفيذ الاتفاق على الارض، ونص الاتفاق على تحويل المتهمين في الأحداث المؤسفة الى النيابة العامة واتخاذ الاجراءات القانونية بحقهم ورفع الغطاء التنظيمي عنهم.

وكان جرى اتصال هاتفي مساء امس بين الرئيس محمود عباس ورئيس الوزراء اسماعيل هنية بحثا خلاله الأحداث المؤسفة وشددا على وجوب احتوائها والحفاظ على اتفاق مكة. وقال شهود عيان في وقت متأخر من الليلة الماضية ان عددا كبيرا من المثلثين ينتشرون في شوارع قطاع غزة بكثافة وتسمع بين الحين والآخر زخات من الرصاص والانفجارات ناجمة عن اشتباكات بين عناصر محسوبة على حركة فتح وعناصر اخرى محسوبة على حركة حماس.

ويعتبر هذا الحادث الأول من نوعه بعد اتفاق مكة وتشكيل حكومة الوحدة الوطنية وتبني الحكومة للخطة الأمنية التي أعدها وزير الداخلية بهدف ضبط حالة الفلتان الأمني. وعلن امس ان هنية اتفق مع وزير الداخلية هاني القواسمي، الذي علق استقالته من منصبه، على البدء في «الخطوات الإجرائية» لتطبيق الخطة الأمنية، في نزع فتيل التوتر على ما يبدو.

وأفاد شهود عيان ان منطقة غرب غزة شهدت اطلاقا كثيفا للنيران وان اشتباكات دارت هناك وصفت بالعنفية وسادت حالة من التوتر الشديد بالقرب من المربع الرئاسي و محيط الجامعات في مدينة غزة. وفي حادث آخر أصيب ثلاثة مواطنين خلال تشييع جنازة القيادي في كتائب الأقصى بهاء ابو جراد في مدينة بيت لاهيا.

وكانت فتح وحماس تبادلتا الاتهامات في اعقاب مقتل قائد كتائب الأقصى ابو جراد ورفيقه ، ففي حين تتهم فتح عناصر حماس باغتيال ابو جراد نفت حماس اية علاقة لها بالحادثة . وحملت حركة فتح على لسان ناطقها عبد الحكيم عوض حركة حماس المسؤولية الكاملة عن عملية الاغتيال التي وصفتها بانها تستهدف الوحدة الوطنية واتفاق مكة.

واعتبر عوض «عملية الاغتيال تجاوزا خطيرا لاتفاق مكة، لان أبو جراد قيادي بارز بفتح وتعرض لأكثر من محاولة اغتيال من قبل حماس حيث تعرض منزله للقصف بقذائف الـ (آر. بي. جي) وعمليات إطلاق نار متكررة».



- من جهتها اعربت حماس «عن قلقها واستغرابها الشديد لوتيرة الأحداث المتسارعة في بيت لاهيا 50 شمال القطاع، والتي أعقبت حادثة مقتل بهاء أبو جراد في بيت لاهيا، وقيام عناصر من حركة فتح بعمليات اختطاف وإطلاق نار واستهداف لمنازل اعضائها .
- واكدت حماس التزامها بالاتفاق الموقع مع حركة فتح، وعدم الرد والتصعيد الإعلامي ورفضها الاتهامات المتسارعة مؤكدة أن لا علاقة للحركة في قتل أبو جراد. ودعت حماس وزارة الداخلية إلى ممارسة دورها المطلوب في التحقيق في أحداث الشمال وفقاً للقانون.
- 55 وكان الطبيب معاوية حسنين مدير عام الطوارئ والإسعاف اعلن بعد ظهر امس وفاة جراد القائد المحلي في كتائب شهداء الأقصى ببيت لاهيا، ومرافقه البودي اثر اصابتها باطلاق نار استهدف سيارتهما اثناء عودة ابو جراد الى منزله في البلدة.
- واندلعت اشتباكات إثر ذلك واعلنت مصادر طبية مقتل مواطنين في مدينة غزة قرب مقر الرئاسة. واصيب تسعة اشخاص آخرين في هذه الاشتباكات، ادهم في حالة خطيرة. واتهم الناطق باسم 60 حركة فتح توفيق ابو خوصة «عناصر مسلحة محسوبة على حركة حماس باغتيال ابو جراد من خلال اطلاق قذيفة اربي جي على سيارته». واكد الناطق في تصريح لفرانس برس «لقد فتحوا النار بكثافة على سيارته عندما كان عائدا الى منزله».
- ولكن المتحدث باسم حركة حماس ايمن طه قال لوكالة فرانس برس «نحن نستغرب الموقف المتسرع من حركة فتح بتوجيه الاتهام الى حماس بمقتل ابو جراد وكنا نأمل من الاخوة في فتح توخي الدقة 65 والثاني قبل القاء التهم جزافا في هذا الموضوع».
- واكد طه ان «لا علاقة لحركة حماس لا من قريب ولا من بعيد في حادث ابو جراد ومن الواضح ان هناك فئة لا تريد لحالة الوفاق والاتفاق ان تستقر وان تستمر في الشارع الفلسطيني فهي تسعى الى عودة الامور الى ما كانت عليه من اقتتال وتناحر لتحقيق اجندتها الخاصة».
- كما حملت كتائب شهداء الأقصى في بيان «المسؤولية الكاملة لما يسمى بالقسام والقوة» التنفيذية 70 مسؤولية اغتيال الاخ القائد بهاء ابو جراد واحد مرافقيه»، في اشارة الى كتائب عز الدين القسام الجناح العسكري لحماس، والقوة التنفيذية التي شكلها وزير الداخلية السابق سعيد صيام من حركة حماس، وتضم بمعظمها عناصر من كتائب القسام.
- وقالت كتائب الأقصى «نمنح الجميع مدة ٢٤ ساعة لاتخاذ الاجراءات المناسبة لملاحقة المجرمين والذين ارتكبوا هذه الجريمة».
- 75 وبدورها اصدرت كتائب القسام بيانا نفت فيه علاقتها بعملية الاغتيال، مؤكدة «انها تستهجن وتستنكر محاولات الزج باسمها وباسماء قيادات من القسام في قضية مقتل بهاء ابو جراد، وتؤكد ان هذه الاتهامات التي تكال جزافا وتصدر الى وسائل الاعلام والى الشارع الفلسطيني هي محاولة لتوتير الساحة عن طريق كيل التهم الجاهزة وتلفيق معلومات لا اساس لها من الصحة».
- وادت اجواء التوتر هذه الى عمليات خطف متبادلة بين حركتي فتح وحماس شملت عشرات الاشخاص. وقالت حماس ان «سبعين شخصا» من انصارها تعرضوا للخطف في قطاع غزة في حين 80 اعلنت فتح ان «العشرات» من انصارها تعرضوا للخطف ايضا. واعلن مصدر في حماس انه تم الافراج عن القيادي في الحركة علي الشريف في غزة مساء امس بعد خطفه لبضع ساعات على ايدي مسلحين مجهولين.
- وعلم ان بين القتلى نتيجة احداث الامس الزميل الصحفي سليمان العشي (٢٥ عاما) الذي يعمل في 85 صحيفة «فلسطين». واعلن رئيس تحرير الصحيفة مصطفى الصواف ان «مسلحين ملثمين في محيط مقر الرئيس في غزة اوقفوا سيارة كان بداخلها الصحفي العشي مع موظف آخر في الصحيفة يدعى محمد عبود واطلقوا عليهما النار ما ادى الى مقتل الاول واصابة الثاني بجروح خطيرة».
- ودعت صحيفة فلسطين الرئيس عباس ورئيس الوزراء ووزير الداخلية للتحقيق في حادثة مقتل العشي الذي يعد صفحة الشؤون الاقتصادية فيها، وتقديم المجرمين للعدالة. كما دعت الصحيفة في بيان وصلت نسخة منه الى «الحياة الجديدة» كل المؤسسات الصحفية والإعلامية إلى إدانة الجريمة 90 التي ارتكبت على أيدي مجموعة وصفتهم بـ«المجرمين القتل والذين خرجوا من مكان يفترض انه مطالب بتوفير الأمن لا ممارسة القتل» على حد تعبير البيان.
- كما ناشدت الصحيفة كل الصحفيين والإعلاميين والعاملين في المؤسسات الإعلامية المشاركة في تشييع جثمان الزميل الصحفي سليمان العشي، والاعتصام عقب التشييع في باحة المجلس التشريعي 95 للتعبير عن استنكار الجريمة البشعة.



ولم يسهم اعلان غازي حمد الناطق باسم رئيس الوزراء ان هنية اتفق مع وزير الداخلية على البدء في «الخطوات الاجرائية» لتطبيق الخطة الامنية، في نزع فتيل التوتر على ما يبدو. من جهة ثانية، اعلنت وزارة الداخلية ان القواسمي علق استقالته من منصبه التي قدمها احتجاجا على تداخل صلاحيات القادة الامنيين وعدم توفر التمويل للخطة الامنية التي تنص خصوصا على تشكيل قوة الامن الداخلي المركزية.

105 ويفترض ان تشكل قوة الامن الداخلي المركزية من الشرطة والدفاع المدني وكذلك من جهاز الامن الوقائي الذي ينتمي غالبية عناصره لحركة فتح، ومن القوة التنفيذية ومعظم اعضائها من كتائب القسام، الجناح العسكري لحماس. واكد حمد انه «سيعقد (اليوم) الاثنان على الاغلب اجتماع لغرفة العمليات المشتركة للاجهزة الامنية بهدف وضع الآليات اللازمة لتنفيذ الخطة الامنية التي اقترتها الحكومة قبل ثلاثة اسابيع».

من جهة ثانية، افادت وزارة الداخلية في بيان صحفي «ان وزير الداخلية هاني القواسمي اعلن عن تعليقه لاستقالته من حكومة الوحدة الوطنية والعودة الى ممارسة مهام عمله». و اضاف البيان ان «قرار الوزير يأتي ادراكا لخطورة هذه المرحلة وتعقيداتهما واحساسا بالمسؤولية الوطنية وسعيا وراء رفع المعاناة عن الشعب الفلسطيني».

110 واكدت الداخلية «ان القواسمي سيعمل على تنفيذ الاتفاق المبرم بين الرئيس محمود عباس ورئيس الوزراء اسماعيل هنية بكل جوانبه والبدء باعداد وتجهيز القوة المشتركة المنوط بها تنفيذ الخطة الخاصة بمواجهة الانفلات الامني». وناشد اللواء برهان جمال حماد رئيس الوفد الامني المصري المتواجد بالاراضي الفلسطينية حركتي فتح وحماس امس ضرورة ضبط النفس وحقق دماء الشعب الفلسطيني مشددا على أن سفك دماء أبناء الشعب هو خط أحمر يجب أن لا يقترب منه أي فصيل فلسطيني. وأعرب اللواء برهان عن أسفه وألمه لتجدد الاشتباكات بين الاشقاء بحركتي فتح وحماس والذي أسفر عن سقوط عدد من الضحايا بين قتيل وجريح في مناطق متفرقة من قطاع غزة، معربا عن قلق مصر والرئيس حسني مبارك ازاء هذه الاشتباكات وأمله في ضرورة وقفها فورا والحفاظ على الوحدة والتكاتف بين جميع أبناء الشعب الفلسطيني.

وأكد اللواء برهان في بيان «على ضرورة مراعاة مصالح الشعب الفلسطيني العليا والذود عن الثوابت الفلسطينية والتي تأتي في مقدمتها حرمة الاقتتال الداخلي بين أبناء الشعب الواحد الذي يعاني من حصار دولي منذ أكثر من عام».

وشدد رئيس الوفد المصري على ضرورة حماية حكومة الوحدة الوطنية والعمل على استمرارها «لأنها نتاج عملية ديمقراطية فريدة عكست رقي الشعب الفلسطيني في ممارسة حقوقه السياسية»، مؤكداً على أهمية التمسك والالتزام بكل ما تم الاتفاق عليه في مكة المكرمة وما سبقه من اتفاقات حرمت الاقتتال الداخلي ووضعت نهاية له.

125 وأشار اللواء برهان حماد الى أن الخلافات الداخلية بين أبناء الشعب الفلسطيني وفصائله تضخ في صالح أعدائه وتؤثر سلبا على القضية الفلسطينية العادلة وعلى حاضر ومستقبل هذا الشعب المناضل. ودعا رئيس الوفد المصري حركتي فتح وحماس وأبناء الشعب الفلسطيني الى ضرورة رفع الغطاء الفصائلي والعائلي عن كل من يثبت تورطه في عمليات القتل والاغتيالات وسفك الدماء التي وقعت مؤخرا وكان آخرها ما وقع اليوم من أحداث مؤسفة أسفرت عن ازهاق أرواح فلسطينية زكية واصابة عدد آخر بجروح.

ودعت حركة الجهاد الإسلامي على لسان وليد حلس أحد ناطقيها الرسميين عصر امس، كلا من حركتي فتح وحماس إلى ضرورة ضبط النفس لتفويت الفرصة التي ينتظرها أعداء الشعب الفلسطيني. وطالب حلس بؤاد الفتنة في مهدها وعدم توسيع دائرة الاشتباكات المؤسفة وحصرها بإظهار مواقف التعقل والحكمة من الطرفين.

135 وقال حلس «هذه الاشتباكات المؤسفة التي أودت بحياة خمسة مواطنين حتى هذه اللحظة نعتبرها شرارة يمكنها أن توقد نار الفتنة التي أطفاها المخلصون والعقلاء من شعبنا، ولذا



على الجميع أن يتحلى بالمسؤولية لضبط الأمور وتفويت فرص الفتنة والاقتتال». وطالب حلس أبناء الشعب الفلسطيني بالوقوف صفاً واحداً في مواجهة التهديدات الاسرائيلية المستمرة والتي كان آخرها ما صدر اليوم من تهديد ووعيد باستخدام القوة وتكثيف الاغتيالات والتصفيات ضد رجال المقاومة.

وأدان أبو أحمد الأمين العام لكتائب الشهيد سامي الغول جريمة الاغتيال التي تعرض القائد في كتائب الاقصى بهاء الدين ابو جراد ومرافقه. وقال في بيان «ان منفذي هذه العملية الإجرامية ليسوا من المجاهدين ولا من المقاومين بل هم حثالة من المتواطئين مع الاحتلال وكل ما يسعون إليه هو الاقتتال الداخلي ومعركة داخلية لمساعدة العدو في تفكيك شعبنا المرابط».

وطالب أبو أحمد القوى الوطنية الفلسطينية بالتصدي للفلتان الأمني وطالب وزير الداخلية بتقديم استقالته لعجزه للتصدي لهذا الفلتان وملاحقة ما وصفهم بـ«العملاء» وكشفهم ليلقوا عقابهم الذي يستحقونه. ودعا ابو احمد رئيس الوزراء لتقديم استقالته واستقالة الحكومة لعجزها عن توفير الامن لابناء الشعب الفلسطيني ولقمة العيش لكافة فئاته، داعيا الرئيس محمود عباس الى العمل الجاد لتوفير الحماية لابناء شعبنا وضبط الفلتان الأمني.



## يوم دام في غزة

## مقتل خمسة مواطنين وإصابة 15 آخرين برصاص عناصر مسلحة

غزة / محمد الدلوو (الوكالة الفرنسية) :

١ | قتل أمس، خمسة مواطنين من بينهم الصحفي في صحيفة "فلسطين" اليومية سليمان العشي "23 عاما" وأصيب خمسة عشرة آخرون بجراح مختلفة في مناطق متفرقة من قطاع غزة، إثر تجديد الاشتباكات المسلحة وعمليات الخطف المتبادل بين حركتي "فتح" و "حماس" في وقت كثفت فيه جهات مختلفة اتصالاتها من أجل نزع فتيل الأزمة ووقف الأحداث المؤسفة التي تدور رحاها في غزة قبيل بدء تطبيق الخطة الأمنية.

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٤٥ للمدينة، حيث اختطف المسلحون على تلك الحواجز ما يزيد على (٧٠) موطناً، غالبيتهم من طلبة الجامعات والمواطنين.

ومن أبرز المختطفين الذين تم الإفراج عنهم د.علي الشريف، المحاضر بالجامعة الإسلامية بغزة الذي تعرض منزله لاعتداء، وتم خطفه وإهانته من عناصر تابعة لحركة فتح حسب ما ذكرت "حماس" في بيان لها.

وأوضح د.جمعة السقا، مدير العلاقات العامة في مستشفى الشفاء أن ثلاثة مواطنين قتلوا، وخمسة عشرة آخرين أصيبوا بجراح، ثلاثة منهم وصفت جراحهم بالخطيرة، إثر إطلاق النار عليهم بشكل مباشر.

أما في المنطقة الوسطى وسط قطاع غزة، فأصيب ثلاثة من موظفي شركة توزيع الكهرباء، برصاص مجهولين أثناء مرورهم بسيارة تابعة للشركة على شارع صلاح الدين، ومن بين المصابين مدير الشركة محمد أبو عامر، والفني بالشركة فايق برم والسكرتيرة سناء عفانة، وفي منطقة خزاعة في مدينة خان يونس لجأ قيادي من حركة حماس من محاولة اغتيال.

وأغلق المسلحون والمثمنون الطرقات المؤدية لمندى الرئاسة، وأجبروا المركبات على سلوك طريق أخرى، كما أغلقوا الطرق المؤدية إلى منطقة السرايا، ونشروا أكثر من أربعة حواجز في المنطقة المحيطة، كما أقاموا حاجزا على طريق صلاح الدين، وحاجزا آخر على طريق "أبو جراد" جنوب القطاع.

١١٥ وخيم التوتر على قطاع غزة حتى ساعات المساء، حيث دوت أصوات انفجارات وأصوات الرصاص في عدد من مناطق وأحياء مدينة غزة، التي أصبحت فارغة من المارة إلا ١١٥ المسلحين والمثمنين .

قبل إلقاء التهم جزافاً.

٤٥ وأضاف: "حركة حماس توجه الاتهام لبعض الجهات التي تسعى لتأجيج الوضع من جديد، ولا يروق لها أن تستمر حالة الوفاق في الشارع الفلسطيني، مشيراً بأصابع الاتهام لفئة خارجة عن الصف الوطني تريد عودة الأمور إلى ما كانت عليه من الاقتتال لتنفيذ أجندة خاصة.

واعتبر طه أن ذكر أسماء أعضاء من كتائب القسام واتهامهم بالقتل يعد دعوة صريحة لاستهدافهم، محذراً من مغبة الوقوع فيه.

٥٥ وبخصوص انتشار المسلحين في الشوارع ونصب الحواجز، قال طه: "نشر قوات الأمن والمسلحين دون استكمال الإجراءات تسرع من الأجهزة الأمنية، سيؤدي لتأزم الأوضاع ويعيدها للمربع الأول". وزاد أن حركة فتح تريد أن توصل رسالة مفادها أنها لا تريد أن يكون هناك شراكة في تنفيذ الخطة الأمنية.

وأكدت حماس على التزامها بالاتفاق الموقع مع حركة فتح بعدم الرد والتصعيد الإعلامي، مؤكدة عدم إجراؤها إلى محاولات مشبوهة تستهدف تفجير الساحة الفلسطينية الداخلية، وتسميم أجواء الوفاق والوحدة الوطنية والسلم الأهلي الفلسطيني.

كما رفضت حماس الاتهامات المتسارعة التي ساقها بيان فتح بعد ساعة من الحدث، محذرة من الزج باسم الحركة في الحادث.

٦٥ وأدانت الحركة جريمة إعدام المواطن توفيق البودي (سلمان)، والذي لا يعمل مرافقا لـ(أبو جراد) -كما ذكر بيان حركة فتح- بإطلاق النار عليه بدم بارد أمام مرأى جمع من المواطنين من قبل عناصر مسلحة ومعروفة للجميع بعد مقتل بهاء أبو جراد.

حواجز .. وخطف

وشهد قطاع غزة انتشارا مكثفا للمسلحين، وإقامة عشرات الحواجز وإغلاق الطرق الرئيسية

وقال وزير الإعلام د.مصطفى البرغوثي، في تصريح له: "إن حصيلة الاشتباكات بين حركتي ١٥ فتح وحماس في غزة أمس بلغت خمسة قتلى و١٤ جرحاً".

ووقعت الاشتباكات بعد ساعات من مقتل بهاء أبو جراد (٣٢ عاما) أحد كوادر كتائب شهداء الأقصى شمال قطاع غزة إثر إصابته بشظايا قذيفة صاروخية أطلقها مسلحون مجهولون على السيارة التي كان يستقلها، واتهمت حركة "فتح" حركة "حماس" باغتياله، فيما قتل توفيق البودي (٢٧ عاما) برصاص مسلحين.

و تبادلت حركتا فتح و حماس الاتهامات بخصوص المسؤولية عن جدد الاشتباكات وعمليات الخطف وتوتر الساحة الداخلية. وحملت حركة "فتح" حركة "حماس" في بيان لها "كامل المسؤولية عن مقتل أبو جراد"، وقالت: "منح الجميع مدة ٤٨ ساعة لاتخاذ الإجراءات المناسبة للملاحقة الجرمين والذين ارتكبوا هذه الجريمة".

بدورها أصدرت كتائب عز الدين القسام، التابعة لحركة "حماس" بيانا نفت فيه علاقتها بعملية الاغتيال، واعتبرت اتهامات فتح محاولة للإذكاء للتوتر وتقويض أجواء الهدوء والاتفاق لتحقيق مآرب شخصية وأجندة خارجية".

وكانت عائلة البودي اتهمت في بيان صحفي أصدرته آل أبو جراد بقتل ابنهم، وقالوا: "لدينا اسم القاتل، و كافة التفاصيل والحيثيات الخاصة بارتكاب الجريمة النكراء"، مهددة بالرد على مقتل ابنهم.

٣٥ حماس تستغرب ومن جهتها أكدت حركة حماس على لسان مثلها في المكتب المشترك أمين طه، أن حركته ليس لا علاقة لا من قريب أو بعيد بمقتل أبو جراد، وقال في حديث لـ "فلسطين": "نستغرب موقف حركة فتح توجيه أصابع الاتهام لحركة حماس (..) كننا نأمل أن تتوخى فتح الدقة والحذر

٤٥ ومثلها في المكتب المشترك أمين طه، أن حركته ليس لا علاقة لا من قريب أو بعيد بمقتل أبو جراد، وقال في حديث لـ "فلسطين": "نستغرب موقف حركة فتح توجيه أصابع الاتهام لحركة حماس (..) كننا نأمل أن تتوخى فتح الدقة والحذر

والتشريعي يناشد الجميع بضرورة وقفها

## عباس و هنية يبحثان تطويق الأحداث المؤسفة بغزة

غزة/”فلسطين“:  
١ جرى مساء أمس اتصال هاتفي بين  
الرئيس محمود عباس ورئيس الوزراء  
إسماعيل هنية، لبحث الأحداث  
المؤسفة في غزة والعمل على ١٥ كما جرى اتصالان هاتفيان مع وزير  
الخارجية السعودي الأمير « 23  
تطويقها بأقصى سرعة.

سعود الفيصل، ورئيس الوفد الأمني المصري  
المقيم في غزة الوكيل برهان حماد، حيث أكد  
الجميع على وجوب وقف النزيف وحقق الدماء.  
١٥ والاحتكام إلى لغة الحوار وتغليب المصلحة  
الوطنية الفلسطينية العليا.  
كما وجه المجلس التشريعي مساء أمس،  
نداءً عاجلاً إلى كافة الأخوة في الفصائل  
والقوى الفلسطينية وخاصة حركتي ”فتح“  
٢٥ و”حماس“، ورجال الإصلاح والخير في كل مكان  
للتدخل العاجل والمساواة لوقف أعمال العنف  
والتخريب التي تقع في قطاع غزة، وتعريه  
القتلة ومنع تدهور الأحداث.  
وعبر المجلس في نداء عاجل عن شجبه  
٢٥ واستنكاره لكافة أحداث القتل والتدمير  
والتخريب والخطف التي وقعت أمس، واعتبرها  
وصمة عار، وتعد على قيم الشعب وعاداته  
وتقاليده وانتهاكاً لحرمة المواطنين، وتوجه  
بالدعوة لوسائل الإعلام الفلسطينية للعمل  
٣٥ بروح وطنية، وعدم توتير الساحة الفلسطينية،  
وخرى الدقة في نشر المعلومات والأخبار.

## قبل منتصف ليلة أمس

# فتح وحماس تتفقان على وقف إطلاق النار وسحب المسلحين من الشوارع

غزة/فلسطين: اتفق وفدان قياديان يمثلان حركتي فتح وحماس، على وقف فوري لإطلاق النار وسحب كافة المسلحين من الشوارع. جاء هذا خلال اجتماع عقده الوفدان، في ساعة متأخرة من مساء أمس، ١٥ الاتفاق: حرصا على المصلحة الوطنية لحفظا على وقف نزيف الدم الفلسطيني اجتمع وفدان من قيادتي حركة حماس وفتح برعاية الوفد الأمني المصري، واتفقا على 23

١٥ الوقف الفوري للاقتتال، وسحب كل مظاهر الاقتتال ورفع الحواجز ونزول المسلحين من على الأبراج وإنهاء كل مظاهر العنف . واتفق الوفدان أيضا على الإفراج الفوري عن 2٢ النيابة العامة للتحقيق معهم واتخاذ كافة الاحتطافين من الطرفين وكل ما تم احتجازه 2٢ من ملكيات عامة وخاصة (أسلحة وعتاد). واتفقت حركتنا فتح وحماس أيضا على ان يقوم المكتب المشترك بمتابعة الإشراف على تثبيت وقف الاقتتال وإعادة الحال على ما كان عليه . كما واتفقا على تحويل كافة المتهمين الي النيابة العامة للتحقيق معهم واتخاذ الإجراءات القانونية حيال من تثبت إدانته على أن يتم رفع أي غطاء تنظيمي عن المتهمين ٢٣ مثل حركة فتح ماجد أبو شمالة وعبد الحكيم حرصا على المصلحة العامة. عوض وتوفيق أبو خوصة.

وحسب الاتفاق تلتزم الحركتان بالعمل على تنفيذ الاتفاق اعتبارا من الساعة الثانية عشرة والنصف من فجر اليوم. وقد مثل حركة حماس في الاجتماع الذي تم تحت رعاية وحضور رئيس الوفد الأمني المصري، اللواء برهان حماد، خليل نوفل، وأمين طه بينما عوض وتوفيق أبو خوصة.



# عناصر أمنية تعمد بدم بارد المحرر بصحيفة فلسطين سليمان العشي

غزة/فلسطين: أقدمت عناصر أمنية على ارتكاب جريمة إعدام المحرر بصحيفة فلسطين سليمان عبد الرحيم العشي، بدم بارد، وإطلاق النار باتجاه الموظف الإداري، محمد عبدو، ما أدى إلى إصابته بجروح خطيرة. وقد استشهد الزميل العشي، بعد أن قامت عناصر أمنية تابعة لحرس الرئاسة باختطافه وزميله عبدو، صباح أمس حينما كانا مستقلين

لسيارة أجرة، قرب منزل الرئيس محمود عباس. وكان الزميلان العشي وعبدو في طريقهما لزيارة بعض المؤسسات الأهلية والرسمية، من أجل نسج العلاقات بينها وبين الصحيفة، ودعوتها لارسال أخبار أنشطتها وإعلاناتها للصحيفة. ويقول سائق سيارة الاجرة، التي كان الزميلان العشي وعبدو يستقلانها، انه كان يسير قبالة منزل الرئيس

عباس، وبالقرب من فندق (روتس) بالقرب من شاطئ بحر غزة، حينما أوقفه حاجز عسكري، وطلب من الزميلين النزول. وأضاف: وجه لي أحد المسلحين بعض الشتائم، وقام بشتم الذات الالهية، قبل ان يطلب مني الرحيل بسرعة مهددا إياي بالقتل. وعقب علم ادارة الصحيفة نبأ اختطاف الزميلين، قامت باجراء الكثير من الاتصالات مع مختلف الجهات، في

محاولة لإطلاق سراحهما، دون جدوي. وقد فوجئت الصحيفة مساء أمس باتصال هاتفى يخبرها بأن الزميل عبدو مصاب بجروح خطيرة في مشفى دار الشفاء، بعد إصابته بعدة طلقات نارية في قدميه، وبأن هناك جثة مجهولة الهوية ترقد في ثلاجة الموتى بالمشفى، قبل ان يتبين أن الجثة تعود للزميل

٤٥ سليمان العشي. وقد أفاد شهود عيان أن العناصر الامنية، كانت تحتجز الزميلين العشي وعبدو وشخص ثالث، بالقرب من (دوار الـ ١٧) وأنها أطلقت النار باتجاههم، ما أدى إلى إصابتهم بجراح خطيرة، وتركتهم ينزفون.



## ١٩ قتيلا بينهم قائد فتحاوي وشقيقه وأب ونجلاه وعشرات الجرحى في غزة

\* الاشتباكات تفض جلسة الحكومة وتمتد الى داخل المستشفيات والصحة ونقابة الأطباء تناشدان لاجراء المرافق الصحية من دائرة الاقتتال \* فتح تقترح وقفاً فورياً لاطلاق النار وحماس تدرس العرض وحماد يدعو الحركتين للاجتماع اليوم ويهدد بالاجواء للشارع

- ١ غزة- وكالات - قتل ١٩ مواطنا وأصيب العشرات بجروح امس في 30 حلبة دموية جديدة من مسلسل الاقتتال الدائر في قطاع غزة بين 5 حركتي فتح وحماس. فيما دعا رئيس الوفد الأمني المصري اللواء برهان حماد الحركتين الى الاجتماع الساعة الواحدة ظهراً اليوم الثلاثاء في مقر الوفد لوقف مظاهر التسلح 10 والاشتباكات المستمرة بين الحركتين.
- وهدد اللواء برهان حماد بالنزول الى شوارع غزة على رأس تظاهرات فلسطينية لوقف حالة التدهور الذي يشهده القطاع. بدورها اقترحت 15 حركة فتح وقفاً فورياً لاطلاق النار في حين قالت حماس انها تدرس مدى جدية هذا العرض. وقال توفيق ابو خوصة الناطق باسم فتح في 20 مؤتمر صحفي في غزة ان فتح «تطرح مبادرة لوقف فوري اطلاق النار.. ونحن مستعدون ان نتحمل المسؤولية ولدينا الجرأة للمبادرة بوقف اطلاق النار من جانب واحد». 25 و اضاف «كفى سفكا للدماء»، موضحا «دعوتنا الى الاخوة في حماس ان يتحملوا مسؤولياتهم ووقف اطلاق النار». وشدد ابو
- خوصة على التزام حركته باتفاق مكة المكرمة الذي «ينص على انهاء المظاهر المسلحة». من جانبه قال فوزي برهوم المتحدث باسم حركة حماس ان حركته «تدرس مدى جدية» هذا الاقتراح. و اضاف ان 35 حماس تعمل من اجل انهاء التوتر. وامتد القتال امس الى داخل المستشفيات، التتمة ص ١٥



ومحيط مقر مجلس الوزراء اثناء عقد الجلسة الرسمية للحكومة ما استدعى تعليق الجلسة ومغادرة رئيس الوزراء اسماعيل هنية المقر. وأطلقت اعيرة نارية على وزارة الرياضة والشباب في غزة في الوقت الذي كان الوزير باسم نعيم داخل المبنى.

وأعلنت مصادر طبية في ساعة متأخرة من الليلة الماضية مقتل ثلاث مواطنات وصلن إلى مجمع الشفاء الطبي في مدينة غزة. وذكر الطبيب معاوية حسنين، مدير عام الإسعاف والطوارئ في وزارة الصحة أن المواطنات هن: المسنة راية أحمد مُحسن (٧٥ عاماً)، وسارة حسن مُحسن (١٥ عاماً) ودلال مُحسن (١٩ عاماً). وقضين في قصف بالقذائف لمنزل المواطن حسن اربيع في منطقة النصر غرب مدينة غزة. وافاد مصدر طبي ان الشاب موسى ابو زينة قتل بالرصاص قرب مستشفى الشفاء في مدينة غزة. وافاد حسنين عن مقتل طفل لم تعرف هويته. وأكد شهود ان اشتباكات عنيفة وقعت في مخيم الشاطئ وفي منطقة شمال قطاع غزة.

وأعلنت مصادر طبية في وقت سابق من امس مقتل أمين سر اقليم فتح شمال غزة وقائد كتائب الاقصى جمال ابو الجديان وشقيقه وإصابة ستين آخرين بجروح في الاشتباكات المسلحة التي دارت في محيط منزله بين عناصر من حماس وفتح. وافادت ذات المصادر ان ابو الجديان وشقيقه وصلا المستشفى وفي جسديهما عشرات الطلقات النارية.

فيما جرت عمليات اختطاف متبادلة بين الجانبين اسفرت عن مقتل محمد نعيم الدحدوح (٢١ عاماً) من حماس بعد نصف ساعة من اختطافه. وكانت اشتباكات عنيفة اندلعت امس بين انصار فتح وحماس في محيط وداخل المستشفيات في قطاع غزة ما ادى الى وقوع العديد من القتلى والجرحى. وقالت مصادر ان اربعة مواطنين بينهم أب واثنان من ابنائه قتلوا خلال الاشتباكات داخل مشفى بيت حانون وهم: المواطن عيد المصري واثنان من ابنائه هما فرج وابراهيم عيد المصري. فيما لم تعرف هوية الثالث. واعلن مشفى بيت حانون الحكومي عن توقف العمل في اقسامه بسبب الاقتتال العنيف في محيطه.

وقال شهود عيان ان قتالا عنيفا اندلع بين مقاتلين من فتح وحماس ما ادى الى سقوط ضحايا والى احتراق مولد الكهرباء داخل المشفى الامر الذي يهدد حياة المرضى.

وفي محيط مشفى الشفاء اندلعت اشتباكات عنيفة اسفرت عن مقتل اثنين احدهما قائد ميداني في كتائب القسام.

وقالت كتائب القسام في بيان لها ان عناصر من حركة فتح اعدمت احد قادتها الميدانيين مازن عجور في مخيم الشاطئ غربى مدينة غزة. اما في بيت لاهيا فقد قتل احد عناصر التنفيذية « محمد محجز جراء الاشتباكات العنيفة في محيط منزل قائد كتائب الاقصى جمال ابو الجديان .

وناشدت نقابة اطباء فلسطين الرئيس محمود عباس التدخل واخراج المسلحين من داخل المشافي في القطاع الامر الذي بات يهدد حياة المرضى . وناشدت وزارة الصحة في بيان لها امس الفصائل والقوى الوطنية والاسلامية ابعاد كافة المرافق وكذلك الصحية من مستشفيات ومراكز عن أي مظاهر للاقتتال والاعتداء والتخريب والتدمير.

وقالت مصادر ان من بين القتلى باسل داود الكفارنة (٢٥ عاماً) من افراد



## 80 القوة التنفيذية التابعة لوزارة الداخلية.

وفي وقت سابق اكدت مصادر طبية فلسطينية وصول جثمان الشاب ياسر غصوب بكر من افراد المخابرات الفلسطينية الى مشفى الشفاء وهو مصاب بعدة طلقات في البطن خرجت من ظهره، وجثمان صدام محمد بكر (١٨ عاماً) فيما لم تعرف هوية قتيل ثالث.

85 واطلق مسلحون بعد ظهر امس النار على مبنى مجلس الوزراء في غزة ما تسبب في وقوع اضرار مادية وفض الاجتماع . واستنكرت الحكومة عملية اطلاق النار، وقال بيان للحكومة «ان هذه الأعمال الاجرامية تدل على نية البعض استمرار حالة الفوضى و الانفلات الامني و خلق حالة من عدم الاستقرار في الشارع الفلسطيني وتؤكد الحكومة انها ستلاحق هؤلاء الفعلة و تقدمهم للعدالة جزاء ما اقترفوه من مخالفات خطيرة».

90 وافاد مصدر في رئاسة الوزراء ان رئيس الوزراء غادر بعد ظهر امس مكتبه وتم رفع جلسة الحكومة الاسبوعية المنعقدة بعد تعرض المقر لاطلاق نار غرب مدينة غزة. وقال المصدر ان هنية «غادر مقر رئاسة الوزراء مع جميع الوزراء الذين يشاركون في جلسة الحكومة بعد تعرض المقر لاطلاق نار من قبل مسلحين يتمركزن فوق برج سكني قريب من المقر» الواقع قرب مخيم الشاطيء في غرب غزة. و اضاف ان جلسة الحكومة «رفعت بسبب اطلاق النار».

واكد المصدر ان هنية «يتابع الاحداث المؤسفة من اجل احتواء الموقف واعادة الوضع الى هدوئه وطبيعته».

100 وقال نائب رئيس الوزراء عزام الاحمد أن الاجتماع الرسمي لم يكتمل بسبب إطلاق النار مرتين في منطقة مجلس الوزراء والمنازل المحيطة نافياً في ذات الوقت أن يكون مقر مجلس الوزراء استهدف بإطلاق النار مباشرة. وأكد الأحمد في مؤتمر صحفي عقب فض الاجتماع أن إطلاق النار الكثيف إضطرنا لإلغاء الاجتماع وعدم استكمال جدول الأعمال علماً أن قضية التهدة الداخلية وترسيخ وقف الاقتتال الداخلي كانت النقطة الأولى على جدول الأعمال.

105 واتهم الأحمد عناصر لم يسمحوا بأنها لا تريد وضع حد لحالة الاقتتال وتريد خلق الظروف التي من شأنها توجيه ضربة قاسمة للاتفاقات التي وقعت بما فيها اتفاق مكة. وأضاف « لا أخفي أن هناك رغبة وإرادة حقيقية لوضع حد للحالة التي تهدد النسيج الاجتماعي الفلسطيني ووحدة الصف الفلسطيني».

110 الفلسطيني.



## عشرة قتلى وعشرين جريحاً حصيلة الاثنى عشر الدامي في غزة

غزة/ فلسطين: "حماس"، فيما تعطلت جلسة لحكومة كانت

أ قتل تسعة مواطنين وإصابة أكثر من عشرين آخرين أمس في الاشتباكات الدموية المؤسفة التي شهدت تصعيداً خطيراً بعد ظهر ١٥ انعقاد الجلسة .

٥ عناصر من الأجهزة الأمنية الموالية لحركة فتح ومسلحين من حركة المقاومة الإسلامية وقالت المصادر الطبية في مستشفى بيت حانون ان المواطن باسل الكفارنة ٢٥ عاماً وهو أحد أفراد القوة التنفيذية التابعة 23

لوزارة الداخلية، قتل بعد أن استهدفته مجموعة مسلحة تتبع حركة فتح شمال قطاع غزة.

وأشارت المصادر ذاتها إلى مقتل المواطن عيد المصري واثنين من أبنائه هما فرج وإبراهيم عيد المصري برصاص مسلحين اقتحموا مستشفى بيت حانون الذي قرر التوقف عن العمل بسبب تصاعد حدة الاشتباكات . 20

وأفاد شهود عيان أن مسلحين يتبعون لحركة فتح قاموا بإطلاق النار على منزل أحد قادة القسام بمشروع بيت لاهيا، دون أن يبلغ عن وقوع إصابات. 25

كما قتل محمد محجز من كتائب القسام في الاشتباكات التي دارت مساء أمس بالقرب من منزل أبو ماهر أبو الجديان القيادي في حركة فتح.

30 وفي مدينة غزة، أعلنت مصادر طبية في مستشفى الشفاء عن مقتل ياسر بكر من سكان مخيم الشاطئ غربي المدينة، من أفراد جهاز المخابرات العامة، ومقتل صدام بكر في اشتباكات مسلحة.

35 وقال شهود عيان في مخيم الشاطئ: "أن عدداً من مسلحي عائلة بكر المحسوبين على حركة فتح قاموا بإطلاق النار على منزل عائلة عجور في الخيم، مما أدى إلى استشهاد المواطن مازن عجور أحد قادة القوة التنفيذية، وقاموا 40 بإشعال النار في منجرة لهم".



كما وأقدم المسلحون على اقتحام المنزل.  
واختطاف الدكتور طارق عجور، الشقيق  
الاصغر لمازن.

وتواصلت عمليات الخطف وإطلاق النار ونصب  
45 الحواجز واعتلاء الأبراج السكنية وكان التوتر  
سيد الموقف في غزة التي خلت شوارعها من  
المارة الا من بعض المسلحين الملتزمين المدججين  
بكل أنواع الأسلحة.

التنفيذية تعلن الاستنفار  
50 إلى ذلك، أعلنت القوة التنفيذية التابعة  
لوزارة الداخلية، حالة الاستنفار العام في  
صفوفها، واستدعاء جميع عناصرها للعمل  
من أجل حماية المواطنين، مؤكدة أنها "لن تقف  
مكتوفة الأيدي وستدافع بكل قوة عن أبناء  
55 شعبنا وستلاحق كل من يعتدي أو يحرص على  
القوة التنفيذية مهما كلف ذلك، ولن تسكت  
بعد الآن".

وأكدت القوة التنفيذية أنها جزء من المؤسسة  
الأمنية تعمل وفق القانون وتضبطها لوائح  
60 المؤسسة الأمنية، معبرة عن رفضها لـ  
سياسة التمييز والكيل بمكيالين، داعية  
إلى توجيه أصابع الاتهام والمسؤولية إلى  
الفئات الحقيقية التي تثير الفتن وتجرح الشارع  
الفلسطيني إلى الاقتتال الداخلي.

وقالت في بيان وصل صحيفة "فلسطين"  
65 نسخة منه، أمس: القوة التنفيذية تدعو إلى  
حماية أبناء شعبنا من انقلابي حركة فتح  
الذين ينفذون مخططات العدو الصهيوني  
ضد أبناء شعبنا، ولن نقف مكتوفي الأيدي،  
70 وسندافع بكل قوة عن أبناء شعبنا من هذه  
الفئة المتآمرة مع العدو الصهيوني.

وأشارت القوة التنفيذية إلى حملة "التحريض  
والدعاية السوداء" التي مورست ضدها منذ  
بداية عملها في الساحة الفلسطينية،  
75 ومضت تقول: "لم تقف الأمور عند التحريض  
والتشكيك بل تعدتها إلى الاستهداف المباشر  
والمتمعد وافتعال الأزمات والمشاكل في محاولة



مكشوفة من أجل جر القوة التنفيذية  
لإشكاليات خرفها عن القيام بدورها الذي  
تشكلت وتأسست من أجله، والمتعلق بحماية 80  
شعبنا وتحقيق الأمن الداخلي بعد حالة  
الفوضى والتسيب التي كانت سائدة في ظل  
التراخي الذي كانت تتعامل به بعض الأجهزة  
الأمنية".

وأكدت أنها مارست أعلى درجات الانضباط 85  
والمسؤولية انطلاقاً من إيمانها العميق بأن  
"صراعنا ليس مع أبناء شعبنا بل مع عدونا  
الغاصب". وأشارت أيضاً إلى دور من أسمتهم  
"الخونة والانقلابين المحسوبين على حركة فتح"  
في استهداف أبناء القوة التنفيذية، لاسيما 90  
جريمة إطلاق النار على موقع القوة في بيت  
حانون، مما أدى إلى ارتقاء عدد من الشهداء  
وبعض الإصابات إضافة إلى خطف عدد كبير  
من أبناء القوة في جميع مناطق قطاع غزة  
وإعدامهم بدم بارد. 95

اتفاق جاد

وفي وقت متأخر من مساء أمس، أعلنت حركة  
"فتح" استعدادها لاتفاق جاد ومُلزم وحقيقي  
لوقف الاقتتال الداخلي في قطاع غزة، وقال 100  
توفيق أبو خوصة المتحدث الرسمي باسم  
الحركة في مؤتمر صحفي بمدينة غزة: "إننا لم  
نعد نحتمل أن نتفق صباحاً وأن يُنقض هذا  
الاتفاق مساءً".

وأضاف، أن "فتح" على استعداد لإعلان اتفاق 105  
وقف إطلاق النار من جانب واحد، والعمل مع  
الجميع ومع الوفد الأمني المصري وحركة الجهاد  
الإسلامي وكافة الفصائل لتثبيت هذا الموقف.  
ودعا حركة "حماس" إلى وقفة جادة ومسؤولة  
من أجل طي هذه الصفحة السوداء في تاريخ  
شعبنا. 110



وكانت حركة المقاومة الإسلامية " حماس " تعهدت بالقصاص ممن وصفتهم بالـ "فئة الباغية"، التي أقدمت على إعدام الإمام الشيخ محمد الرفاتي والمواطن حسام أبو قينص قائلة: "هذا عهد قطعناه لا رجعة فيه، وهي نقطة الفصل ولا لوم علينا كيف سنعالج ما يترتب عليها، لأنها تجاوزت كل الخطوط الحمراء".

وقالت حماس في بيان وصل فلسطين نسخة عنه: "إنها ليست في صراع مع حركة فتح، وليس بيننا وبينها أي شيء للتنازع عليه"، مطالبة حركة فتح بالإعلان عن موقفها بوضوح تام من القنلة، وأن ترفع عنهم الغطاء التنظيمي، حتى لا يحول المأجورون ما يحدث على أنه صراع بين فتح وحماس حول سلطة أو تقاسم كعكة".

ودعت حماس الوفد الأمني المصري أن يكشف الحقيقة أمام الناس، وأن يكشف عورة الفئة التي تريد أن تجر الشارع الفلسطيني إلى حمام دم، كما طالبت القوى الوطنية والإسلامية ولجنة المتابعة أن تأخذ دورها بالكامل، وأن تنحاز إلى الحق، وأن لا تقف عند الشجب والاستنكار.



# الرئيس يقيل الحكومة ويعلن فرض حالة الطوارئ في الضفة وغزة

## حماس تسيطر على المقار الأمنية بما فيها منتدى الرئاسة ومقتل ٢٧ مواطناً بالقطاع

١ رام الله- غزة - الحياة الجديدة - وكالات - أعلن الطيب عبد الرحيم الأمين العام للرئاسة مساء امس ان الرئيس محمود عباس قرر اقالة الحكومة الحالية برئاسة اسماعيل هنية وفرض حالة الطوارئ اثر التطورات الامنية الاخيرة في قطاع غزة. جاء ذلك بعد تدهور الأوضاع في قطاع غزة واستيلاء مقاتلي حركة حماس على جميع المقار الأمنية بما فيها مقر الرئاسة. وذلك في اليوم السادس للاقتتال بين ٥ حركتي فتح وحماس وقد سقط امس ٢٧ قتيلا وعشرات الجرحى ما رفع حصيلة الضحايا الى أكثر من مئة قتيل.

وقال عبد الرحيم ان الرئيس عباس اصدر مرسوما «باقالة رئيس الوزراء اسماعيل هنية وعلى الجهات المختصة كافة تنفيذ هذا المرسوم». و اضاف ان عباس اصدر مرسوما ثانيا اعلن فيه «حالة الطوارئ في جميع اراضي السلطة الوطنية الفلسطينية بسبب الحرب الاجرامية في قطاع غزة والاستيلاء على مقار الامن والانقلاب العسكري والعصيان المسلح من الجهات الخارجة عن السلطات والقانون».

١٥ و اضاف ان الرئيس اصدر مرسوما ثالثا يقضي بتشكيل «حكومة انفاذ حالة الطوارئ»، كما اعلن ان عباس «سيعمل على العودة الى الشعب من خلال انتخابات عامة عندما تسمح الظروف بذلك». وقال عبد الرحيم ان عباس امر بـ«تشكيل الحكومة المكلفة بتنفيذ انظمة وتعليمات حالة الطوارئ تزاوُل مهامها بعد تأدية اليمين امام عباس». ولم يعلن عبد الرحيم تشكيلة هذه الحكومة. ووصف عبد الرحيم التطورات في غزة بانها «محاولة انقلابية عسكرية ضد الشرعية الفلسطينية وفي انتهاك واضح للقانون الاساسي» الذي هو بمثابة دستور. ٢٥ واكد ان الاقتتال ترك «آثارا مدمرة على النضال والحقوق الوطنية الفلسطينية» في الوقت الذي «تستمر اسرائيل في ضرب شعبنا».

واعتبر المتحدث باسم حركة حماس سامي ابو زهري مساء امس ان قرار الرئيس عباس باقالة الحكومة واعلان حالة التتمة ص ١٩ تفاصيل في الصفحات الداخلية



25 الالطوارىء وتشكيل حكومة انتقالية «مرفوض وليس له ادنى قيمة عملية». و اضاف ان «قرار حل الحكومة و اعلان حالة الطوارىء مرفوض وهو يؤكد ان الرئاسة و حركة فتح غير معنيتين بتطويق الاحداث».

واضاف ابو زهري «هذا القرار ليس له ادنى قيمة عملية لأنه بموجب القانون تتحول الحكومة الحالية الى حكومة تصريف اعمال كما انه لا يوجد في القانون اي شيء اسمه حالة الطوارىء».

30 وجاءت هذه القرارات عقب اقتتال داخلي عنيف بين حركتي حماس وفتح يتواصل منذ اسبوع قتل فيه ١٠٧ اشخاص على الأقل. و اعلن ابو عبيدة الناطق باسم كتائب عز الدين القسام ان كتائب القسام سيطرت مساء امس على جميع المقار الامنية للسلطة الوطنية الفلسطينية في قطاع غزة بما فيها منتدى الرئاسة (مقر الرئيس).

واوضح ابو عبيدة لوكالة فرانس برس «ان كتائب القسام قد سيطرت على جميع المقار الامنية في قطاع غزة بما فيها منتدى الرئاسة الفلسطينية». وكان استولى مقاتلو حماس امس على مجمع القوى الأمنية و أعلن مسؤولوها «تحرير» قطاع غزة. ورفرت الاعلام الخضراء لحركة حماس فوق سطح مقر جهاز الامن الوقائي في مدينة غزة.

وقالت مصادر طبية ان ٢٤ شخصا على الاقل قتلوا في غزة من بينهم ١٨ من رجال فتح عشر عليهم في مقر قوة الامن الوقائي. ورفع مسلحون رايات اسلامية خضراء فوق مباني فتح وذكوا مجمع الرئاسة في غزة بنيران المدفعية الثقيلة.

واكدت كتائب القسام الذراع العسكرية لحماس في بيان ان مقاتليها باتوا يسيطرون على جميع مقار الاجهزة الامنية في رفح، القريبة من الحدود مع مصر. وذكر شهود عيان ان مسلحين دخلوا الى حي تل الهوا في مدينة غزة ورفعوا علم حماس الاخضر على سطح مبنى مقر الامن الوقائي بعد معركة استمرت ساعات اسفرت عن مقتل ١٤ شخصا على الاقل.

45 وقام مسلحون مقنعون من حماس باخراج عشرات من مقاتلي فتح، جرد بعضهم من ملابسه، من المبنى وقد رفعوا ايديهم في الهواء، حسب الشهود. وقال سامي ابو زهري المتحدث باسم حماس ان ما يجري في غزة هو «تحرير ثان» للقطاع من «قطعان العملاء» بعد تحريره اولا من «قطعان المستوطنين»، على حد تعبيره



# القسام يحكم قبضته على قطاع غزة

غزة / وكالات / فلسطين:

١ سيطر مقاتلو حركة المقاومة الإسلامية (حماس) أمس على أبرز المقرات الأمنية في غزة، باسطين سيطرتهم على كافة القطاع، بعد استسلام وهروب أفراد وقادة الأجهزة الأمنية الفلسطيني. وأصبحت مقرات الأمن الوقائي الفلسطيني والمخابرات وأمن الرئاسة والأمن الوطني، في محافظات قطاع غزة بأيدي مقاتلي حماس. وقال سامي ابو زهري المتحدث باسم حماس للصحفيين، ان ما يجري في غزة هو "تحرير ثان" للقطاع من "قطاع العملاء" بعد تحريره اولا من "قطاع المستوطنين". وأضاف أبو زهري "نحن كنا مضطرين لهذه الخطوة بعد ان فشلت كل الوساطات لوقف الجرائم من هذه الفئة".

١٥ وحذرت الولايات المتحدة، حليفة اسرائيل، من ان الاقتتال الداخلي يهدد احتمال اقامة دولة فلسطينية فيما ذكرت روسيا ان التصعيد يهدد "بالفوضى الشاملة (...). وانتشار العنف في المنطقة". ومن ناحيته رأى الأمين العام للأمم المتحدة بان كي مون وجوب البحث في فكرة تدخل قوة دولية في قطاع غزة. الا ان حماس رفضت الفكرة وقالت انها ستعامل اية قوات اجنبية على انها قوات محتلة.



## الرئيس عباس يقرر حل الحكومة وإعلان حالة الطوارئ

- ١ رام الله / فلسطين: أعلن الطيب عبد الرحيم الامين العام للرئاسة الفلسطينية مساء أمس ان الرئيس محمود عباس قرر إقالة الحكومة الحالية برئاسة اسماعيل هنية وفرض حالة الطوارئ اثر التطورات الامنية الاخيرة في قطاع غزة.
- ٥ وقال عبد الرحيم من رام الله ان عباس اصدر مرسوما "باقالة رئيس الوزراء اسماعيل هنية وعلى الجهات المختصة كافة تنفيذ هذا المرسوم".
- واضاف عبد الرحيم ان عباس اصدر مرسوما ثانيا اعلن فيه "حالة الطوارئ في جميع اراضي السلطة الوطنية الفلسطينية بسبب الحرب الاجرامية في قطاع غزة، والاستيلاء على مقار الامن والانقلاب العسكري والعصيان المسلح من الجهات الخارجة عن السلطات والقانون".
- ١٥ واضاف ان الرئيس الفلسطيني اصدر مرسوما ثالثا يقضي بتشكيل "حكومة إنفاذ حالة الطوارئ"، كما اعلن ان عباس "سيعمل على العودة الى الشعب من خلال انتخابات عامة عندما تسمح الظروف بذلك".
- وقال عبد الرحيم ان عباس امر بـ "تشكيل الحكومة المكلفة بتنفيذ أنظمة وتعليمات حالة الطوارئ تزاوّل مهامها بعد تأدية اليمين امام عباس".
- ١٥ وقد بسطت حماس الخميس سيطرتها على قطاع غزة بعد ان استولت على المقار الامنية التابعة لفتح في القطاع.
- ووصف عبد الرحيم التطورات في غزة بأنها "محاولة انقلابية عسكرية ضد الشرعية الفلسطينية وانتهاك واضح للقانون الاساسي" الذي هو بمثابة دستور. واكد ان الاقتتال ترك "آثارا مدمرة على النضال والحقوق الوطنية الفلسطينية" في الوقت الذي "تستمر (اسرائيل) في ضرب شعبنا".
- ٢٥



## جاءت استجابة لضغوط خارجية

# حماس تعتبر ان قرارات عباس "مرفوضة ولا قيمة عملية لها"

غزة /محمد ياسين/وكالات: ١٥ كما انه لا يوجد في القانون اي شيء

١ اعتبر المتحدث باسم حركة حماس الدكتور سامي أبو زهري مساء أمس ان قرار الرئيس محمود عباس باقالة الحكومة وعلان حالة الطوارئ وتشكيل حكومة انتقالية "مرفوض وليس له ادنى قيمة عملية".

واضاف في تصريحات صحفية "قرار حل الحكومة وعلان حالة الطوارئ مرفوض وهو يؤكد ان الرئاسة وحركة

١٥ فتح غير معنيين بتطويق الاحداث".

واضاف أبو زهري "هذا القرار ليس له ادنى قيمة عملية لانه بموجب القانون تتحول الحكومة الحالية (في حال الاقالة) الى حكومة تصريف اعمال

اسمه حالة الطوارئ". وكشف أن اتصالات جرت بين حركة حماس والرئيس عباس، برعاية سعودية، خلال اليومين الاخيرين، الا ان القرارات الاخيرة فاجأت حماس، الامر الذي يدل على ان الرئيس استجاب لضغوط خارجية.

وقال أبو زهري: "أول أمس قدمت الحركة مبادرة للوفد المصري، والذي قدمها بدوره للرئيس عباس، حيث وافق عليها، وكلف القيادي في فتح أحمد حلس، بالتفاوض معنا بخصوصها".

وأضاف "أمس جرت اتصالات سعودية معنا ومع الرئيس عباس. 23



30 وكلف الرئيس عباس حلس بالجلوس معنا مجدداً، واثناء اجتماعنا معه مساء أمس فوجئنا بقرارات الرئيس. الأمر الذي يؤكد أن الرئيس خضع لضغوط خارجية".

35 من جانبه أبدى وزير الحكم المحلي في الحكومة المقالة، محمد البرغوثي استغرابه من مراسيم الرئيس، مؤكداً أنها ستتعدّد الأمور. حيث قال لقناة الجزيرة القطرية: "ماذا بعد هذه المراسيم، نريد توافق يمكن أن يعيدنا لحالة التوافق، لكن إعلان الطوارئ وإقالة الحكومة بهذا الاستعجال 40 سيزيد تعقيد الأمور، لأنه سيكون لها مردود سلبي.

مراسيم متخبطة من جانبه وصف الدكتور صلاح البردويل الناطق باسم كتلة التغيير والإصلاح مثلة 45 حركة حماس في المجلس التشريعي، مراسيم الرئيس محمود عباس بإقالة حكومة الوحدة الوطنية وإعلان حالة الطوارئ بأنها "متخبطة 70 ومتناقضة وانفعالية"، مؤكداً أن هذه المراسيم الرئاسية "لا علاقة لها بالدستور ولا بالمصلحة العامة". 50

وقال في تصريحات خاصة لصحيفة "فلسطين"، أمس: من حق الرئيس أن يعلن حالة

الطوارئ لمدة شهر ثم يعرض هذا الوضع على المجلس التشريعي فإذا مدد المجلس التشريعي حكومة الطوارئ بعد ذلك جاز لها (الاستمرار)، وإذا لم يمدد تلغى حالة الطوارئ".

وكان الرئيس محمود عباس، قد أصدر مراسيم رئاسية قضت بإقالة إسماعيل هنية، رئيس الوزراء، وإعلان حالة الطوارئ في جميع أراضي السلطة الوطنية الفلسطينية، وتشكيل حكومة إنقاذ حالة الطوارئ. وقد تلا المراسيم الثلاثة الطيب عبد الرحيم، أمين عام الرئاسة في مؤتمر صحفي عقده في مقر الرئاسة في رام الله. وقال إنه تقرر دعوة المجلس المركزي للانعقاد، في أقرب فرصة ممكنة، حتى يضطلع بمسؤولياته الوطنية، والحفاظ على الشرعية الفلسطينية.

وتابع د. البردويل قائلاً: في حال أعلن الرئيس حالة الطوارئ يتم إسناد تنفيذها للحكومة الموجودة، فكيف يستقيم إعلان حل الحكومة وإقالتها مع حالة الطوارئ؟! "متسائلاً: هل سيسارع الرئيس بحكومة من بلد أخرى لكي 95 تنفذ حالة الطوارئ؟!".

وعقب على مرسوم تشكيل حكومة مكلفة بتنفيذ حالة الطوارئ قائلاً: تشكيل حكومة

ليست لعبة، تشكيل الحكومة يمر عبر الأدوات القانونية، وهذه الأدوات القانونية تعني أن الحكومة الحالية تظل حكومة تسيير أعمال". نافياً أن يكون في مواد الدستور ما يسمى بـ "حكومة طوارئ". 80

وقال الناطق باسم كتلة حماس البرلمانية: نعتقد أن هذه القرارات قرارات انفعالية ومتخبطة ولا علاقة لها بالدستور ولا بالمصلحة العامة". موضحاً أن المطلوب هو حركة حماس من أجل صياغة الأجهزة الأمنية صياغة سليمة.

وأضاف "يجب أن يجلس القادة الحقيقيون لحركة فتح مع حركة حماس بعيداً عن ضغوط مجموعات الانقلابيين وأن يعيدوا صياغة 90 الأجهزة الأمنية صياغة وطنية بعيداً عن الحزبية، وأن يغلبوا المصلحة العليا للشعب الفلسطيني على المصالح الفئوية والحزبية".

وقال: نحن مع تدعيم حكومة الوحدة الوطنية ومع تدعيم وزارة الداخلية ومع تدعيم القوة المشتركة التي ستحفظ الأمن". مضيفاً أن "هذه فرصة كبيرة لحركة فتح ولحركة حماس".